diff --git a/docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.md b/docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.md
index 19bd966..582402e 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/C1-repair-job-authority.md
@@ -262,13 +262,80 @@ turns a human decision into a record of this shape does not exist yet, and
 building it is an explicit later decision rather than an implementation detail of
 whichever layer needs it first.
 
-`operatorMergeAuthorizes` enforces every required property: operator-originated,
-repository-bound, pull-request-bound, exact-HEAD-SHA-bound, structurally
-single-use, invalid the moment HEAD changes, and incapable of authorizing another
-pull request or a future SHA.
+`operatorMergeAuthorizes` checks **binding, and only binding**. The distinction
+between what C1 proves and what a later layer must enforce is stated exactly,
+because overclaiming here would be worse than not checking.
+
+**Proved by a `true` result.** The candidate record carries the required
+structural fields as readable identifiers; its `singleUse` is literally `true`;
+and its `repositoryId`, `pullRequestId`, and `headSha` are exactly equal to the
+corresponding fields of the **supplied** `MergeTarget` — including
+`MergeTarget.currentHeadSha`. Every comparison is exact string equality, so a
+candidate can never cover a target naming another pull request, another
+repository, or a different SHA, and there is no path that widens, refreshes, or
+re-binds it.
+
+`MergeTarget` is caller-supplied input. `operatorMergeAuthorizes` performs no
+repository read, no GitHub API call, no adapter call, and no network access, so
+**the binding guarantee is only ever as fresh and as authoritative as the target
+handed to it.** C1 compares against a value; it does not observe a repository.
+
+**Not proved, and not claimed.**
+
+| Property | C1 |
+| --- | --- |
+| target SHA is authoritative | **not proved** — `MergeTarget.currentHeadSha` is an input; C1 cannot distinguish a live HEAD from a stale or invented one |
+| target SHA is fresh | **not proved** — C1 cannot know whether the repository moved after the target was built |
+| operator origin | **not proved** — the argument is untrusted data; a plain object literal written by any caller passes |
+| human identity / authentication | **not proved** — `operatorId` is a readable string; C1 reads no credential and authenticates nothing |
+| trusted minting, signature, possession | **not proved** — C1 has no issuing boundary and no secret material, so it cannot distinguish a minted record from an assembled one |
+| a changed SHA means a new operator decision | **not proved** — see below |
+| uniqueness / one-time consumption | **not proved** — C1 has no consumed-capability store |
+| replay prevention | **not proved** — the identical record returns `true` on every call while the same target is supplied |
+
+`singleUse: true` is a **structural intent marker**: it records that the shape is
+that of a single-use capability. It is *not* enforced single consumption, and
+this document does not claim the record is replay-proof or that it cannot be
+reused. Likewise, a non-empty `operatorId` is descriptive data; it does not make
+the record operator-originated, authenticated, or human-authorized.
+
+On a changed SHA, C1 requires only a **newly matching candidate record**: if the
+supplied target SHA changes, the previous candidate stops matching, and some
+candidate whose `headSha` equals the newly supplied target SHA would be required.
+This document does **not** claim that a new SHA requires a new operator decision.
+C1 cannot tell whether such a candidate is a fresh human decision or the same
+untrusted caller assembling another literal; the future trusted boundary must
+establish that.
+
+**A `true` result is therefore not sufficient proof that a merge may execute.**
+It is a necessary binding check.
+
+### What the future trusted Merge Broker must do
+
+An explicitly reviewed later Cockpit layer, not implemented here, must:
+
+1. authenticate the operator;
+2. establish trusted capability minting and origin, so the record cannot have
+   been assembled by a caller;
+3. obtain the authoritative pull-request/repository HEAD immediately before the
+   merge attempt;
+4. require that exact HEAD to match the operator capability;
+5. enforce single-use consumption atomically;
+6. reject if HEAD changed;
+7. perform or request the merge only after all gates still pass.
+
+C1 performs **none** of those steps and claims none of them: no authentication,
+no signatures, no token issuance, no secret material, no repository or live-HEAD
+lookup, no replay or consumed-capability store, no operator session, and no
+endpoint.
 
