fix(wallet): stop a bounded scan from erasing a live CrowdNode link - #1058
fix(wallet): stop a bounded scan from erasing a live CrowdNode link#1058romchornyi wants to merge 11 commits into
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`ownsAddress` answers "is this stored CrowdNode address mine?" by re-deriving
`m/44'/<coin>'/0'/{0,1}/{0..299}` and matching hash160 — the SDK exposes no
address→index lookup. That bound came from the message signer (2e44a26),
where running out is safe: no key, no signature. Reusing it for the ownership
question (3766008) turned the bound into an ownership horizon: a wallet whose
CrowdNode address sits past index 300 was told the address was foreign, and
`validatePrefs` answered by resetting the stored account.
The reset is not cosmetic. Without `signUpState == .finished`/`.linkedOnline`
the CrowdNode shortcut leaves `customizableActions`, and that shortcut is the
only way into CrowdNode — there is no menu entry — so the customer's account
becomes unreachable in the app (ticket 32026: "CrowdNode disappeared", logs
show "Found alien address in CrowdNode prefs" on every launch).
Exhaustion now answers `nil` (unknown), which `validatePrefs` already handles
by keeping the stored account and re-checking on the next `restoreState`.
`false` is left to the one case that really proves foreignness: an address that
is not a P2PKH address of the running network. The signer is untouched and
still fails closed.
Trade-off taken deliberately: an address belonging to a genuinely different
wallet now reads as unknown rather than foreign, so a stale link survives where
it used to be cleared. Keeping a stale pointer is recoverable; erasing a live
account is not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughCrowdNode ownership checks now distinguish owned, foreign, wallet-unavailable, and bounded-scan-miss results. Restoration quarantines stored metadata until a recovered address is confirmed. Linking downgrades persist only for genuinely different recovered addresses. Tests cover the ownership and recovery paths. ChangesCrowdNode ownership validation and recovery
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The reported ownership and restoration regressions are addressed, with no remaining merge-blocking risk identified. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant CrowdNodeRestore
participant CrowdNodeMessageSigner
participant StoredAccount
participant ConfirmationAPI
CrowdNodeRestore->>CrowdNodeMessageSigner: validate stored address
CrowdNodeMessageSigner-->>CrowdNodeRestore: ownership verdict
CrowdNodeRestore->>StoredAccount: quarantine or reset stored metadata
CrowdNodeRestore->>ConfirmationAPI: recover account address
ConfirmationAPI-->>CrowdNodeRestore: recovered confirmation address
CrowdNodeRestore->>StoredAccount: restore matching metadata
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 37.50% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 48 functions across 3 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Final validation — GLM Flash + Sol
At exact head 3311d74, bounded-scan exhaustion is correctly distinguished from definitive foreignness, but the new nil result can activate legacy CrowdNode state copied from another same-network wallet and expose that wallet's account and balance under the active wallet. This cross-wallet state restoration is blocking; the tri-state contract also needs regression coverage, and the updated rerun comment does not match the restore guards. Source: reviewers glm-5.3-flash and gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier gpt-5.6-sol.
Source: reviewer 1: glm-5.3-flash (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: glm-5.3-flash (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Phase 1 reviewers (GLM Flash):
glm-5.3-flash— general (completed); agentphase1-reviewer,glm-5.3-flash— security-auditor (completed); agentphase1-reviewer - Fresh verifier (Sol):
gpt-5.6-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers (Sol):
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed); agentphase2-reviewer
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s) | 💬 1 nitpick(s)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/CrowdNode/CrowdNodeModel.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/CrowdNode/CrowdNodeModel.swift:424: Unknown ownership can restore another wallet's CrowdNode state
A valid same-network P2PKH address belonging to a different active wallet now produces nil instead of false. This has a concrete path through the existing legacy migration behavior: CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey seeds each wallet's missing per-wallet keys from the retained global values, including accountAddress, savedOnlineAccountState, and lastKnownBalance. When wallet B first reads legacy values left by wallet A, this scan misses A's address and validatePrefs keeps the copied state. If savedOnlineAccountState is non-.none, getOnlineAccountAddress trusts the address and tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount publishes .linkedOnline; refreshBalance then fetches and displays A's CrowdNode balance under B. Preserve inconclusive persisted data, but quarantine it from active state until wallet-scoped transaction history or an authoritative SDK ownership operation proves that the address belongs to the current wallet.
