Only the latest release receives security fixes.

1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred): Report here
2. Email: protoscience@anulum.li
3. Subject: [SECURITY] Director-AI — <brief description>
4. Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide a fix within 7 days for critical issues.

Security concerns for Director-AI:

• Prompt injection: adversarial inputs designed to bypass coherence oversight
• Metric evasion: inputs crafted to produce high coherence scores for hallucinated outputs (false negatives)
• Knowledge base poisoning: malicious entries that corrupt factual scoring
• Model deserialization: unsafe loading of NLI model weights
• Dependency supply chain: compromised upstream packages

• Dual-entropy scoring: NLI contradiction detection + RAG fact-checking
• Opt-in streaming contradiction halt: completed streamed claims can be checked against retrieved grounding facts; this is an interlock for grounded streaming deployments, not the sole production gate
• Safety kernel: hardware-level output interlock with emergency stop
• Two-stage prompt injection detection: Stage 1 — InputSanitizer detects instruction overrides, role-play injections, delimiter tricks, output manipulation, and data exfiltration attempts; scrubs null bytes, control chars, and homoglyphs. Stage 2 — InjectionDetector measures output divergence from original intent via bidirectional NLI scoring; catches injection effects regardless of encoding; per-claim attribution with grounded/drifted/injected verdicts
• YAML policy engine: Policy blocks forbidden phrases, enforces length limits, requires citations, and evaluates custom regex rules
• Multi-tenant isolation: TenantRouter guarantees per-tenant KB separation with thread-safe access
• Structured audit trail: AuditLogger writes JSONL with SHA-256 query hashes (never plaintext queries) for compliance and forensic review
• Minimal dependencies: core requires only numpy and requests
• No pickle.load of untrusted data in any module
• CI security audit: pip-audit runs on every push

Upstream advisories against optional dependencies, with whether they apply to Director-AI's usage:

• chromadb — CVE-2026-45830/45831/45833 (GHSA-2wm9-hf6c-p5cr, GHSA-xph7-9rjv-w5fr, GHSA-36p7-vc44-83pf; high/high/critical, unpatched). These missing tenant-authorization, cross-tenant RBAC, and authenticated code-injection flaws affect the chromadb server through 1.5.9; no fixed release exists as of 2026-08-30. Not applicable to Director-AI: chromadb is an optional [vector] extra (not installed by pip install director-ai), and the ChromaDB backend uses only the embedded in-process client (chromadb.PersistentClient / chromadb.Client). Tests prohibit HttpClient, and the unused compose service that previously exposed port 8000 has been removed. We will repin to a patched chromadb release when one ships.

Director-AI is open core:

1. Core — Apache-2.0: the guardrail engine and supporting surfaces are permissively licensed and free for any use, including production and closed-source products, with no source-disclosure obligation.
2. Advanced & Labs — BUSL-1.1: source-available; free for non-production and evaluation, with each file converting to Apache-2.0 on its change date. Production or hosted use of the advanced tier needs a commercial license — contact protoscience@anulum.li.
3. Dependency compatibility: all runtime dependencies are permissively licensed (MIT/Apache-2.0/BSD), compatible with both tiers.

• No third-party security audit.
• Heuristic scorer (without NLI model) is deterministic and trivially bypassed.

External security test packet: security/EXTERNAL_SECURITY_TEST_PACKET.md. Execution gate: security/EXTERNAL_SECURITY_TEST_RUNBOOK.md.

Two transitive dependencies carry advisories for which no patched release exists, so they cannot be resolved by upgrade. Both are assessed as not exploitable in Director-AI's execution path; each is documented here and will be upgraded the moment a fixed version ships.

The three current advisories are GHSA-2wm9-hf6c-p5cr (missing tenant authorization), GHSA-xph7-9rjv-w5fr (SimpleRBACAuthorizationProvider cross-tenant authorization), and GHSA-36p7-vc44-83pf (authenticated code injection through collection updates with trust_remote_code). All affect the ChromaDB server through 1.5.9, and none has a patched release as of 2026-08-30.

Exposure: effectively nil. chromadb is an optional vector backend. The ChromaBackend integration uses chromadb in embedded mode only (PersistentClient(path=…) / in-memory Client()), never HttpClient against a running server and never trust_remote_code — the vulnerable server-side authentication, authorization, and HTTP collection-update paths are not reachable from Director-AI. This embedded-only boundary is covered by vector-store unit tests so future Chroma adapter changes cannot accidentally switch to the server client path. The dead chromadb/chroma:latest compose service and its host port publish were removed, eliminating the only shipped server exposure.

Upgrading within the vulnerable no-fix range is not a remediation. The alerts are dismissed as not used only after the embedded-only tests pass; when an upstream fixed release exists, regenerate and verify the vector extra lock from current main.

Memory corruption through torch.jit.script. Vulnerable range <= 2.12.0; no patched release exists.