 **No merge executor and no GitHub merge API call exists in this PR.**
 
+None of this weakens the merge barrier above. `OperatorMergeAuthorization` is not
+wired into `authorizeJobOperation`, and ordinary repair-job authority still
+receives `OPERATOR_REQUIRED` with no permit for `merge`, regardless of what any
+record of this shape says.
+
 ## Execution permits
 
 An `ExecutionPermit` is the record of one authorization: exactly one job, exactly
diff --git a/src/domain/execution-permit.ts b/src/domain/execution-permit.ts
index b556074..4abfdb8 100644
--- a/src/domain/execution-permit.ts
+++ b/src/domain/execution-permit.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * One-time execution permits, and the separate operator merge authority
+ * One-time execution permits, and the separate operator merge authority *shape*
  * (Cockpit C1).
  *
  * ## A permit is not a bearer token
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ export function permitsEqual(candidate: ExecutionPermit, issued: ExecutionPermit
 }
 
 /**
- * A merge authorization that originated from a human operator.
+ * The structural shape a merge authorization must have. **Not proof that one
+ * exists.**
  *
  * **This is not job authority and is not reachable from job authority.** No
  * function in AgentBridge produces one: there is no factory, no builder, and no
@@ -258,54 +259,131 @@ export function permitsEqual(candidate: ExecutionPermit, issued: ExecutionPermit
  * data about an `ActionRequest` at PR 003's gate; reusing it here would make
  * every existing approval a candidate merge authority.
  *
- * The required properties, all of which {@link operatorMergeAuthorizes}
- * enforces:
+ * ## A value of this type is untrusted data, not authority
  *
- * - operator-originated — `operatorId` names a human, and nothing in the
- *   domain mints one
- * - repository-bound, pull-request-bound, and bound to an exact HEAD SHA
- * - single-use, and invalid the moment HEAD changes
- * - incapable of authorizing another pull request or a future SHA
+ * Nothing in C1 establishes where such a value came from. There is no minting
+ * boundary, so a caller can write the object literal by hand and C1 will read it
+ * exactly as it reads any other untrusted record. What this layer models is the
+ * *binding* a merge authority must carry:
+ *
+ * - repository-bound, pull-request-bound, and bound to one exact HEAD SHA
+ * - carrying the structural `singleUse: true` marker
+ * - incapable of covering another pull request or a different SHA
+ *
+ * {@link operatorMergeAuthorizes} checks exactly that binding, and nothing more.
+ * It compares the record against a caller-supplied {@link MergeTarget}, so it
+ * does **not** establish that the target SHA is authoritative or fresh, nor
+ * operator origin, human identity, authentication, trusted minting, uniqueness,
+ * one-time consumption, or replay prevention.
+ *
+ * A future trusted operator boundary — the merge broker — owns those properties:
+ * it must authenticate the operator, guarantee that the record was minted by
+ * that boundary rather than assembled by a caller, obtain the authoritative
+ * pull-request HEAD immediately before merging and require the record to match
+ * it, and consume the record so it cannot authorize a second merge. Until that
+ * boundary exists, a record of this shape proves nothing about a human.
  */
 export interface OperatorMergeAuthorization {
   /** Caller-minted identity of this one operator decision. */
   readonly authorizationId: string;
-  /** The human who decided. Never an agent, and never inferred from a label. */
+  /**
+   * Identifier of the operator a future trusted boundary must authenticate.
+   * Descriptive data here: C1 checks only that it is a readable identifier, and
+   * never establishes that it names a human rather than an agent or a caller.
+   */
   readonly operatorId: string;
   /** The one repository this authorization is valid in. */
   readonly repositoryId: string;
   /** The one pull request this authorization is valid for. */
   readonly pullRequestId: string;
-  /** The exact HEAD the operator approved. A different HEAD is a different merge. */
+  /** The one HEAD SHA this record names. A different SHA is a different merge. */
   readonly headSha: string;
   /** Caller-supplied timestamp. Data; no clock is read here. */
   readonly authorizedAt: string;
-  /** Structural: one merge, then nothing. */
+  /**
+   * Structural intent: this record is *shaped* as a single-use capability. C1
+   * has no consumed-capability store, so single consumption is not enforced
+   * here — a later trusted boundary must enforce it.
+   */
   readonly singleUse: true;
 }
 