- [SUGGESTION] DashWallet/Sources/UI/CrowdNode/CrowdNodeModel.swift:414-424: Add regression coverage for tri-state ownership and nil handling
This PR changes the contract that determines whether CrowdNode preferences are destroyed, retained, or trusted, but adds no compile-ready regression coverage. Add a focused seam covering scan-found → true, bounded exhaustion → nil, unavailable wallet state → nil, and malformed, wrong-network, or P2SH address → false. Also cover validatePrefs so nil preserves persisted recovery data without activating unverified account state. The documented repository-wide test-target breakage prevents executing the suite, but it does not preclude adding compile-ready tests for this correctness-critical behavior.
In `DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift`:
- [NITPICK] DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift:338-343: Comment overpromises validation on the next restoreState call
The ownership check does not necessarily rerun on the next restoreState invocation. A restored account is stopped by the signUpState guard at lines 193-196, while an inconclusive pass that finds no account can persist fruitlessRestoreTxCount and return at lines 215-217 before validatePrefs. Remove the unconditional rerun claim so the comment describes the actual control flow.
| return derivationPath(ofHash160: targetHash160, wallet: wallet, network: network) != nil | ||
| // Scan exhaustion is "unknown", never "not mine" — the bound exists | ||
| // for cost, not as an ownership horizon. | ||
| return derivationPath(ofHash160: targetHash160, wallet: wallet, network: network) != nil ? true : nil |
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🔴 Blocking: Unknown ownership can restore another wallet's CrowdNode state
A valid same-network P2PKH address belonging to a different active wallet now produces nil instead of false. This has a concrete path through the existing legacy migration behavior: CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey seeds each wallet's missing per-wallet keys from the retained global values, including accountAddress, savedOnlineAccountState, and lastKnownBalance. When wallet B first reads legacy values left by wallet A, this scan misses A's address and validatePrefs keeps the copied state. If savedOnlineAccountState is non-.none, getOnlineAccountAddress trusts the address and tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount publishes .linkedOnline; refreshBalance then fetches and displays A's CrowdNode balance under B. Preserve inconclusive persisted data, but quarantine it from active state until wallet-scoped transaction history or an authoritative SDK ownership operation proves that the address belongs to the current wallet.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in 144cc80 — this was the real hole.
CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey seeds a wallet's missing per-wallet keys from the retained pre-multi-wallet globals, so wallet B could hold wallet A's accountAddress, savedOnlineAccountState and lastKnownBalance. Before this branch B was protected by accident: the bounded scan answered false and validatePrefs reset the copied state. Once exhaustion answers nil the copy survives, and getOnlineAccountAddress trusted it outright on savedAddress != nil && state != .none.
validatePrefs now returns its verdict instead of only logging it, and the online path takes the stored address only when ownership was actually proven (trustStoredAddress). The signup path is untouched — it proves ownership from this wallet's own transaction history. An unproven address stays on disk and is re-checked on later launches, but can no longer activate an account, so tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount never publishes .linkedOnline and refreshBalance never fetches another wallet's balance.
d68e6ae then named the rule (CrowdNode.StoredAccountVerdict: trusted / unproven / alien) so both the restore and validatePrefs read the same decision instead of comparing a raw optional to true.
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Resolved in d68e6ae — Unknown ownership can restore another wallet's CrowdNode state no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| @@ -413,7 +419,9 @@ enum CrowdNodeMessageSigner { | |||
| guard let targetHash160 = hash160(ofAddress: address, network: network) else { | |||
| return false // not a P2PKH address of this network ⇒ not ours | |||
| } | |||
| return derivationPath(ofHash160: targetHash160, wallet: wallet, network: network) != nil | |||
| // Scan exhaustion is "unknown", never "not mine" — the bound exists | |||
| // for cost, not as an ownership horizon. | |||
| return derivationPath(ofHash160: targetHash160, wallet: wallet, network: network) != nil ? true : nil | |||
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🟡 Suggestion: Add regression coverage for tri-state ownership and nil handling
This PR changes the contract that determines whether CrowdNode preferences are destroyed, retained, or trusted, but adds no compile-ready regression coverage. Add a focused seam covering scan-found → true, bounded exhaustion → nil, unavailable wallet state → nil, and malformed, wrong-network, or P2SH address → false. Also cover validatePrefs so nil preserves persisted recovery data without activating unverified account state. The documented repository-wide test-target breakage prevents executing the suite, but it does not preclude adding compile-ready tests for this correctness-critical behavior.
source: ['claude', 'codex']
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Now added in d68e6ae — this was deferred earlier because ownsAddress reached the SDK through SwiftDashSDKHost.shared, which is exactly the seam you asked for.
