Windk is currently under active development and has not yet reached its first official release. Until a 1.0.0 release is published, only the latest commit on the default branch is supported with security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main (unreleased) |
✅ |
| Pre-release builds | ❌ |
This table will be updated once official versioned releases begin.
If you discover a security vulnerability in Windk, please open an issue in this repository.
Please include:
- A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
- Steps to reproduce, including any relevant
windk.cfgcontents (redacted of anything sensitive) or command invocations - The environment it was found in (Windows version,
cmd.exeversion) - Any suggested remediation, if known
- We aim to acknowledge new reports within a few business days.
- We'll work with you to understand and validate the issue.
- A fix will be prioritized based on severity, and credit will be given to the reporter (unless anonymity is requested) once a fix is released.
Windk executes as cmd.exe batch scripts and resolves configuration and subcommand targets dynamically at runtime. Areas of particular security interest include:
- Config injection — malformed or malicious entries in
windk.cfg(e.g. crafted@:alias pointers or path values) that could cause unintended path resolution or command execution. - Path traversal — relative path expansion (
.\,..\) resolving outside intended directories. - Subcommand trust —
lib/executables are invoked viaCALLwith forwarded arguments; care should be taken that argument forwarding doesn't allow unintended flag/argument injection into subcommands. - Environment variable pollution — cross-scope handshakes (
SETVAR) between the router and config engine should not leak or overwrite unrelated environment state.
If your report touches on any of the above, please flag it explicitly — it helps us triage faster.
Thank you for helping keep Windk and its users secure.