diff --git a/blueprint/api.md b/blueprint/api.md
index 01e056f10..3a0e7c59a 100644
--- a/blueprint/api.md
+++ b/blueprint/api.md
@@ -37,7 +37,19 @@ What left the API relative to v1 — with the design that removed it:
 ## Identity and auth
 
 - Account = the Web3Auth-derived secp256k1 **identity key**; challenge-signature
-  login; SIWE wallet login stays as a secondary auth method (feature-set decision FSM1/cipher-box-next#5).
+  login. **CipherBox issues the identity token the Core Kit consumes** (FSM1/cipher-box-next#5 as
+  amended by [ADR 0008](https://github.com/FSM1/cipher-box-next/blob/main/decisions/0008-cipherbox-issues-the-identity-token.md)): each verified method mints a CipherBox JWT, and the Core Kit
+  logs in against a CipherBox custom verifier over the API's own JWKS. The account
+  model is unchanged by this — the Core Kit yields the same key whichever provider
+  vouched.
+- **Method set**: Google, passwordless email, and wallet. Passwordless email is
+  CipherBox's own — the API issues and verifies the code and owns its delivery.
+  Wallet is a **first-class first login on web only**: a SIWE signature the API
+  verifies mints the same JWT as any other method, so it reaches the same derived
+  key. It is absent on desktop because that webview reaches no wallet, which is a
+  platform property rather than a deferred feature (ADR 0008).
+- Google's OAuth client ID is the **provider's**, distinct from the Web3Auth project
+  client ID. The two are not interchangeable.
 - Short-lived access JWT + rotating refresh token (HTTP-only cookie on web,
   OS keychain on desktop). Staging-gated test-login endpoint for e2e.
 - Tables: `users` (keyed by `publicKey`; carries quota-limit override and BYO flag),
diff --git a/blueprint/desktop.md b/blueprint/desktop.md
index 8cd962641..de36b8139 100644
--- a/blueprint/desktop.md
+++ b/blueprint/desktop.md
@@ -250,6 +250,18 @@ navigation (FSM1/cipher-box-next#33 D2):
   the shell's only credential duty is hosting the keychain seam. Dev-key mode
   survives: a debug flag feeds the staging test-login path through the same
   facade, keychain bypassed — the headless agent/e2e seam.
+- **The orchestration is the web client's** ([ADR 0008](https://github.com/FSM1/cipher-box-next/blob/main/decisions/0008-cipherbox-issues-the-identity-token.md) D3): the shell imports the
+  same host-agnostic login package and supplies its own credential collector. It
+  does **not** take `packages/client` — the worker, leadership and Service Worker
+  machinery has no place here.
+- **Google collection is native, not in-webview.** Google Identity Services does
+  not run in this webview, and the manual OAuth2 flow it falls back to needs a
+  `redirect_uri` a packaged Tauri origin cannot satisfy — `tauri://localhost` is
+  refused as a non-`http(s)` scheme. The shell therefore serves the callback from
+  a loopback listener on a pre-registered port. This is the one login step that
+  is genuinely native (ADR 0008).
+- **No wallet method here.** The webview reaches no wallet, so the method is
+  absent rather than offered and unable to complete (ADR 0008 D2).
 - **Tray** renders the event stream: the staleness ladder maps to
   `Synced / Reconciling / Stale / Offline`, dead-letters to the parked-writes
   state (edge-triggered notifications, v1's anti-spam watermark kept), trust
diff --git a/blueprint/web-client.md b/blueprint/web-client.md
index d3878ed11..6450aae32 100644
--- a/blueprint/web-client.md
+++ b/blueprint/web-client.md
@@ -197,8 +197,18 @@ all living in `packages/client` and running inside the engine worker realm:
   entry.
 - **The engine owns the token lifecycle** (FSM1/cipher-box-next#28 D5): challenge-signature login
   through its API client; access JWT in engine memory; refresh cookie rides
-  the Http seam. SIWE stays secondary — wagmi collects the wallet signature
-  on the UI thread and the facade forwards it (engine.md).
+  the Http seam. This is a distinct authentication from unlocking the Core Kit,
+  and only the latter involves an identity provider ([ADR 0008](https://github.com/FSM1/cipher-box-next/blob/main/decisions/0008-cipherbox-issues-the-identity-token.md)).
+- **The login orchestration is shared, the credential collection is not**
+  (ADR 0008 D3). One host-agnostic package sequences provider credential → API
+  exchange → Core Kit login → secret export → `start(secret)`; both hosts import
+  it and inject their own collector. On web that collector is the Google popup
+  and wagmi; desktop's is its own (desktop.md). The boundary is credential
+  collection, not the bearer token — v1 drew it at the token and the two hosts
+  drifted.
+- **Wallet is a first login here** (ADR 0008 D2): wagmi collects the signature on
+  the UI thread, the API verifies it and mints the identity token, and the Core
+  Kit login proceeds as for any other method. Web only.
 - **Cold start**: facade `start(secret)` → vault-pointer resolve, floor
   cold-seed, root adoption (the engine's non-circular cold-start sequence) →
   first snapshot event. The UI shows exactly two cold-start states: an