CrowdNodeMessageSigner.OwnershipLookup reduces the wallet to two closures (address → hash160 for the running network, and the bounded BIP44 scan), so ownsAddress(_:using:) is the verdict rule alone and a nil lookup means "the wallet isn't up". liveOwnership() builds it from the host; live behaviour is unchanged. hash160(ofAddress:network:) became internal so the tests classify real addresses instead of restating that classification in a stub.
CrowdNodeOwnershipTests covers what you listed: scan found → true, bounded exhaustion → nil, wallet unavailable → nil, undecodable address → false; the address forms themselves (mainnet P2PKH, P2SH, wrong network, malformed, broken checksum); and the three verdicts, with unproven asserted to equal neither trusted nor alien — the regression for the cross-wallet finding above.
The repo-wide test-target breakage still stands, so these are compile-ready and unrunnable like the tests around them; verification was a clean dashpay build.
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Resolved in d68e6ae — Add regression coverage for tri-state ownership and nil handling no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
| // SDK-native ownership check (BIP44 acct-0 scan — the same one the | ||
| // CrowdNode signer uses). Tri-state: nil ⇒ the SDK wallet isn't up | ||
| // yet, so we can't validate — skip rather than reset a live account; | ||
| // the check reruns on the next restoreState. | ||
| // CrowdNode signer uses). Tri-state: nil ⇒ unknown (the SDK wallet | ||
| // isn't up yet, or the address sits beyond the bounded scan) — skip | ||
| // rather than reset a live account; the check reruns on the next | ||
| // restoreState. false is returned only for an address that cannot | ||
| // belong to this wallet (not a P2PKH address of the running network). |
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💬 Nitpick: Comment overpromises validation on the next restoreState call
The ownership check does not necessarily rerun on the next restoreState invocation. A restored account is stopped by the signUpState guard at lines 193-196, while an inconclusive pass that finds no account can persist fruitlessRestoreTxCount and return at lines 215-217 before validatePrefs. Remove the unconditional rerun claim so the comment describes the actual control flow.
| // SDK-native ownership check (BIP44 acct-0 scan — the same one the | |
| // CrowdNode signer uses). Tri-state: nil ⇒ the SDK wallet isn't up | |
| // yet, so we can't validate — skip rather than reset a live account; | |
| // the check reruns on the next restoreState. | |
| // CrowdNode signer uses). Tri-state: nil ⇒ unknown (the SDK wallet | |
| // isn't up yet, or the address sits beyond the bounded scan) — skip | |
| // rather than reset a live account; the check reruns on the next | |
| // restoreState. false is returned only for an address that cannot | |
| // belong to this wallet (not a P2PKH address of the running network). | |
| // SDK-native ownership check (BIP44 acct-0 scan — the same one the | |
| // CrowdNode signer uses). Tri-state: nil ⇒ unknown (the SDK wallet | |
| // isn't up yet, or the address sits beyond the bounded scan) — keep | |
| // the stored account rather than resetting it. false is returned only | |
| // for an address that cannot belong to this wallet (not a P2PKH | |
| // address of the running network). |
source: ['codex']
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Correct, and dropped in 144cc80. The comment claimed the ownership check reruns on the next restoreState, which the control flow does not guarantee: a restored account is stopped by the signUpState guard, and an inconclusive pass that finds no account persists fruitlessRestoreTxCount and returns before validatePrefs. The doc now describes the tri-state and what each verdict means for the stored account, without the rerun promise.
