diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index eee383e..269655f 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 Pre-releases are not listed separately. A beta is a step towards the next public version, so its changes are folded into that version's entry as they land and are described against the **last public release**, never against the beta before it. What one
 beta corrected in an earlier beta does not appear at all: from the point of view of somebody upgrading between released versions, it never happened.
 
+## [3.4.1]
+
+A panel that merely advertises itself on the network no longer produces the plaintext-transport warning when discovery probes it, closing the remaining way issue span#264's log line reached an operator who could do nothing about it.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The status endpoint no longer emits the plaintext-transport warning**, for the CA download's reason from the other side: it is the detection probe made against devices nobody has configured, where no pin can exist and the only action is configuring the
+  panel — whose flow pins before any credential moves. It carries no credential in either direction, and it no longer spends the once-per-host warning slot, which it previously claimed first in every flow so that a genuinely credential-bearing call behind
+  it said nothing. Registration, passphrase rotation, and the schema fetch warn exactly as before.
+
 ## [3.4.0]
 
 A consumer that pinned the panel's CA could not put its schema fetches behind that pin, because the one port `SpanMqttClient` took served two transports with opposite security properties — the schema fetch, which should ride the pinned HTTPS transport, and
diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml
index dab4056..b9df534 100644
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "span-panel-api"
-version = "3.4.0"
+version = "3.4.1"
 description = "A client library for SPAN Panel API"
 authors = [
     {name = "SpanPanel"}
diff --git a/src/span_panel_api/_http.py b/src/span_panel_api/_http.py
index 20b90bb..97066fc 100644
--- a/src/span_panel_api/_http.py
+++ b/src/span_panel_api/_http.py
@@ -31,11 +31,14 @@
 #: The one bootstrap path two modules request: the detector probes it to decide
 #: whether the panel speaks v2 at all, and `get_v2_status` reads the same answer
 #: for a caller that already knows it does. Named here rather than spelled out in
-#: each, so the two cannot drift apart the way their parsers had.
+#: each, so the two cannot drift apart the way their parsers had. Load-bearing
+#: for `_warn_plaintext_transport`'s exemption: a request to this path is the
+#: one the warning stays silent for, so a change here changes what warns.
 V2_STATUS_PATH = "/api/v2/status"
 
-#: The one bootstrap path exempt from the plaintext warning, named here because
-#: the transport is what grants the exemption. See `_warn_plaintext_transport`.
+#: Exempt from the plaintext warning alongside `V2_STATUS_PATH`, named here
+#: because the transport is what grants the exemption. See
+#: `_warn_plaintext_transport`.
 CA_CERT_PATH = "/api/v2/certificate/ca"
 
 #: The verbs the bootstrap API uses. Spelled as a `Literal` rather than passed
@@ -174,19 +177,33 @@ def _reset_plaintext_warnings() -> None:
 def _warn_plaintext_transport(host: str, path: str, ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None) -> None:
     """Say out loud, once per panel, that its bootstrap traffic is not encrypted.
 
-    **The CA download is exempt, and does not claim the once-per-host slot.**
+    **Two endpoints are exempt, and neither claims the once-per-host slot.**
     The warning exists so an operator can tell a security property is off when
-    it could be on, and for that endpoint there is no "on": verifying the fetch
-    of the anchor would require the anchor being fetched, an unverified-TLS
-    wrapping is readable and forgeable by the same active on-path attacker, and
-    the payload is a public certificate carrying no credential in either
-    direction — its authenticity control is the leaf check callers run *after*
-    the fetch. Each caller also states its own trust posture in its own voice:
-    the bridge's unpinned warning, a config flow's fingerprint confirmation, a
-    consumer's trust-on-first-use log. Warning here anyway named credentials the
-    call never carries, which is the line issue span#264 reported. Not marking
-    the host matters as much as not warning: a pinned consumer's diagnostic
-    re-read must not spend the slot a genuinely plaintext call needs later.
+    it could be on, and for both there is no "on". The CA download fetches the
+    very anchor verification would need — an unverified-TLS wrapping is
+    readable and forgeable by the same active on-path attacker, the payload is
+    a public certificate, and its authenticity control is the leaf check
+    callers run *after* the fetch. The status endpoint is the detection probe:
+    most prominently the request discovery makes against a device nobody has
+    configured, where no pin can exist because trust-on-first-use has not
+    happened and the only action available is configuring the panel — whose
+    flow pins before any credential moves, with a person confirming the
+    fingerprint. Neither call carries a credential in either direction, and
+    warning on them named credentials they never carry: the CA download's line
+    is what issue span#264 reported, and the status probe's is what a merely
+    *advertising* unconfigured panel produced at every boot.
+
+    Two limits of the status exemption, stated rather than implied. The body
+    informs decisions — `proximityProven`, the serial an identity check reads —
+    and a plaintext answer is one anything on the path can write; the controls
+    for that are the panel's own registration gate and the pin the consumer's
+    flow acquires before a credential moves, not a log line. And a consumer
+    *can* probe a configured, pinned panel's status without its context; the
+    exemption means no warning will point that out, so a consumer owes every
+    probe of a configured host the entry's own transport. Not marking the host matters as
+    much as not warning — the probe runs first in every flow and a diagnostic
+    re-read runs on pinned entries, and neither may spend the slot a
+    credential-bearing call needs later.
 
