Record SLSA Build Level 3 assessment

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ on:
         description: Digest of the repository-owner authorization record; required only for promotion
         type: string
         required: false
+      owner_authorization_base64:
+        description: Canonical owner-authorization JSON encoded as one-line base64; required only for promotion
+        type: string
+        required: false
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -176,7 +180,7 @@ jobs:
             echo "Candidate tag: $CANDIDATE_TAG"
             echo "Manifest SHA-256: $MANIFEST_SHA256"
             echo "Preparation is not publication authorization."
-            echo "Promotion remains blocked pending SLSA runtime assessment and exact owner authorization."
+            echo "Promotion remains blocked pending exact owner authorization."
           } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
 
   promotion-entry-gate:
@@ -203,13 +207,17 @@ jobs:
           CANDIDATE_TAG: ${{ inputs.candidate_tag }}
           MANIFEST_SHA256: ${{ inputs.manifest_sha256 }}
           OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256: ${{ inputs.owner_authorization_sha256 }}
+          OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BASE64: ${{ inputs.owner_authorization_base64 }}
           PREPARATION_RUN_ID: ${{ inputs.preparation_run_id }}
+          DISPATCH_ACTOR_ID: ${{ github.actor_id }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           [[ "$CANDIDATE_COMMIT" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]
           [[ "$MANIFEST_SHA256" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]
           [[ "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]
+          [[ -n "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BASE64" ]]
           [[ "$PREPARATION_RUN_ID" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]
+          [[ "$DISPATCH_ACTOR_ID" == 3743841 ]]
           [[ "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" == "$CANDIDATE_COMMIT" ]]
           [[ "$CANDIDATE_TAG" == "auths-v$(sed -n 's/^version = "\([^"]*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | head -1)" ]]
       - name: Refuse absent or unprotected promotion environment
@@ -237,8 +245,14 @@ jobs:
           CANDIDATE_TAG: ${{ inputs.candidate_tag }}
           MANIFEST_SHA256: ${{ inputs.manifest_sha256 }}
           OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256: ${{ inputs.owner_authorization_sha256 }}
+          OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BASE64: ${{ inputs.owner_authorization_base64 }}
           PREPARATION_RUN_ID: ${{ inputs.preparation_run_id }}
         run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          printf '%s' "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BASE64" \
+            | base64 --decode > target/owner-authorization.json
+          [[ "$(sha256sum target/owner-authorization.json | cut -d' ' -f1)" == \
+            "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256" ]]
           jq -n \
             --arg commit "$CANDIDATE_COMMIT" \
             --arg tag "$CANDIDATE_TAG" \
@@ -252,13 +266,15 @@ jobs:
           cargo xtask release-control verify-promotion
           target/staged
           target/promotion-request.json
+          target/owner-authorization.json
       - name: Preserve verified promotion input for protected job
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
         with:
           name: auths-promotion-input-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}
           path: |
             target/staged/
             target/promotion-request.json
+            target/owner-authorization.json
           if-no-files-found: error
           retention-days: 7
           compression-level: 0
@@ -284,12 +300,19 @@ jobs:
           CANDIDATE_TAG: ${{ inputs.candidate_tag }}
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           MANIFEST_SHA256: ${{ inputs.manifest_sha256 }}
+          OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256: ${{ inputs.owner_authorization_sha256 }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           MANIFEST=target/promotion/staged/target/release-evidence/release-manifest.json
           [[ "$(sha256sum "$MANIFEST" | cut -d' ' -f1)" == "$MANIFEST_SHA256" ]]
           [[ "$(jq -r '.source.commit' "$MANIFEST")" == "$CANDIDATE_COMMIT" ]]
           [[ "$(jq -r '.release.tag' "$MANIFEST")" == "$CANDIDATE_TAG" ]]
+          AUTHORIZATION=target/promotion/owner-authorization.json
+          PROMOTION_REQUEST=target/promotion/promotion-request.json
+          [[ "$(sha256sum "$AUTHORIZATION" | cut -d' ' -f1)" == \
+            "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256" ]]
+          [[ "$(jq -r '.ownerAuthorizationSha256' "$PROMOTION_REQUEST")" == \
+            "$OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_SHA256" ]]
           EXISTING="$(gh api "repos/auths-dev/auths-proof/git/ref/tags/$CANDIDATE_TAG" --jq '.object.sha' 2>/dev/null || true)"
           [[ -z "$EXISTING" || "$EXISTING" == "$CANDIDATE_COMMIT" ]]
           if [[ -z "$EXISTING" ]]; then
@@ -304,13 +327,18 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           MANIFEST=target/promotion/staged/target/release-evidence/release-manifest.json
+          NOTES=target/promotion/staged/target/release-evidence/RELEASE_CANDIDATE_NOTES.md
+          AUTHORIZATION=target/promotion/owner-authorization.json
+          PROMOTION_REQUEST=target/promotion/promotion-request.json
           mapfile -t SUBJECTS < <(jq -r '.subjects[].name' "$MANIFEST" | sed 's#^#target/promotion/staged/#')
           mapfile -t EVIDENCE < <(find target/promotion/staged/target/release-evidence -type f -print | sort)
           gh release create "$CANDIDATE_TAG" \
             --repo auths-dev/auths-proof \
             --verify-tag \
             --prerelease \
             --title "Auths $CANDIDATE_TAG" \
-            --notes "Release candidate. Not stable v1. No independent security audit is claimed. Registry publication remains separately gated by issue #50." \
+            --notes-file "$NOTES" \
             "${SUBJECTS[@]}" \
-            "${EVIDENCE[@]}"
+            "${EVIDENCE[@]}" \
+            "$AUTHORIZATION" \
+            "$PROMOTION_REQUEST"

