Require MFA for organization settings

.changeset/organization-settings-verification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"@executor-js/cloud": patch
+---
+
+Require authenticator verification for organization settings while preserving shared workspace reads and API-key access.

apps/cloud/src/account/account-api.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+import { env } from "cloudflare:workers";
+import { ADMIN_MFA_COOKIE, readAdminMfaProof } from "../auth/admin-mfa-proof";
 import { HttpRouter, HttpServerRequest } from "effect/unstable/http";
-import { Effect, Layer } from "effect";
+import { Clock, Effect, Layer } from "effect";
 
 import {
   AccountProvider,
@@ -75,6 +77,16 @@ const AccountProviderMiddleware = HttpRouter.middleware<{
         // session is `""` (vs `SessionAuthLive`, which keeps the inbound cookie).
         const session: Session | null = resolved ? sessionFromSealed(resolved, "") : null;
 
+        const proof = resolved
+          ? yield* readAdminMfaProof(
+              env.WORKOS_COOKIE_PASSWORD,
+              { userId: resolved.userId, sessionId: resolved.sessionId },
+              "verified",
+              request.cookies[ADMIN_MFA_COOKIE],
+              yield* Clock.currentTimeMillis,
+            )
+          : null;
+
         // Built inside the request body so the WorkOS account service closes
         // over the per-request `UserStoreService` (postgres socket) supplied by
         // the combined request-scoped layer. `local` keeps that promise: the
@@ -84,7 +96,7 @@ const AccountProviderMiddleware = HttpRouter.middleware<{
           AccountProvider.asEffect(),
           workosAccountProvider.pipe(
             Layer.provide(ApiKeyService.WorkOS),
-            Layer.provide(Layer.succeed(AccountCaller)({ session })),
+            Layer.provide(Layer.succeed(AccountCaller)({ session, adminVerified: proof !== null })),
           ),
           { local: true },
         );

apps/cloud/src/account/workos-account-service.ts

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 // the same `WorkOSClient.authenticateSealedSession` the rest of cloud uses.
 export class AccountCaller extends Context.Service<
   AccountCaller,
-  { readonly session: Session | null }
+  { readonly session: Session | null; readonly adminVerified?: boolean }
 >()("@executor-js/cloud/AccountCaller") {}
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -146,6 +146,16 @@
     const requireAdmin = (org: { readonly memberRole: "admin" | "member" }) =>
       org.memberRole === "admin" ? Effect.void : Effect.fail(new AccountForbidden());
 
+    // Settings mutations require MFA; shared member reads and key management do not.
+    const requireVerifiedSettings = (org: { readonly memberRole: "admin" | "member" }) =>
+      Effect.gen(function* () {
+        yield* requireAdmin(org);
+        if (caller.adminVerified !== true)
+          return yield* new AccountForbidden({
+            message: "Verify your identity to change organization settings.",
+          });
+      });
+
     // Ownership check so an admin can't mutate a membership id from another
     // org: the id must name a row the mirror holds for THIS org (any status —
     // revoking a pending invite is a delete too). One point read on the
@@ -390,7 +400,7 @@
       inviteMember: (headers, body) =>
         Effect.gen(function* () {
           const { org } = yield* requireOrganization(headers);
-          yield* requireAdmin(org);
+          yield* requireVerifiedSettings(org);
           yield* reserveMemberSlot(org.id);
           const invitation = yield* workos
             .sendInvitation({
@@ -422,7 +432,7 @@
       removeMember: (headers, membershipId) =>
         Effect.gen(function* () {
           const { org } = yield* requireOrganization(headers);
-          yield* requireAdmin(org);
+          yield* requireVerifiedSettings(org);
           const membership = yield* assertMembershipInOrg(org.id, membershipId);
           yield* workos
             .deleteOrgMembership(membershipId)
@@ -453,7 +463,7 @@
       updateMemberRole: (headers, membershipId, roleSlug) =>
         Effect.gen(function* () {
           const { org } = yield* requireOrganization(headers);
-          yield* requireAdmin(org);
+          yield* requireVerifiedSettings(org);
           yield* assertMembershipInOrg(org.id, membershipId);
           const updated = yield* workos
             .updateOrgMembershipRole(membershipId, roleSlug)
@@ -467,7 +477,7 @@
       updateOrgName: (headers, name) =>
         Effect.gen(function* () {
           const { org } = yield* requireOrganization(headers);
-          yield* requireAdmin(org);
+          yield* requireVerifiedSettings(org);
           const updated = yield* workos
             .updateOrganization(org.id, name)
             .pipe(Effect.catchTag("WorkOSError", toAccountError));

