Several allowlist bumps are blocked on upstream actions adding verification or
provenance for artifacts they ship or download. Filing these individually works
- upstream has acted on them before - but there is nowhere to see which are
outstanding and what each one blocks.
Open
Resolved, as precedent that the ask lands
How these should affect review
Pinning an action with a known finding is still strictly better than the
wildcard it replaces, so an open upstream request should not usually block a
bump on its own. The exception is a newly introduced opaque binary - the #1141
case - where no previously approved version carries the same exposure, so
accepting it would be a genuine regression rather than a carried-over warning.
Drafted-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) via Claude Code; reviewed by @potiuk before posting
Several allowlist bumps are blocked on upstream actions adding verification or
provenance for artifacts they ship or download. Filing these individually works
outstanding and what each one blocks.
Open
tc.downloadTool. No checksum today, and the_latestURL is republishableactions/attest-build-provenanceor aSHA256SUMSrelease asset coveringdist/core_bg.wasm, new in v5.0.0 and unattestedopCLI download before extracting. Open since 2026-06-13, no responseResolved, as precedent that the ask lands
actions/attest-build-provenanceand started shipping
SHA256SUMS; later bumps verify automatically.verification.
How these should affect review
Pinning an action with a known finding is still strictly better than the
wildcard it replaces, so an open upstream request should not usually block a
bump on its own. The exception is a newly introduced opaque binary - the #1141
case - where no previously approved version carries the same exposure, so
accepting it would be a genuine regression rather than a carried-over warning.
Drafted-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) via Claude Code; reviewed by @potiuk before posting