release/CANDIDATE_CLOSURE.md

@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@
 
 ## Scope
 
-This record closes the repository-local portion of AP32-PR5. The commit that
-merges this bounded change is the proposed candidate revision. It becomes the
-final candidate revision only after all required hosted checks and the two
-isolated release preparations complete successfully against that exact commit.
+This record closes the repository-local portion of AP32-PR5. The initial
+candidate revision completed two isolated preparations successfully in
+[run 30849197798](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/actions/runs/30849197798).
+That run exposed no remaining reproducibility defect and supplied the runtime
+evidence for the builder assessment. The commit that merges the assessment is
+the new proposed candidate revision and must complete the same preparation
+again because its release metadata changed.
 
 The change intentionally contains no semantic refactor. It advances release
 metadata to the first approved RC coordinate, regenerates the semantic-freeze
@@ -19,8 +22,8 @@ behavior remain unchanged and domain-owned.
 - Python distribution `auths`: `1.0.0rc1`, the PEP 440 spelling equivalent to
   the SemVer RC.
 - Candidate tag contract: `auths-v1.0.0-rc.1`.
-- Release public-surface semantic identity: version 4.
-- Semantic-freeze inventory: version 4.
+- Release public-surface semantic identity: version 15.
+- Semantic-freeze inventory: version 15.
 
 The release manifest, rather than this prose, owns the eventual full commit and
 artifact digests.
@@ -37,8 +40,8 @@ The following are hard gates and are not represented as passed by this PR:
 4. their deterministic subjects match according to the frozen reproducibility
    classes;
 5. every manifest subject has verified signed provenance and SPDX coverage;
-6. an evidence-backed assessment establishes every applicable SLSA 1.2 Build
-   Level 3 producer and build-platform requirement; and
+6. the checked-in SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 assessment remains valid for the exact
+   reusable-builder bytes; and
 7. offline verification succeeds from the staged, digest-bound bundle.
 
 If a hosted preparation exposes any defect or drift, this proposed candidate
@@ -50,9 +53,10 @@ two preparations must start again from its new merged revision.
 This repository change does not configure GitHub settings, upload a secret,
 run a preparation, approve a manifest, create or move a tag, create a GitHub
 prerelease, publish a registry package, engage an external reviewer, or make a
-public assurance claim. The SLSA runtime assessment and independent security
-review remain pending. Issue #50 continues to govern separately authorized
-publication.
+public assurance claim. The SLSA build assessment has passed, but the exact
+candidate must be prepared again; owner promotion authorization and the Phase
+9 independent security review remain pending. Issue #50 continues to govern
+separately authorized publication.
 
