ECR Credential Sync is a credential-bearing compatibility helper. It handles temporary ECR passwords, AWS credentials, and environment-scoped platform API credentials. Do not expose it directly to untrusted users or public networks.

• Use least-privilege AWS IAM permissions that allow only the required ECR authorization token operation and optional role assumption.
• Treat PLATFORM_ACCESS_KEY, PLATFORM_SECRET_KEY, AWS environment variables, and /home/pasturestack/.aws as secrets.
• Do not enable debug logging unless the resulting logs are protected as credential-bearing operational data.
• ECR authorization tokens are never logged. Malformed decoded tokens are reported only with a redaction marker and decoded length.
• Nil and incomplete AWS authorization responses are handled without panics.

AWS ECR and environment API failures use ten bounded attempts with an incremental ten-second backoff. Waiting occurs only between failed attempts. A successful request returns immediately. The policy is injectable in tests so the test suite never waits on production delays.

• Registry and registry-credential API field behavior remains compatible.
• PLATFORM_URL, PLATFORM_ACCESS_KEY, and PLATFORM_SECRET_KEY are required contracts.
• The runtime uses numeric user and group 10001:10001; it does not require privileged mode, host networking, the Docker socket, or host filesystem access.
• The minimal client under internal/platformapi sends only the required registry and credential operations. See COMPATIBILITY.md.

• The build image uses the digest-pinned Ubuntu 26.04 base. It uses Go 1.27.0, Docker CLI 29.7.2, and the checksum-patched Buildx 0.36.1 source. Its identity resolver uses jq 1.8.1-4ubuntu2, installed from the same dated Ubuntu snapshot and verified against the direct package lock. The Linux runtime is scratch: it contains only the static service binary, the pinned CA bundle, legal notices, and an empty non-root home directory.
• The host Buildx client is v0.36.1, built twice by the repository-owned scripts/install-locked-host-buildx verifier inside an empty, caller-owned mode-0700 run root below $HOME. CI copies the byte-identical binary into a separate run-owned DOCKER_CONFIG at cli-plugins/docker-buildx, verifies its hash, owner, mode, version, and commit, and binds DAPPER_BUILDX_COMMAND to the installer-returned binary. Dapper builders use BuildKit v0.32.2 from moby/buildkit:v0.32.2@sha256:28a898719c18a33f4e8000685287fa36fd0dd9560c6440227d3a732d79bb41d8. The source gate rejects mutable BuildKit fallbacks.
• Development packaging may use scripts/install-locked-host-buildx only when the host plugin does not match the lock. The helper downloads the exact Buildx source (sha256:fb28b5c2a198d05482f0656dfb7ee161240a904e36697bf7108e5d517f23854b) and Go 1.27.0 archive (sha256:675c26c449cbb18fc24b74650de1eabbae6e16f64326fd85a283fb3b58280685), applies the repository patch (sha256:a29fdda204d592d0d46ed32b5fdc4336a7b3a7276301836d0a75b9386ca780f7), downloads the checksum-verified target modules once, and performs two GOPROXY=off source builds from separate module caches. It requires identical dependency lists and binaries, verifies result sha256:05d6007425f3ec0c9bcf10aad49034e4342c34bd63ecd1cb0ac89ddfdf934c79, Buildx v0.36.1, commit 1d8dde89b8aba914e05e45366770736fea1fd690, github.com/moby/go-archive v0.3.0, golang.org/x/mod v0.40.0, and google.golang.org/grpc v1.83.2. It writes only below an empty, canonical, caller-owned run root whose ancestors are root- or caller-owned; any group- or world-writable ancestor must be sticky. Later operations stay bound to that validated directory identity. The helper never installs into a system directory or global Docker CLI plugin directory. Always-run cleanup revalidates the exact two run-root paths, identities, owners, and mode 0700 before deleting only those directories. As of 2026-09-09, the latest signed upstream Buildx release remains v0.36.1; its official binary contains go-archive v0.2.1, x/mod v0.38.0, and grpc v1.82.1; no signed fixed release exists for all three modules. The same locked upgrade is therefore required for both host and Dapper binaries; these CVEs must not be suppressed with OpenVEX.
• Every Dapper export records its manifest digest separately. The Buildx IID must equal the top-level configuration digest when that metadata field is present; otherwise it must equal the manifest digest selected by Buildx's fallback rule. At least one metadata configuration source is required, and all present sources must agree. The loaded Docker daemon image ID must equal either that configuration digest or the exported manifest digest; the observed engine mode is recorded. Missing, malformed, or conflicting identity evidence fails closed.
• Runtime images are built by an exact run-owned docker-container builder using the locked BuildKit image. The reproducible exporter writes a new Docker archive without daemon unpack/load options, verifies the archive hash, then calls docker image load explicitly. The loaded image must pass the same Buildx IID-mode, metadata, daemon configuration-ID, label, and non-root-user checks. Failure cleanup is restricted to the exact run-owned archive, builder, container, state volume, and identity-bound image; broad builder or image pruning is forbidden.
• The build does not download the historical Dapper binary or use its retired upstream build image.
• Go telemetry is disabled with the official go telemetry off command before the first ordinary Go invocation. Its mode file is then canonicalized to the exact off YYYY-MM-DD format with the UTC date and metadata derived from SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH; an OS GOTELEMETRY variable is not accepted as a control. The same repository-owned verifier runs after every Go-bearing layer and in final-image evidence, requiring the derived mode and directory values and rejecting local, upload, debug, counter, weekends, or .count state.
• The Windows variant uses the Microsoft Nano Server LTSC 2022 base, runs as ContainerUser, and contains only the cross-compiled service executable above that base. Validate the host build against the Windows Server 2022 container compatibility matrix before production rollout.
• Runtime distributions include all 27 vendored license, notice, and author files in addition to the root license and attribution documents.
• The source SBOM is generated from vendor/modules.txt; source vulnerabilities are not suppressed with OpenVEX and every finding fails the gate. The disposable builder may assess only unfixed linux-libc-dev findings because the package supplies headers rather than the vulnerable kernel implementation and is absent from the runtime image. That exact-package assessment expires on 2026-09-15; every other builder finding fails the gate.
• Do not add broad vulnerability, secret, or misconfiguration ignores.

Report vulnerabilities privately to the PastureStack maintainers. Do not place credentials, tokens, private API endpoints, account IDs, or unredacted logs in an issue.