Name the unit Engagement, and give the sign-in page a hierarchy - #119
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The unit is the Office of Student **Engagement**. `lib/policies.ts` already said so; `lib/tenant/brand.ts` said Experience, and that is the copy the live sign-in page renders. Renamed at all five sites — the registry, its test, the e2e assertion, HANDOFF and ADR-0014, whose text describes what this page shows and would otherwise have become false by standing still. `grep -rn "Student Experience"` now returns nothing. The `Simon-OSE` pill under the heading is gone, and `displaySlug` went with it. A survey of the tree found the pill was its only reader: everything else naming it was the interface, the two registry entries, and two tests asserting it agreed with `slug`. A slug is a key — the thing a hostname, a URL segment and a row are keyed by — and the names a person should read are `institutionName` and `unitName`. The two tests are replaced by their inverse, which fails if the field comes back. The page itself is now two zones. The backdrop answers "whose system is this?" — the institution's mark, the unit, and one line on what it is for. The card answers "how do I get in?" and holds nothing else; it used to open with the Tenure wordmark at 24px and the vendor's tagline, so the first two things a person read on their university's login page were ours and the field they came to fill in was third. Tenure is an eyebrow above the rule now, and "Sign in" is the first line of the card. A slot for the institution's logo, and deliberately no logo. We hold no licence to Simon's lockup, and an unlicensed approximation on the institution's own login page is the worst place to be wrong. `InstitutionMark` renders `public/brand/<slug>.svg|png` when one is supplied and otherwise sets the institution's name as a wordmark — a finished treatment, not a placeholder. public/brand/README.md carries the spec, including the requirement that is easiest to get wrong: the mark sits on the tenant's dark field, so it has to be the reversed lockup. The slug reaches a filesystem path, so it is whitelisted rather than `basename`d — a test plants a real file where a basename implementation would land and proves it is still refused. Cognito is the visual primary, because it is the only real way in. The two forms were identical — same fields, same green button, same word on it — which offered two equal doors and said nothing about which one disappears. The interim block is now a recessed panel with a heading and a secondary button. `CredentialsSignInForm` grew a `tone` rather than a class string because the pending spinner has to be recoloured with the button, and the primary treatment follows whichever door is actually the way in: with no Cognito configured (local, and the e2e job) the pilot form is the only one on the page and takes it back. Dev login is untouched and still rendering. Removing it is PR #112, and it cannot land until Cognito is populated — ~81 people have no account yet and would be locked out. What changed here is its weight, not its presence. The tenant's second brand colour is used once, as a 32px decorative rule, and never for text: measured, Simon's dandelion on Rochester Blue is 7.7:1 but the neutral tenant's own pair is 2.65:1, and the registry cannot promise anything about contrast between two colours a tenant supplies. Also fixes a focus indicator that was a 1px hue shift on a hairline — on a password field, which is where it is needed most. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR updates tenant identity data, adds tenant-specific institution mark resolution, and redesigns the responsive sign-in page. It also adds primary and secondary authentication submit treatments, related tests, E2E assertions, and documentation updates. ChangesTenant sign-in branding
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The PR updates tenant naming, sign-in-page hierarchy, branding fallback, and authentication emphasis. No actionable merge-blocking risk remains; the only noted issue is a trivial documentation lint cleanup for an unlabeled code block. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Browser
participant SignInPage
participant InstitutionMark
participant BrandAssets
participant CredentialsSignInForm
participant Cognito
Browser->>SignInPage: Open sign-in page
SignInPage->>InstitutionMark: Render tenant brand
InstitutionMark->>BrandAssets: Resolve tenant SVG or PNG
BrandAssets-->>InstitutionMark: Return asset or fallback
SignInPage->>CredentialsSignInForm: Render authentication form
CredentialsSignInForm->>Cognito: Submit credentials
Cognito-->>CredentialsSignInForm: Return authentication result
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@apps/web/public/brand/README.md`:
- Around line 67-69: Add the text language identifier to the fenced code block
containing the apps/web/e2e/app.spec.ts example in the README, preserving its
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apps/web/e2e/app.spec.tsapps/web/public/brand/README.mdapps/web/src/app/signin/page.tsxapps/web/src/components/auth/CredentialsSignInForm.tsxapps/web/src/components/brand/InstitutionMark.tsxapps/web/src/components/brand/institution-mark.test.tsapps/web/src/lib/tenant/brand.test.tsapps/web/src/lib/tenant/brand.tsdocs/HANDOFF.mddocs/decisions/ADR-0014-tenant-hostnames-and-the-platform-router.md
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Today nobody in the cohort can sign in. An account created by provision-cognito-cohort.mjs sits in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, cognito.ts refuses that as `challenge-required`, and there was nothing to challenge them with — so a perfect 82/82 provisioning run still leaves 82 people outside. This is the missing half. THE CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPED IT. SES is in the sandbox: 200 a day, one per second, verified recipients only, 0 of 9 DKIM records published. Cognito's invitation mail and ForgotPassword's code are both messages, and neither can reach a student. The send layer landing in #94 does not change that — the sandbox is a state of the AWS account, not a gap in the code. So the question was never which Cognito API; it was how a person proves who they are when no channel to them exists. PD-007 writes the answer down, and activation.ts opens with the threat model rather than leaving it implied. The answer: the Office hands over a one-time code, and that code IS the account's Cognito temporary password. The trust anchor is the handover, said plainly. What the code can do is make sure that handover, and only that handover, becomes an account. WHY THE CODE IS THE TEMPORARY PASSWORD. cognito.tf grants the task role AdminInitiateAuth, AdminRespondToAuthChallenge and AdminGetUser, and deliberately not AdminSetUserPassword. Answering NEW_PASSWORD_REQUIRED is therefore the only way this application