 ## Rollback and withdrawal
 

release/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Auths release directory
+
+This directory owns the frozen release contract and the evidence needed to
+prepare, authorize, promote, verify, or withdraw an Auths release candidate.
+Preparation is not authorization, and GitHub prerelease promotion is not
+registry publication.
+
+Start with:
+
+- [`RELEASE_RUNBOOK.md`](RELEASE_RUNBOOK.md) for the exact operator procedure;
+- [`RELEASE_CONTROL.md`](RELEASE_CONTROL.md) for the security architecture and
+  trust boundaries;
+- [`CANDIDATE_CLOSURE.md`](CANDIDATE_CLOSURE.md) for the current candidate and
+  remaining gates;
+- [`RELEASE_CANDIDATE_NOTES.md`](RELEASE_CANDIDATE_NOTES.md) for the text that
+  will become the GitHub prerelease description; and
+- [`SLSA_BUILD_LEVEL_3_ASSESSMENT.md`](SLSA_BUILD_LEVEL_3_ASSESSMENT.md) for
+  the assessed build-platform boundary.
+
+The JSON schemas, fixtures, subject catalogue, naming authority, and semantic
+freeze are machine-enforced inputs. Do not hand-edit generated evidence merely
+to make a release pass.

release/RELEASE_CONTROL.md

@@ -52,18 +52,33 @@ Promotion requires a second workflow dispatch naming:
 - exact release-manifest digest; and
 - SHA-256 digest of the repository owner's separate authorization record.
 
+The dispatch also carries the exact canonical authorization record as one-line
+base64. The entry gate decodes it, requires the immutable repository-owner
+identity, rejects unknown or non-canonical fields, verifies its digest, and
+requires every candidate, run, manifest, destination, and statement field to
+match the promotion request. The protected job receives and rechecks that
+record. Both the authorization and promotion request are preserved with the
+GitHub prerelease evidence. The schema is
+[`owner-authorization.schema.json`](owner-authorization.schema.json); the
+operator procedure is [`RELEASE_RUNBOOK.md`](RELEASE_RUNBOOK.md).
+
 The unprivileged entry job downloads and validates the staged artifact. The
 protected `release-promotion` job receives only verified staged bytes. Static
 repository policy rejects checkout, compilation, packaging, evidence
 generation, or overwriting in that job. It may create the tag only when the tag
 is absent, or resume when the existing tag already targets the exact candidate.
-It then creates a GitHub prerelease from the staged subjects and evidence.
-
-The first-RC manifest deliberately records the SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 runtime
-assessment as pending. Promotion remains terminally blocked until an
-independent assessment of the implemented builder and an actual preparation
-run changes that exact manifest field to `passed` through the candidate-closure
-process. No label or ordinary successful workflow is treated as that evidence.
+It then creates a GitHub prerelease from the staged subjects and evidence. The
+prerelease description comes from the digest-bound staged copy of
+[`RELEASE_CANDIDATE_NOTES.md`](RELEASE_CANDIDATE_NOTES.md), not mutable or
+hardcoded workflow prose.
+
+The SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 assessment is recorded in
+[`SLSA_BUILD_LEVEL_3_ASSESSMENT.md`](SLSA_BUILD_LEVEL_3_ASSESSMENT.md) and its
+machine-readable companion. It is bound to an observed successful preparation
+and the exact reusable-builder SHA-256. Finalization and offline promotion
+verification reject a stale workflow digest, an incomplete requirement set,
+or a status other than `passed`. The assessment is not an independent security
+audit and does not itself authorize promotion.
 
 Publication to crates.io, npm, and PyPI remains separately gated by
 [issue #50](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/50). This workflow
@@ -90,6 +105,11 @@ semantic freeze, SPDX subject coverage, and `preparation-comparison.json`.
 Verification requires neither repository write access nor an Auths-hosted
 service.
 
+After promotion, also verify that `promotion-request.json` names the same
+manifest, run, tag, and authorization SHA-256, and that the published canonical
+`owner-authorization.json` hashes to that value. These two post-preparation
+records authorize distribution; they do not retroactively become build inputs.
+
 ## Withdrawal
 
 Never move or delete an issued candidate tag. Mark a defective candidate as