-/** The exact merge an operator authorization is being checked against. */
+/**
+ * The merge a candidate authorization is being checked against.
+ *
+ * Every field is **caller-supplied input**. C1 reads no repository, no API, and
+ * no adapter, so it cannot check any of these values against reality. They
+ * define what the candidate is compared *to*, and nothing more.
+ */
 export interface MergeTarget {
   readonly repositoryId: string;
   readonly pullRequestId: string;
-  /** The repository's HEAD *now*, supplied by a trusted adapter. */
+  /**
+   * The HEAD SHA supplied for this merge target. **C1 does not establish that
+   * this value is authoritative or current** — it performs no repository, API,
+   * or adapter observation, so a stale, invented, or caller-constructed SHA is
+   * indistinguishable from a live one here. The future trusted merge boundary
+   * must obtain the authoritative repository/pull-request HEAD immediately
+   * before the merge attempt and supply and enforce that exact value.
+   */
   readonly currentHeadSha: string;
 }
 
 /**
- * Does this operator authorization cover exactly this merge, right now?
+ * Is this candidate record *structurally bound* to exactly this **supplied**
+ * merge target?
  *
  * Pure, total, and deterministic; never throws. Both arguments are read
  * defensively, own-only, and exactly once.
  *
- * Every comparison is exact string equality, so a HEAD that moved by one commit
- * invalidates the authorization, and an authorization for pull request 41 can
- * never cover pull request 42. There is no path that widens, refreshes, or
- * re-binds an authorization to a newer SHA: a new HEAD requires a new operator
- * decision.
+ * ## What a `true` result proves
+ *
+ * Only that the candidate carries the required structural fields as readable
+ * identifiers, that its `singleUse` is literally `true`, and that its
+ * `repositoryId`, `pullRequestId`, and `headSha` are exactly equal to the
+ * corresponding fields of the supplied {@link MergeTarget} — including
+ * `target.currentHeadSha`, which is an **input value, not an observation**.
+ * Every comparison is exact string equality, so a candidate naming pull request
+ * 41 can never cover a target naming pull request 42, and a candidate whose
+ * `headSha` differs from the supplied target SHA never matches. There is no path
+ * that widens, refreshes, or re-binds a candidate to a different SHA.
+ *
+ * ## What a `true` result does not prove
+ *
+ * Stated explicitly, because overclaiming here would be worse than not checking:
+ *
+ * - **That the target SHA is authoritative or fresh.** C1 fetches nothing and
+ *   observes no repository, so it cannot tell a live HEAD from a stale or
+ *   invented one, and cannot know whether the repository moved after the target
+ *   was built. The binding is only ever as good as the supplied target.
+ * - **Operator origin.** The first argument is untrusted data. A plain object
+ *   literal, written by any caller with the right field names, satisfies this
+ *   predicate.
+ * - **Human identity or authentication.** `operatorId` is a readable string and
+ *   nothing more. C1 performs no authentication and reads no credential.
+ * - **Trusted minting or possession.** There is no signature, no secret, and no
+ *   issuing boundary, so this predicate cannot distinguish a record a trusted
+ *   boundary minted from one a caller assembled.
+ * - **That a changed SHA reflects a new operator decision.** If the supplied
+ *   target SHA changes, the previous candidate simply stops matching, and *some*
+ *   candidate whose `headSha` equals the newly supplied target SHA would be
+ *   required. C1 cannot tell whether such a candidate is a fresh human decision
+ *   or the same untrusted caller assembling another literal.
+ * - **Uniqueness, one-time consumption, or replay prevention.** C1 stores
+ *   nothing and consumes nothing. The identical record returns `true` on every
+ *   call for as long as the same target is supplied. `singleUse: true` is a
+ *   structural intent marker, not enforcement.
+ *
+ * **A `true` result is therefore not sufficient proof that a merge may
+ * execute.** It is a necessary binding check that a future trusted operator
+ * boundary / merge broker must run *in addition to* authenticating the operator,
+ * verifying that it minted the record itself, obtaining the authoritative
+ * pull-request HEAD at merge time and requiring the candidate to match that
+ * value, and consuming the record atomically. Those properties belong to that
+ * later, explicitly reviewed layer.
  *
- * C1 executes no merge. This predicate exists so that the merge barrier is
- * defined by something more precise than a comment.
+ * C1 executes no merge. This predicate exists so that the binding half of the
+ * merge barrier is defined by something more precise than a comment.
  */
 export function operatorMergeAuthorizes(
   authorization: OperatorMergeAuthorization,
diff --git a/tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts b/tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts
index 0198261..24f2a16 100644
--- a/tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts
+++ b/tests/domain/job-authorization-invariants.test.ts
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ describe('merge is operator-only, permanently', () => {
   });
 });
 