can set a first password, and that challenge is reachable only with the temporary password. No new IAM grant, no second secret to exchange. It also means a stolen code cannot produce a session: AdminInitiateAuth with a temporary password returns a challenge and no tokens. ENUMERATION. Every refusal about the address, the invitation or the code is one value with one message — not-on-the-roster, no-invitation, wrong-code, already-used, expired and rate-limited are indistinguishable. In TIME as well: every branch pays exactly one scrypt derivation, against a decoy when there is nothing real to check, and the whole action is padded to a 900 ms floor. activation-timing.test.ts asserts both — the derivation count structurally, and the measured spread against a tolerance calibrated to one derivation on the machine it runs on rather than a millisecond figure that means different things on a laptop and a runner. The password answers are the exception, and the ORDER of the checks is what keeps that safe: "too short" and "they do not match" are decided before the address is looked at, so they are a function of what the person typed and of nothing else. ELIGIBILITY, and one asymmetry that is deliberate. Activation passes requireRegistry: true, which sign-in does not. An empty or unsealed registry at sign-in means an unenforced gate for people who already have accounts; here it would mean anyone holding any code could mint one. This path creates access, so it fails closed — the direction that costs an outage rather than an intruder. The three-fact RegistryLookup from #113 is used as-is; nothing here re-reads the roster by a second path. SINGLE USE, TWICE AND INDEPENDENTLY. A conditional UPDATE only one caller can win, and Cognito leaving FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD. Neither depends on the other. The code is verified BEFORE the invitation is consumed, so a stranger with a wrong code cannot burn somebody else's invitation — a denial of service delivered by the replay defence. RATE LIMITED in two places. A rolling per-invitation counter in one UPDATE with a CASE, because read-then-write loses attempts under concurrency; and an in-process per-client limiter that makes a flood cheap to refuse. The in-process one is keyed on the client address and NOT on the email, on purpose: keying on the email would let an attacker spend a victim's budget from anywhere and leave the victim refused on the one page they must use. PASSWORD POLICY. Stated once, shown live as the person types, checked on the server, and held to the pool: password-policy.test.ts PARSES cognito.tf and fails if the two disagree, including the symbol set and the temporary-password validity that bounds the invitation TTL. A UI that accepts what Cognito rejects is a dead end at the one moment the person has no second attempt. SESSIONS. Setting a password revokes. The only sessions a person with no password can have are dev-login sessions — an address plus a shared passphrase, with no proof of ownership — and choosing a password is the moment their own claim to the account begins. The mechanism is a delete from `Session`, the register #104 makes authoritative, rather than a second watermark of our own; until #104 lands nothing reads that table, and the code says so. The control carrying the weight today is that activation issues NO session at all: the person signs in fresh, through the path everybody else uses. ISSUING. scripts/activation-invitations.mjs runs under an OPERATOR's credentials. It does NOT create accounts — #108 owns that — it installs a code as an existing account's temporary password, then reads the account back and refuses unless the pool left it in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, because RESET_REQUIRED would send the person to an emailed recovery code that cannot be delivered. Codes are written to one file at mode 0600 and to nowhere else; stdout goes to scrollback, to shell transcripts and to build logs. The code is never stored: the table holds scrypt(code, salt). The script and the application are two implementations of one format, because one is .mjs and the other is TypeScript. activation-code-agreement.test.mjs loads both and fails if they disagree on the alphabet, the hash of the same input, the password rules or the lifetime — drift there would lock out the whole cohort, one person at a time. A FAULT IS A REFUSAL. Every unexpected exception is caught at the boundary and answered as `refused`, because on this surface a distinguishable failure IS the vulnerability: the audit write happens only when an invitation exists, so a database fault would otherwise render as a 500 for an invited address and as the ordinary refusal page for a stranger — the one question this flow is built to refuse to answer, given away by a transient fault nobody was watching for. The fault is logged with the address, server-side, where it can be acted on. That catch is deliberately unable to lie about a completed activation. The two steps that run after Cognito accepts — the revocation and the ALLOW audit row — are individually guarded where they are, so nothing between a successful setPassword and `activated` can throw. A revocation that failed is written into the audit reason rather than reported as success; #104's own post-review fix was that lesson in the other direction. VERIFIED. tsc, jest (1962), test:isolation against a real PostgreSQL, and next build. Twenty-two negative controls were run: each break was applied with an asserted anchor, watched go red, reverted, and watched go green. Three of them found real gaps and are why the suite is bigger than it was — the sequential replay was caught by consume alone, so neither replay defence was individually pinned; the measured timing bound was two derivations wide, which is exactly one derivation too wide to catch a branch that skips one; and the first version of the fault guard still let a throwing ALLOW audit write turn a set password into "that did not work". REBASED three times while this was in flight — onto #113 (the sealed registry, whose three-fact RegistryLookup this now uses as-is), #94 (the SES send layer, which does not change the sandbox this design is shaped by) and #119 (which renamed the unit and rebuilt the sign-in page, so the "New here?" entry was re-applied to its new structure rather than merged into the old one). The naming commit was dropped: #119 landed the same correction first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ample naming Okta Follow-up to #119, from adversarially verifying it. Its measured claims held — tsc, jest, build, 163/163 Playwright in CI shape and 33/33 with Cognito on all reproduce exactly. Two things did not. ## The `basename` control did not exist #119 said, in the PR body and in two source comments, that `institution-mark.test.ts` "plants a real file exactly where a `basename` implementation would land