Exposure: effectively nil. Director-AI does not call torch.jit.script (the only reference is a deprecation-warning suppression comment, not an invocation), so the vulnerable function is never reached.

When the NLI model repository itself becomes unavailable on the Hub, the opt-in fallback model registry (DirectorConfig.model_fallback_enabled) degrades to a vetted, revision-pinned alternate model rather than failing — narrowing the supply-chain availability surface.

InputSanitizer Stage 1 uses regex pattern matching. Before matching it defangs the input — NFKC normalisation, null/control/zero-width stripping, Cyrillic/Greek homoglyph folding to ASCII — and additionally scans the ROT13-decoded form, so the classic literal-evasion vectors are caught at Stage 1:

• Unicode homoglyphs (Cyrillic а vs Latin a) — folded before matching
• Zero-width characters inserted between keywords — stripped before matching
• ROT13-encoded instructions — re-scanned in clear
• Base64 payloads — detected by a dedicated decoder check

The folding is conservative (only ASCII-confusable code points), so benign Latin and non-Latin prose is not false-halted. The residual Stage 1 gap is semantic / prompt-level obfuscation (indirect references that contain no literal attack phrase in any encoding).

Mitigation for the residual: Stage 2 (InjectionDetector) uses bidirectional NLI divergence scoring to detect the effect of injection regardless of phrasing, and the optional model-backed Stage 1 classifier (prompt_guard) adds adaptive-attack coverage. Stage 1 remains a fast filter, not the sole defence — enable all stages for production.

If an attacker can modify KB entries (e.g., via an unprotected ingestion API), they can insert false "ground truth" that the scorer will validate against. Hallucinated outputs matching poisoned KB entries will score as grounded.

Mitigation: KB writes support HMAC-signed entries with tamper detection. Set knowledge_write_require_signature=True and supply knowledge_write_hmac_keys so writes with a missing or invalid signature are rejected; production_mode forces signature enforcement on. Combine with TenantRouter strict ACLs on KB writes and AuditLogger to detect unexpected modifications. The opt-in pre-model evidence firewall additionally screens retrieved chunks before they reach the model — checking tenant match, provenance, signature, content hash, expiry, source owner, sensitivity, allowed use case, and poisoning heuristics — and quarantines failing chunks.

Adversaries can craft outputs that the NLI model fails to detect as contradictions (adversarial examples). FactCG-DeBERTa-v3-Large is robust for general text but may miss:

• Numerical inconsistencies (e.g., "100" vs "101")
• Subtle logical inversions in complex sentences
• Domain-specific terminology substitutions

Mitigation: Use the rules engine (Tier 2) for numeric consistency checks. Enable AdversarialTester for red-teaming. Consider multi-scorer consensus for high-stakes domains.

In token-level streaming, an adversary could front-load coherent tokens to build trust, then inject hallucinated content after the coherence window has shifted.

Mitigation: StreamingKernel uses adaptive window sizing and three independent halt mechanisms. ContradictionTracker catches cross-turn inconsistencies. Set hard_limit conservatively for high-risk applications.

Despite SHA-pinned HuggingFace models and pip-audit in CI, transitive dependencies (torch, transformers, ONNX) have a broad attack surface. A compromised upstream package could execute arbitrary code at model-load time.

Mitigation: MODEL_REGISTRY with pinned revision SHAs. use_model=False fallback available. The opt-in fallback model registry (model_fallback_enabled) degrades to a vetted, revision-pinned alternate model if the primary is delisted on the Hub. SBOM generation in release pipeline. Sigstore signing of published packages. Consider airgapped deployment for highest-security environments. Currently open, no-fix advisories are tracked under Known Open Advisories above.

Deployment notes for torch, transformers, ONNX Runtime, Chroma, and other heavy optional packages live in docs-site/deployment/supply-chain.md.

Cyber-physical hooks can screen proposed actions before they reach a robot, simulator, or actuator gateway, but they do not make unsafe hardware safe by themselves. Residual risks include:

• Hardware damage: a caller can still request a physically unsafe move if the deployment has incomplete constraints, stale world state, or incorrect actuator calibration.
• Malformed action payloads: invalid coordinates, oversized vectors, or unexpected actuator ids can stress adapters if callers bypass PhysicalAction validation.
• Expensive solver payloads: repeated inverse-kinematics or collision checks can exhaust simulator or robotics runtimes without per-tenant budgets.
• Simulator dependency isolation: ROS 2, MuJoCo, CARLA, and similar stacks bring large native dependency surfaces and should not run in the default web API process.

Mitigation: Physical hooks are warn-only by default. Blocking real-world actions requires both physical_action_mode="block" and allow_physical_action_blocking=True. Use TenantPhysicalBudget to cap action validation, inverse-kinematics, and simulation checks per tenant. Install simulator stacks only in an isolated director-ai[physical] runtime, keep hardware drivers behind a local gateway, and require an external emergency stop outside Director-AI for live robots or machinery.