-describe('operator merge authorization is separate, exact, and single-use', () => {
+describe('operator merge authorization is separate, exact, and structurally single-use', () => {
   const authorization: OperatorMergeAuthorization = {
     authorizationId: 'op-merge-1',
     operatorId: 'human-operator-1',
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ describe('operator merge authorization is separate, exact, and single-use', () =
     ).toBe(true);
   });
 
-  it('becomes invalid the moment HEAD moves', () => {
+  it('stops matching once a different target SHA is supplied', () => {
     expect(
       operatorMergeAuthorizes(authorization, {
         repositoryId: REPO_A,
@@ -274,6 +274,45 @@ describe('operator merge authorization is separate, exact, and single-use', () =
     ).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  // The next two tests pin what C1 deliberately does NOT prove, so that the
+  // documented limitation cannot drift away from the implementation. They are
+  // not a statement that this behaviour is desirable forever: the future trusted
+  // operator boundary / merge broker must supersede both, and when it does these
+  // tests are expected to be replaced rather than preserved.
+  it('accepts a plain caller-written literal: it proves binding, not operator origin', () => {
+    const callerWritten = {
+      authorizationId: 'assembled-by-any-caller',
+      operatorId: 'not-authenticated-just-a-string',
+      repositoryId: REPO_A,
+      pullRequestId: PARENT_PR_A,
+      headSha: HEAD_A,
+      authorizedAt: 'caller-supplied',
+      singleUse: true,
+    } as const;
+
+    expect(
+      operatorMergeAuthorizes(callerWritten, {
+        repositoryId: REPO_A,
+        pullRequestId: PARENT_PR_A,
+        currentHeadSha: HEAD_A,
+      }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('returns true repeatedly for the same record: C1 has no consumed-capability store', () => {
+    const target = {
+      repositoryId: REPO_A,
+      pullRequestId: PARENT_PR_A,
+      currentHeadSha: HEAD_A,
+    };
+
+    expect([
+      operatorMergeAuthorizes(authorization, target),
+      operatorMergeAuthorizes(authorization, target),
+      operatorMergeAuthorizes(authorization, target),
+    ]).toEqual([true, true, true]);
+  });
+
   it('fails closed on hostile input without throwing', () => {
     for (const value of NON_OBJECTS) {
       expect(() =>