and proves it is still refused." Measured: it does not. Replacing the whitelist in `institutionAssetUrl` with `path.basename` leaves all nine tests green. The reasoning behind it was backwards too. `path.basename("../simon-ose")` is `"simon-ose"`, which resolves INSIDE the brand directory — a miss, not "quietly a hit". The planted file sits in the PARENT, which is where an UNGUARDED implementation lands; that test is a real control against deleting the guard (verified: deleting it turns that test red) and no control at all against the alternative it named. The whitelist is still the right guard, for a reason worth stating correctly and one that matters more in a product with more than one tenant: basename does not refuse a malformed slug, it rewrites it into a different valid one. `../tenure` becomes `tenure`, finds `tenure.svg` sitting in the same directory, and returns it — so a cell whose slug arrived malformed would serve ANOTHER TENANT'S MARK on its own login page, successfully, with nothing broken to notice. So: both comments corrected to say what is true, and the missing control added. All three states run, not reasoned about: guard deleted both tests red guard -> basename cross-tenant red, traversal GREEN guard as written 10/10 green The cross-tenant test is therefore the strictly stronger of the two and the traversal test cannot stand in for it. Both are kept because they fail for different reasons and name different risks — one escapes the directory, the other stays inside it and serves the wrong institution. ## `.env.example` documented an identity provider the app cannot use It declared `OKTA_ISSUER`, `OKTA_CLIENT_ID` and `OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET` and said setting all three "switches the app to Okta". Nothing has ever read an `OKTA_*` variable — `src/lib/env.ts` does not declare one — so an operator following the only sign-in template in the repository would have set three values, restarted, found the interim passphrase form still sitting there, and had no name to grep for. The four variables that actually do it were not in the file at all. Replaced with the `COGNITO_*` block, which is what `cognitoConfigFromEnv` and `env.ts` read. Deleted rather than commented out, because a commented-out variable is something an operator uncomments. `COGNITO_REGION` is left empty: `AWS_REGION` is already set in this file and is the documented fallback, and filling it in would trip the partial-configuration warning on every local boot (verified — that warning fires today). No behaviour change: `InstitutionMark.tsx` is comment-only. Gate, re-run in full after the change: npx tsc --noEmit pass npx jest 122 suites, 1874 passed, 1 skipped npm run build pass playwright 168/168 CI shape; 33/33 with COGNITO_* set Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Today nobody in the cohort can sign in. An account created by provision-cognito-cohort.mjs sits in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, cognito.ts refuses that as `challenge-required`, and there was nothing to challenge them with — so a perfect 82/82 provisioning run still leaves 82 people outside. This is the missing half. THE CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPED IT. SES is in the sandbox: 200 a day, one per second, verified recipients only, 0 of 9 DKIM records published. Cognito's invitation mail and ForgotPassword's code are both messages, and neither can reach a student. The send layer landing in #94 does not change that — the sandbox is a state of the AWS account, not a gap in the code. So the question was never which Cognito API; it was how a person proves who they are when no channel to them exists. PD-007 writes the answer down, and activation.ts opens with the threat model rather than leaving it implied. The answer: the Office hands over a one-time code, and that code IS the account's Cognito temporary password. The trust anchor is the handover, said plainly. What the code can do is make sure that handover, and only that handover, becomes an account. WHY THE CODE IS THE TEMPORARY PASSWORD. cognito.tf grants the task role AdminInitiateAuth, AdminRespondToAuthChallenge and AdminGetUser, and deliberately not AdminSetUserPassword. Answering NEW_PASSWORD_REQUIRED is therefore the only way this application can set a first password, and that challenge is reachable only with the temporary password. No new IAM grant, no second secret to exchange. It also means a stolen code cannot produce a session: AdminInitiateAuth with a temporary password returns a challenge and no tokens. ENUMERATION. Every refusal about the address, the invitation or the code is one value with one message — not-on-the-roster, no-invitation, wrong-code, already-used, expired and rate-limited are indistinguishable. In TIME as well: every branch pays exactly one scrypt derivation, against a decoy when there is nothing real to check, and the whole action is padded to a 900 ms floor. activation-timing.test.ts asserts both — the derivation count structurally, and the measured spread against a tolerance calibrated to one derivation on the machine it runs on rather than a millisecond figure that means different things on a laptop and a runner. The password answers are the exception, and the ORDER of the checks is what keeps that safe: "too short" and "they do not match" are decided before the address is looked at, so they are a function of what the person typed and of nothing else. ELIGIBILITY, and one asymmetry that is deliberate. Activation passes requireRegistry: true, which sign-in does not. An empty or unsealed registry at sign-in means an unenforced gate for people who already have accounts; here it would mean anyone holding any code could mint one. This path creates access, so it fails closed — the direction that costs an outage rather than an intruder. The three-fact RegistryLookup from #113 is used as-is; nothing here re-reads the roster by a second path. SINGLE USE, TWICE AND INDEPENDENTLY. A conditional UPDATE only one caller can win, and Cognito leaving FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD. Neither depends on the other. The code is verified BEFORE the invitation is consumed, so a stranger with a wrong code cannot burn somebody else's invitation — a denial of service delivered by the replay defence. RATE LIMITED in two places. A rolling per-invitation counter in one UPDATE with a CASE, because read-then-write loses attempts under concurrency; and an in-process per-client limiter that makes a flood cheap to refuse. The in-process one is keyed on the client address and NOT on the email, on purpose: keying on the email would let an attacker spend a victim's budget from anywhere and leave the victim refused on the one page they must use. PASSWORD POLICY. Stated once, shown live as the person types, checked on the server, and held to the pool: password-policy.test.ts PARSES cognito.tf and fails