     In the same voice as the MQTT bridge's unpinned-CA warning, and for the same
     reason: a security property that is off by default is only a decision if the
@@ -214,7 +231,7 @@ def _warn_plaintext_transport(host: str, path: str, ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext
     """
     if ssl_context is not None:
         return
-    if path == CA_CERT_PATH:
+    if path in (CA_CERT_PATH, V2_STATUS_PATH):
         return
     if host in _warned_plaintext_hosts:
         return
diff --git a/tests/test_plaintext_warning.py b/tests/test_plaintext_warning.py
index 5c33e92..56aa962 100644
--- a/tests/test_plaintext_warning.py
+++ b/tests/test_plaintext_warning.py
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
 import httpx
 import pytest
 
-from span_panel_api.auth import download_ca_cert, regenerate_passphrase, register_v2
+from span_panel_api.auth import download_ca_cert, get_v2_status, regenerate_passphrase, register_v2
+from span_panel_api.detection import detect_api_version
 from span_panel_api.mqtt.models import MqttClientConfig
 
 HOST = "panel.invalid"
@@ -166,6 +167,54 @@ async def test_the_ca_download_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixtur
 
         assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
 
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_status_probe_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Exempted in 3.4.1, for the CA download's reason from the other side.
+
+        The status endpoint is the detection probe — the request zeroconf
+        discovery makes against a device nobody has configured, once per boot,
+        where no pin can exist because trust-on-first-use has not happened and
+        there is nothing the operator can do but configure the panel. It
+        carries no credential in either direction, and the flows that probe it
+        on a configured-but-unpinned entry acquire the pin before any
+        credential moves, with a human confirming the fingerprint. The warning
+        here named credentials the call never carries and pointed at an action
+        nobody could take — the line that made an operator remove a healthy
+        emulator. The exemption's limits live in `_warn_plaintext_transport`'s
+        docstring: a consumer probing a *configured* host owes that probe the
+        entry's own transport, because no warning will say so anymore.
+        """
+        answer = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await get_v2_status(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", answer))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_detection_probe_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Detection reads the same endpoint, and must be equally silent."""
+        answer = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await detect_api_version(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", answer))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_status_probe_does_not_swallow_a_later_warning(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """The probe fires first in every flow, so it must not spend the slot.
+
+        Today it does exactly that: a reauth's status probe claims the
+        once-per-host warning, and the credential-bearing call behind it says
+        nothing. The warning belongs to whichever call actually deserves it.
+        """
+        status = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        rotate = _json_response({"ebusBrokerPassword": "new-pass"}, method="PUT")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await get_v2_status(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", status))
+            # The midpoint is the assertion: the slot must still be unspent
+            # here, so the warning below demonstrably belongs to the rotation.
+            assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+            await regenerate_passphrase(HOST, "jwt", httpx_client=_client("put", rotate))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 1
+
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_the_ca_download_does_not_swallow_a_later_warning(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
         """Skipping the warning must not mark the host as already warned.
diff --git a/uv.lock b/uv.lock
index 553b402..ec51795 100644
--- a/uv.lock
+++ b/uv.lock
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "span-panel-api"
-version = "3.4.0"
+version = "3.4.1"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "httpx" },