apps/cloud/src/api/router.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { UserStoreService } from "../auth/context";
 import { WorkOsMirror } from "../auth/workos-mirror";
 import { DbService } from "../db/db";
 import { makeAccountApiLive } from "../account/account-api";
+import { AdminMfaRoutes } from "../auth/admin-mfa-routes";
 
 import { AutumnRoutesLive } from "../extensions/billing/route";
 import { CloudDocsLive } from "../extensions/docs";
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ export const makeApiLive = (
     Layer.provide(requestScopedMiddleware(requestScopedLive).layer),
   );
   return Layer.mergeAll(
+    AdminMfaRoutes.pipe(Layer.provide(requestScopedMiddleware(requestScopedLive).layer)),
     makeNonProtectedApiLive(requestScopedLive),
     makeOrgApiLive(requestScopedLive),
     makeAccountApiLive(requestScopedLive),

apps/cloud/src/auth/admin-mfa-proof.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+import { Data, Effect, Option, Schema } from "effect";
+import { SignJWT, jwtVerify } from "jose";
+
+/** HttpOnly cookies used only for the administrative verification flow. */
+export const ADMIN_MFA_COOKIE = "__Host-executor-admin-mfa";
+/** The pending challenge is bound to the same user and WorkOS session. */
+export const ADMIN_MFA_CHALLENGE_COOKIE = "__Host-executor-admin-challenge";
+/** Verification is session-bound, with a seven-day maximum matching the login cookie. */
+export const ADMIN_MFA_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+/** A verified WorkOS session, supplied by the authentication adapter. */
+export interface AdminMfaIdentity {
+  readonly userId: string;
+  readonly sessionId: string;
+}
+
+const Proof = Schema.Struct({
+  factorId: Schema.String,
+  challengeId: Schema.String,
+  mode: Schema.Literals(["enroll", "challenge"]),
+  exp: Schema.Number,
+});
+const decodeProof = Schema.decodeUnknownOption(Proof);
+
+/** Signing failures are server failures; invalid input cookies are simply refused. */
+export class AdminMfaProofError extends Data.TaggedError("AdminMfaProofError")<{
+  readonly cause: unknown;
+}> {}
+
+type Purpose = "challenge" | "verified";
+const issuer = (purpose: Purpose) => `executor:admin-mfa:${purpose}`;
+const key = (secret: string) => new TextEncoder().encode(secret);
+
+/** Sign a purpose-specific, session-bound proof with an explicit expiration. */
+export const signAdminMfaProof = (
+  secret: string,
+  identity: AdminMfaIdentity,
+  purpose: Purpose,
+  proof: typeof Proof.Type,
+  now: number,
+) =>
+  Effect.tryPromise({
+    try: () =>
+      new SignJWT({ factorId: proof.factorId, challengeId: proof.challengeId, mode: proof.mode })
+        .setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
+        .setIssuer(issuer(purpose))
+        .setSubject(identity.userId)
+        .setAudience(identity.sessionId)
+        .setIssuedAt(Math.floor(now / 1000))
+        .setExpirationTime(proof.exp)
+        .sign(key(secret)),
+    catch: (cause) => new AdminMfaProofError({ cause }),
+  });
+
+/** Reject expired, tampered, cross-user, cross-session, and wrong-purpose proofs. */
+export const readAdminMfaProof = (
+  secret: string,
+  identity: AdminMfaIdentity,
+  purpose: Purpose,
+  token: string | undefined,
+  now: number,
+) => {
+  if (!token) return Effect.succeed(null);
+  return Effect.tryPromise({
+    try: () =>
+      jwtVerify(token, key(secret), {
+        algorithms: ["HS256"],
+        issuer: issuer(purpose),
+        subject: identity.userId,
+        audience: identity.sessionId,
+        requiredClaims: ["exp", "iat", "sub", "aud"],
+        maxTokenAge: purpose === "challenge" ? 300 : ADMIN_MFA_TTL_SECONDS,
+        currentDate: new Date(now),
+      }),
+    catch: (cause) => new AdminMfaProofError({ cause }),
+  }).pipe(
+    Effect.map(({ payload }) => {
+      const maxAge = purpose === "challenge" ? 300 : ADMIN_MFA_TTL_SECONDS;
+      if (
+        typeof payload.iat !== "number" ||
+        typeof payload.exp !== "number" ||
+        payload.exp > payload.iat + maxAge
+      )
+        return null;
+      return Option.getOrNull(decodeProof(payload));
+    }),
+    Effect.catchTag("AdminMfaProofError", () => Effect.succeed(null)),
+  );
+};