if the two disagree, including the symbol set and the temporary-password validity that bounds the invitation TTL. A UI that accepts what Cognito rejects is a dead end at the one moment the person has no second attempt. SESSIONS. Setting a password revokes. The only sessions a person with no password can have are dev-login sessions — an address plus a shared passphrase, with no proof of ownership — and choosing a password is the moment their own claim to the account begins. The mechanism is a delete from `Session`, the register #104 makes authoritative, rather than a second watermark of our own; until #104 lands nothing reads that table, and the code says so. The control carrying the weight today is that activation issues NO session at all: the person signs in fresh, through the path everybody else uses. ISSUING. scripts/activation-invitations.mjs runs under an OPERATOR's credentials. It does NOT create accounts — #108 owns that — it installs a code as an existing account's temporary password, then reads the account back and refuses unless the pool left it in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, because RESET_REQUIRED would send the person to an emailed recovery code that cannot be delivered. Codes are written to one file at mode 0600 and to nowhere else; stdout goes to scrollback, to shell transcripts and to build logs. The code is never stored: the table holds scrypt(code, salt). The script and the application are two implementations of one format, because one is .mjs and the other is TypeScript. activation-code-agreement.test.mjs loads both and fails if they disagree on the alphabet, the hash of the same input, the password rules or the lifetime — drift there would lock out the whole cohort, one person at a time. A FAULT IS A REFUSAL. Every unexpected exception is caught at the boundary and answered as `refused`, because on this surface a distinguishable failure IS the vulnerability: the audit write happens only when an invitation exists, so a database fault would otherwise render as a 500 for an invited address and as the ordinary refusal page for a stranger — the one question this flow is built to refuse to answer, given away by a transient fault nobody was watching for. The fault is logged with the address, server-side, where it can be acted on. That catch is deliberately unable to lie about a completed activation. The two steps that run after Cognito accepts — the revocation and the ALLOW audit row — are individually guarded where they are, so nothing between a successful setPassword and `activated` can throw. A revocation that failed is written into the audit reason rather than reported as success; #104's own post-review fix was that lesson in the other direction. VERIFIED. tsc, jest (1962), test:isolation against a real PostgreSQL, and next build. Twenty-two negative controls were run: each break was applied with an asserted anchor, watched go red, reverted, and watched go green. Three of them found real gaps and are why the suite is bigger than it was — the sequential replay was caught by consume alone, so neither replay defence was individually pinned; the measured timing bound was two derivations wide, which is exactly one derivation too wide to catch a branch that skips one; and the first version of the fault guard still let a throwing ALLOW audit write turn a set password into "that did not work". REBASED three times while this was in flight — onto #113 (the sealed registry, whose three-fact RegistryLookup this now uses as-is), #94 (the SES send layer, which does not change the sandbox this design is shaped by) and #119 (which renamed the unit and rebuilt the sign-in page, so the "New here?" entry was re-applied to its new structure rather than merged into the old one). The naming commit was dropped: #119 landed the same correction first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`main` moved five commits under this branch and two of them landed in the same files. #119 rebuilt /signin as two zones — an institution backdrop and a card — and deliberately KEPT dev-login inside it as a de-emphasised "Pilot access" panel, because removing it was this change's job and doing it there would have locked out the ~81 people with no Cognito account. So the resolution is the new layout with that panel taken out: `devLoginEnabled`, `passphraseRequired`, `devSignIn` and `PILOT_TITLE_ID` are gone, the Cognito form's `: null` becomes the sentence that says why there is no form, and the card is one form and one notice. Four things the merge exposed, each a real defect rather than a textual clash: - The divider test asserted a divider EXISTS. #119's card has no "Or" at all — the SSO notice is a labelled panel, not an alternative — so the test failed on a page that is correct precisely because it draws none. It now asserts the invariant (every separator is guarded by something governing its neighbour), which a page with no separators satisfies, plus a separate row recording that today there are none. - ADR-0015 collided. `main`'s index reserves 0015 BY NAME for the platform exception object and 0016 for another change in the same merge sequence, and `decision-records.test.ts` fails a reserved number that has a file. This change's ADR takes 0019; all 13 references moved with it. - `.env.example` — which RUNBOOK.md calls the file that documents every variable for local setup — still assigned all three retired switches and named no COGNITO_* variable at all, so following the documentation produced an app with no provider and a sign-in page with no form. Neither standing guard could see it: one walks `src` for TypeScript, the other walks `*.tf`. Both now also read `.env.example`, for the dead switches and for the live ones. - RUNBOOK's "while it is still on" procedure told an operator to set DEV_LOGIN_PASSPHRASE as a repository secret, or let Terraform generate one into `tenure-pilot/dev-login`. This change deletes both mechanisms, so read after the merge it was a procedure that appears to work and does nothing. `restricted-registry.test.ts` takes main's SEEDED_AND_SEALED() with this branch's provider name; `app.spec.ts` takes main's "Office of Student Engagement", which retires the last of the four Experience strings the PR body had flagged as out of scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`signin-cognito.spec.ts` asserted `dividers === ssoNotices` — one "Or" for each SSO notice. That was a fact about the old single-column card, not the property being defended, and it failed against #119's card, which introduces the notice with its own heading and draws no separator at all. The direction is what matters: never a divider with less than two things to divide. `dividers <= ssoNotices` keeps the regression it was written for (a separator with one option beside it) and stops asserting a separator has to exist. Caught by running the suite, not by reading it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ample naming Okta (#123) Follow-up to #119, from adversarially verifying it. Its measured claims held — tsc, jest, build, 163/163 Playwright in CI shape and 33/33 with Cognito on all reproduce exactly. Two things did not. ## The `basename` control did not exist #119 said, in the PR body and in two source comments, that `institution-mark.test.ts` "plants a real file exactly where a `basename` implementation would land and proves it is still refused." Measured: it does not. Replacing the whitelist in `institutionAssetUrl` with `path.basename` leaves all nine tests green. The reasoning behind it was backwards too. `path.basename("../simon-ose")` is `"simon-ose"`, which resolves INSIDE the brand directory — a miss, not "quietly a hit". The planted file sits in the PARENT, which is where an UNGUARDED implementation lands; that test is a real control against deleting the guard (verified: deleting it turns that test red) and no control at all against the alternative it named. The whitelist is still the right guard, for a reason worth stating correctly and one that matters more in a product with more than one tenant: basename does not refuse a malformed slug, it rewrites it into a different valid one. `../tenure` becomes `tenure`, finds `tenure.svg` sitting in the same directory, and returns it — so a cell whose slug arrived malformed would serve ANOTHER TENANT'S MARK on its own login page, successfully, with nothing broken to notice. So: both comments corrected to say what is true, and the missing control added. All three states run, not reasoned about: guard deleted both tests red guard -> basename cross-tenant red, traversal GREEN guard as written 10/10 green The cross-tenant test is therefore the strictly stronger of the two and the traversal test cannot stand in for it. Both are kept because they fail for different reasons and name different risks — one escapes the directory, the other stays inside it and serves the wrong institution. ## `.env.example` documented an identity provider the app cannot use It declared `OKTA_ISSUER`, `OKTA_CLIENT_ID` and `OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET` and said setting all three "switches the app to Okta". Nothing has ever read an `OKTA_*` variable — `src/lib/env.ts` does not declare one — so an operator following the only sign-in template in the repository would have set three values, restarted, found the interim passphrase form still sitting there, and had no name to grep for. The four variables that actually do it were not in the file at all. Replaced with the `COGNITO_*` block, which is what `cognitoConfigFromEnv` and `env.ts` read. Deleted rather than commented out, because a commented-out variable is something an operator uncomments. `COGNITO_REGION` is left empty: `AWS_REGION` is already set in this file and is the documented fallback, and filling it in would trip the partial-configuration warning on every local boot (verified — that warning fires today). No behaviour change: `InstitutionMark.tsx` is comment-only. Gate, re-run in full after the change: npx tsc --noEmit pass npx jest 122 suites, 1874 passed, 1 skipped npm run build pass playwright 168/168 CI shape; 33/33 with COGNITO_* set Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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* A first password, set with a code the Office hands over Today nobody in the cohort can sign in. An account created by provision-cognito-cohort.mjs sits in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, cognito.ts refuses that as `challenge-required`, and there was nothing to challenge them with — so a perfect 82/82 provisioning run still leaves 82 people outside. This is the missing half. THE CONSTRAINT THAT SHAPED IT. SES is in the sandbox: 200 a day, one per second, verified recipients only, 0 of 9 DKIM records published. Cognito's invitation mail and ForgotPassword's code are both messages, and neither can reach a student. The send layer landing in #94 does not change that — the sandbox is a state of the AWS account, not a gap in the code. So the question was never which Cognito API; it was how a person proves who they are when no channel to them exists. PD-007 writes the answer down, and activation.ts opens with the threat model rather than leaving it implied. The answer: the Office hands over a one-time code, and that code IS the account's Cognito temporary password. The trust anchor is the handover, said plainly. What the code can do is make sure that handover, and only that handover, becomes an account. WHY THE CODE IS THE TEMPORARY PASSWORD. cognito.tf grants the task role AdminInitiateAuth, AdminRespondToAuthChallenge and AdminGetUser, and deliberately not AdminSetUserPassword. Answering NEW_PASSWORD_REQUIRED is therefore the only way this application can set a first password, and that challenge is reachable only with the temporary password. No new IAM grant, no second secret to exchange. It also means a stolen code cannot produce a session: AdminInitiateAuth with a temporary password returns a challenge and no tokens. ENUMERATION. Every refusal about the address, the invitation or the code is one value with one message — not-on-the-roster, no-invitation, wrong-code, already-used, expired and rate-limited are indistinguishable. In TIME as well: every branch pays exactly one scrypt derivation, against a decoy when there is nothing real to check, and the whole action is padded to a 900 ms floor. activation-timing.test.ts asserts both — the derivation count structurally, and the measured spread against a tolerance calibrated to one derivation on the machine it runs on rather than a millisecond figure that means different things on a laptop and a runner. The password answers are the exception, and the ORDER of the checks is what keeps that safe: "too short" and "they do not match" are decided before the address is looked at, so they are a function of what the person typed and of nothing else. ELIGIBILITY, and one asymmetry that is deliberate. Activation passes requireRegistry: true, which sign-in does not. An empty or unsealed registry at sign-in means an unenforced gate for people who already have accounts; here it would mean anyone holding any code could mint one. This path creates access, so it fails closed — the direction that costs an outage rather than an intruder. The three-fact RegistryLookup from #113 is used as-is; nothing here re-reads the roster by a second path. SINGLE USE, TWICE AND INDEPENDENTLY. A conditional UPDATE only one caller can win, and Cognito leaving FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD. Neither depends on the other. The code is verified BEFORE the invitation is consumed, so a stranger with a wrong code cannot burn somebody else's invitation — a denial of service delivered by the replay defence. RATE LIMITED in two places. A rolling per-invitation counter in one UPDATE with a CASE, because read-then-write loses attempts under concurrency; and an in-process per-client limiter that makes a flood cheap to refuse. The in-process one is keyed on the client address and NOT on the email, on purpose: keying on the email would let an attacker spend a victim's budget from anywhere and leave the victim refused on the one page they must use. PASSWORD POLICY. Stated once, shown live as the person types, checked on the server, and held to the pool: password-policy.test.ts PARSES cognito.tf and fails if the two disagree, including the symbol set and the temporary-password validity that bounds the invitation TTL. A UI that accepts what Cognito rejects is a dead end at the one moment the person has no second attempt. SESSIONS. Setting a password revokes. The only sessions a person with no password can have are dev-login sessions — an address plus a shared passphrase, with no proof of ownership — and choosing a password is the moment their own claim to the account begins. The mechanism is a delete from `Session`, the register #104 makes authoritative, rather than a second watermark of our own; until #104 lands nothing reads that table, and the code says so. The control carrying the weight today is that activation issues NO session at all: the person signs in fresh, through the path everybody else uses. ISSUING. scripts/activation-invitations.mjs runs under an OPERATOR's credentials. It does NOT create accounts — #108 owns that — it installs a code as an existing account's temporary password, then reads the account back and refuses unless the pool left it in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD, because RESET_REQUIRED would send the person to an emailed recovery code that cannot be delivered. Codes are written to one file at mode 0600 and to nowhere else; stdout goes to scrollback, to shell transcripts and to build logs. The code is never stored: the table holds scrypt(code, salt). The script and the application are two implementations of one format, because one is .mjs and the other is TypeScript. activation-code-agreement.test.mjs loads both and fails if they disagree on the alphabet, the hash of the same input, the password rules or the lifetime — drift there would lock out the whole cohort, one person at a time. A FAULT IS A REFUSAL. Every unexpected exception is caught at the boundary and answered as `refused`, because on this surface a distinguishable failure IS the vulnerability: the audit write happens only when an invitation exists, so a database fault would otherwise render as a 500 for an invited address and as the ordinary refusal page for a stranger — the one question this flow is built to refuse to answer, given away by a transient fault nobody was watching for. The fault is logged with the address, server-side, where it can be acted on. That catch is deliberately unable to lie about a completed activation. The two steps that run after Cognito accepts — the revocation and the ALLOW audit row — are individually guarded where they are, so nothing between a successful setPassword and `activated` can throw. A revocation that failed is written into the audit reason rather than reported as success; #104's own post-review fix was that lesson in the other direction. VERIFIED. tsc, jest (1962), test:isolation against a real PostgreSQL, and next build. Twenty-two negative controls were run: each break was applied with an asserted anchor, watched go red, reverted, and watched go green. Three of them found real gaps and are why the suite is bigger than it was — the sequential replay was caught by consume alone, so neither replay defence was individually pinned; the measured timing bound was two derivations wide, which is exactly one derivation too wide to catch a branch that skips one; and the first version of the fault guard still let a throwing ALLOW audit write turn a set password into "that did not work". REBASED three times while this was in flight — onto #113 (the sealed registry, whose three-fact RegistryLookup this now uses as-is), #94 (the SES send layer, which does not change the sandbox this design is shaped by) and #119 (which renamed the unit and rebuilt the sign-in page, so the "New here?" entry was re-applied to its new structure rather than merged into the old one). The naming commit was dropped: #119 landed the same correction first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * The rate limiter cannot be flushed by the client it is refusing Map.set on a key that already exists does not move it, so the front of the window map is the FIRST-SEEN key rather than the oldest window. Evicting from the front therefore dropped an exhausted client's own record before any of the forged addresses that displaced it: twenty attempts, a flood of rotating X-Forwarded-For values, and a fresh window. charge() now deletes before re-inserting, so map order really is oldest-window- first, and eviction skips any window that is at or above the limit. Age is the tie-break among windows that are refusing nobody, not the criterion. When every window held is refusing somebody the cap still holds by dropping the oldest -- reaching that state costs the attacker limit x maxKeys requests to buy back one window. The suite's 'drops the OLDEST windows when it evicts' case asserted the defect as intended behaviour; it is replaced by the control that reproduces the attack. * Pin the Map.set ordering invariant the eviction tie-break rests on A negative control found the delete-before-set entirely untested: removing it left all twelve cases green. This is the case that discriminates -- a key seen first whose window re-opened last must NOT be read as the oldest window. * The issuing script writes the row before the pool, and opens its file first Four findings on scripts/activation-invitations.mjs. The output file was written with writeFileSync(..., {mode: 0o600, flag: 'w'}). mode is applied by the kernel only on CREATION, so a re-run into the same --out, or a path an operator touched, put 82 live temporary passwords into whatever permissions that file already had. It is now opened with 'wx' and fchmod-ed on the descriptor, and a path that exists is refused rather than replaced. It was also opened only AFTER the whole loop of pool mutations, so a missing directory or a read-only volume lost every code that had just been installed while leaving every account in FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD with a password nobody knew. It is now opened, proved and given its header before the first AdminSetUserPassword, and each code is appended and fsync-ed as it is issued. AdminSetUserPassword ran before the database row was written. A failure in between discarded the code while the account's temporary password WAS that code -- and under --rotate the row still held the previous hash, so the old code verified, consume() spent the invitation, the pool refused, and setPassword mapped that to 'refused', the one reason that does not restore. Burnt for good. The row is now written FIRST and already expired, and given its real expiry only once the pool has confirmed FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD; every partial failure now leaves an invitation nobody can redeem, which a re-run repairs. The catch names the last step that succeeded and prints the remedy, including the one case where a live credential is loose. planInvitations promised 'reissue' for a redeemed invitation under --rotate that the run always refused as CONFIRMED. The plan now takes each address's Cognito UserStatus -- read on the dry-run path too -- and can say 'refuse'. It still plans a rotation for the redeemed-but-never-confirmed case, which is a real state and the only remedy for it. The doing half is now issueOneInvitation, behind ports, so the ordering and every partial failure are asserted rather than described. * Pin the fchmod: a negative control found it untested Removing fchmodSync left the suite green, because a default umask of 022 takes nothing out of 0600. The case that discriminates sets a umask that does. * The index the redemption read needs, and one query count for everybody Two lows. ActivationInvitation had no index that could serve findInvitation's read. It filters on emailNormalized alone, and both existing indexes lead with institutionId -- a btree cannot seek on a predicate that names only the second column. So the redemption path's 'one indexed read', which the constant-time argument in activation.ts is sized against, was a sequential scan on a table reached from a public unauthenticated form. Additive migration, one index. lookupRegistry ran a different NUMBER of queries depending on the address: a roster member returned after findMany + seal, a stranger additionally paid for a table-wide count. Slower meant 'not on the list', which is the informative direction, and only the 900ms response floor hid it -- on the activation form only, since sign-in has no floor. The count is now an existence probe (LIMIT 1 rather than a tally, so it is cheap enough to run unconditionally) and it joins the other two reads. Three queries, same shape, whoever is asking. * Pin the audit trail, and name the caller that fails closed Two lows an adversarial pass found, neither of which any test could see. FOUR of the five meaningful columns on the AuditEvent row this flow writes were unasserted. Replacing `outcome: entry.outcome` with a hard-coded "ALLOW" left 1,988 unit tests and 107 isolation tests green -- a refused attempt would have been written into an append-only log as a successful one and nothing would have said so. `reason`, `resourceId` and the address in `metadata` survived the same treatment. Only the ALLOW row had ever been looked at, so only the ALLOW row was held, and the refusals are the half an operator actually reads: the response says nothing on purpose, and the trail is where the real reason is kept. Two tests now cover the DENY row -- its outcome, action, resource, address and reason -- and the ALLOW assertions gain the three columns they were missing. All five mutations go red and restore green. The multi-refusal test compares SORTED reasons: `occurredAt` comes from one `now()` per attempt, two attempts can share a millisecond, and an assertion that depends on which of two equal timestamps the planner returns first is a test that fails once a month for a reason nobody can reproduce. And `eligibility.ts` still said "NOTHING PASSES IT TODAY" of `requireRegistry`, naming first-time activation as the path that would pass it "on another branch". This is that branch, and it landed -- so the comment claimed a boundary was unenforced at the one call site where it IS enforced. That is the inverse of the defect the same paragraph warns about, and it is a comment, so a rule in prose would recur. `eligibility.test.ts` now scans the tree for call sites that pass the option -- comments stripped, so a file that merely describes it is not mistaken for one that passes it -- and fails if the paragraph does not name each one. Both directions negatively controlled: removing the name goes red, and so does removing the call, which is what stops the gate passing vacuously. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Re-run CI: the previous push did not fire a pull_request event 3dc56fe was pushed to this branch and GitHub created no check run for it -- zero on /commits/3dc56fe/check-runs, while pull_request CI fired for three other branches in the same ten minutes. Nothing about that commit explains it: it touches two test files and one comment, and the same push credential triggered the run on a7275a2 an hour earlier. An empty commit is the smallest thing that re-fires `synchronize` without changing what is being reviewed. If this one runs, the gate is green on content identical to 3dc56fe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * The isolation edge comment counted 41 models; the merged schema has 45 The number that matters there is the numerator — 14 UNENFORCEABLE, which is unchanged — but the denominator had drifted through four model additions and nothing guards prose in this file the way registry.test.ts guards registry.ts's. Measured with grep -c '^model ' against the merged schema.prisma. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Redo of a track that died mid-run. The dead branch was based on
b125b27; its diff againsttoday's
maindeleted the SES production-access workflow and the Cognito cohort provisioner,both of which landed after it. This is rebuilt on current
mainand rebased onto044e321(#113) after that merged mid-run.
1. The unit is Engagement
lib/policies.tsalready said Engagement.lib/tenant/brand.ts:151said Experience, and thatis the string the live sign-in page renders. Renamed at all five sites, each anchor asserted
before and after the edit:
apps/web/src/lib/tenant/brand.ts:151apps/web/src/lib/tenant/brand.test.ts:15apps/web/e2e/app.spec.ts:48getByText(..., { exact: true })docs/HANDOFF.md:26docs/decisions/ADR-0014grep -rn "Student Experience"over the repo returns zero.2. The
Simon-OSEpill is gone — and so isdisplaySlugYou asked me to check whether the field still had a purpose. It did not. The pill at
page.tsx:138was its only reader anywhere in the tree; every other reference was the interfacedeclaration, the two registry entries, and two tests asserting it agreed with
slug.So it is removed. A slug is a key — what a hostname, a URL segment and a database row are keyed
by — and the URL people are actually given (
/SimonOSE) is handled byTENANT_ROUTE_ALIASES,which never used this field. The names a person reads are
institutionNameandunitName.The two tests are replaced by their inverse:
carries no key that is written to be read by a personfails if the field comes back. Negative control run — re-addingdisplaySlugto theSimon entry turns it red.
3. The logo slot — no logo, on purpose
Nothing was downloaded, scraped, embedded or recreated. We hold no licence to the University
of Rochester / Simon Business School lockup, and an unlicensed approximation on the
institution's own login page is the worst possible place to be wrong.
public/brand/ships witha README and no image.
InstitutionMarkrenders a supplied file when one exists and otherwise sets the institution'sname as a wordmark. The fallback is a finished typographic treatment, not a broken state — it is
what ships today and what a tenant that never supplies a file keeps.
To supply the real file, drop it in. No code change.
apps/web/public/brand/simon-ose.svg(preferred) or.pngTENANT_SLUG/brand/simon-ose.svg#003b71, not on white. Transparent background.viewBox; no external refs, no embedded raster, no<script>; text converted to outlines; < ~40 KBAspect ratio is free:
object-containletterboxes rather than distorting.Verified end to end by planting a throwaway SVG, confirming it rendered at the right size with
alt="Simon Business School"preserved, then deleting it. No image is in this diff.institutionAssetUrlresolves against the filesystem rather than a registry field, because aregistry field naming a file that does not exist renders a broken image until someone notices.
The slug reaches a filesystem path, so it is whitelisted rather than
basenamed — a test plantsa real file exactly where a
basenameimplementation would land and proves it is still refused.(The other traversal test passes with the guard deleted; that is why both exist.)
4. The page has a hierarchy now
Two zones. The backdrop answers whose system is this — the institution's mark, the unit,
and one line on what it is for, on the tenant's own brand field. The card answers how do I
get in and holds nothing else.
It used to open with the Tenure wordmark at 24 px and our tagline, so the first two things a
person read on their university's login page were the vendor's name and the vendor's pitch, and
the field they came to fill in was third. Tenure is now an eyebrow above the rule — attributed,
quiet — and "Sign in" is the first line of the card.
Below
lgthe zones stack, institution first. Above it they sit side by side: a 420 px columncentred in 2560 px of brand field reads as a dialog that failed to open.
Existing tokens only, no parallel colour system, no
oklch()(ADR-0011). The tenant's secondbrand colour is used exactly once, as a 32 px decorative rule, and never for text — measured,
Simon's dandelion on Rochester Blue is 7.7:1 and would be fine, but the neutral tenant's own
pair is 2.65:1. The registry takes two colours from a tenant and can promise nothing about
the contrast between them, so backdrop text is white at a measured opacity (8.0:1 and 6.9:1).
Also fixed: the input focus indicator was
focus:outline-noneplus a 1 px border hue shift —on a password field, where it matters most. It now uses the product's own
--shadow-focus.5. Cognito is the visual primary
The two forms were identical — same fields, same green button, same word on it — which offered
two equal doors and said nothing about which one disappears. Cognito now leads the card with the
primary treatment; the interim block is a recessed panel with a heading and a secondary button.
CredentialsSignInFormgained atoneprop rather than aclassName, because the pendingspinner has to be recoloured with the button and that is exactly what a caller passing a class
string would forget. The primary treatment follows whichever door is actually the way in:
with no
COGNITO_*configured (local dev, and the e2e job) the pilot form is the only form onthe page and takes the primary treatment back.
Both buttons still say "Sign in", because both do, and the e2e suite names them by accessible
name.
Dev login is NOT removed
It is intact and rendering. Its removal is #112, which cannot land until Cognito is
populated — ~81 people have no account yet and would be locked out. What changed here is its
weight, not its presence. The region's accessible name is still exactly
Pilot access(now via
aria-labelledbyon the visible heading, so it is not announced twice), which is whate2e/support/auth.tslocates it by.Verification
Rebased onto
044e321(#113) mid-run and re-verified from scratch — #113's schema changerequired
prisma generate, which surfaced 13 type errors that were not mine and are now gone.npx tsc --noEmitnpx jestnpm run buildapp,signin-routing,dev-login-gate,entitlementThe Cognito-on run matters: CI sets no
COGNITO_*, so the e2e job has never rendered thetwo-form layout that production actually serves. Both were run.
Negative controls (committed first; all three went red, then green on restore)
institutionAssetUrldisplaySlugto the Simon entrybrand.tsto "Experience"Screenshots
Taken against this exact commit, viewport shots checked separately from full-page.
Light and dark both verified, with the pre-hydration
html.darkclass confirmed present ratherthan assumed. Body text length is identical at every size — nothing is dropped responsively.
On the full-page screenshots: they show a cream band below the first viewport height. That
is the artifact this repo has produced before, not a defect.
TenantBackdropisposition: fixed, so a full-page capture only paints it once. Scrolled to the bottom in a real1280x800 viewport, the footer sits on ink and is legible — verified by scrolling and
re-capturing, not by reasoning about it.
Two things I did not fix, and why
--bg-basebehind the fixed backdrop.Pre-existing, shared with
access-pendingandTenantSplash, and fixing it means touchingthe global body background or repositioning a component three surfaces use. Out of scope here.
apps/web/.env.examplestill documents Okta ("Setting all three switches the app toOkta") in a Cognito-only product. Stale developer documentation, not a live path — flagging it
rather than widening this PR.
Note for the reviewer
The e2e suite is not idempotent — it mutates seeded state, so a second run against the same
database fails on finance/reimbursement. Every number above is from a dropped-and-reseeded
database. Separately, something on this machine SIGTERMs
next startevery ~30 s (other agentsrunning
pkill node); runs were supervised and the oneERR_CONNECTION_REFUSEDcasualty passed15/15 when its spec file was re-run against a live server.
Do not merge.
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