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Resolved in 144cc80 — Comment overpromises validation on the next restoreState call no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
…store Review follow-up on the tri-state ownership change. `CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey` seeds a wallet's missing per-wallet keys from the retained pre-multi-wallet globals — account address, saved online state, last known balance. Before this branch a second wallet was protected by accident: the bounded scan answered `false` for the first wallet's address and `validatePrefs` reset the copied state. Now that exhaustion answers `nil`, the copy survives, and the online path trusted it outright: `getOnlineAccountAddress` returned the stored address on `savedAddress != nil && state != .none`, so `tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount` published `.linkedOnline` and `refreshBalance` displayed the *other* wallet's CrowdNode balance. `validatePrefs` now returns the verdict instead of only logging it, and the online path takes the stored address only when ownership was actually proven. The signup path is untouched — it proves ownership from this wallet's own transaction history. An unproven address stays on disk and is re-checked, but can no longer activate an account on trust alone. Also drops the doc claim that the check reruns on the next `restoreState`: the `signUpState` guard and the fruitless-restore memo can both return before it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review follow-up on the deferred test-coverage finding. The rule that decides whether the CrowdNode account link is trusted, kept or destroyed had no regression coverage, because `ownsAddress` reached the SDK through `SwiftDashSDKHost.shared` and the decision behind `validatePrefs` was an unnamed `Bool?`. - `CrowdNodeMessageSigner.OwnershipLookup` reduces the wallet to two closures — address → hash160 for the running network, and the bounded BIP44 scan — so `ownsAddress(_:using:)` is the verdict rule alone, with a nil lookup standing for "the wallet isn't up". `liveOwnership()` builds it from the host; behaviour is unchanged. - `hash160(ofAddress:network:)` becomes internal. It is the only input that lets the check answer `false`, so the tests exercise it against real addresses rather than restating its classification in a stub. - `CrowdNode.StoredAccountVerdict` (trusted / unproven / alien) names what a restore may do with the stored account. `validatePrefs` switches on it, and the online restore's trust decision reads the same rule instead of comparing the raw optional to `true`. - `CrowdNodeOwnershipTests`: scan found -> true, scan exhausted -> nil, wallet not up -> nil, undecodable address -> false; the address forms that reach the scan at all (mainnet P2PKH, P2SH, wrong network, malformed, broken checksum); and the three verdicts, including that `unproven` equals neither of the other two — the regression for the cross-wallet finding. Verified with a clean `dashpay` build; the test target is broken repo-wide, so these are compile-ready and unrunnable like the tests around them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014bk8aoTkF8TUS7LyhRBNwH
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Inline comments:
In `@DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift`:
- Around line 248-251: Update the restore flow around getOnlineAccountAddress so
an untrusted stored address sets the local onlineState to linking before
publishing state. Ensure the linking branch also starts the existing tracking
timer and preserves signUpState at linking, preventing restore from completing
as done or returning early on subsequent restores.
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… stored state Review follow-up (CodeRabbit). When ownership is unproven, `getOnlineAccountAddress` falls through to this wallet's own API-confirmation transaction and, in doing so, downgrades the persisted state to `.linking`. The restore then carried the *stored* `onlineState` into `tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount` regardless, so a legacy `.done` copied from another wallet by `CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey` was published for an account this wallet had only just found evidence of — and `signUpState` came out above `.notStarted`, so later restores returned early and never re-checked. Take the fallback's own verdict when the address is not trusted: `.linking`, matching what it just persisted. `checkIfAddressIsInUse` then re-validates against the API (its `onlineAccountState <= .linking` gate passes, the published state still being `.none` at restore) and moves the account on to `.validating` from evidence rather than from a copied preference. Verified with a clean `dashpay` build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014bk8aoTkF8TUS7LyhRBNwH
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Final validation — GLM Flash + Sol
The tri-state ownership helper and direct linked-account restore are corrected, but the signup-history branch can still combine the active wallet's recovered address with balance and online-state metadata seeded from another wallet. The new tests cover verdict mapping but not the restore side effects that expose this remaining cross-wallet state path.
Source: reviewer 1: glm-5.3-flash (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: glm-5.3-flash (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-5.6-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Phase 1 reviewers (GLM Flash):
glm-5.3-flash— general (completed); agentphase1-reviewer,glm-5.3-flash— security-auditor (completed); agentphase1-reviewer - Fresh verifier (Sol):
gpt-5.6-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers (Sol):
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed); agentphase2-reviewer
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s) | 💬 1 nitpick(s)
1 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift:239-243: Unknown ownership can restore another wallet's CrowdNode state
`CrowdNodeDefaults.resolvedKey` can seed wallet B's address, saved online state, and cached balance from wallet A's retained global values. When ownership of A's stored address is inconclusive, `validatePrefs` correctly preserves those values; however, if B's wallet-scoped transaction history makes `tryRestoreSignUp` succeed, the reconstruction replaces only the account address and signup state. `setFinished` can then publish A's copied `lastKnownBalance`, while `restoreCreatedOnlineAccount` unconditionally publishes A's `.creating`, `.signingUp`, or `.done` state for B. For an incomplete B signup, a copied `.done` also changes the reconstructed signup state to `.linkedOnline`. B's transaction history proves the recovered B address, not the metadata associated with the original stored address. Preserve the original stored address and quarantine or clear its associated state and balance when an unproven address is replaced by a different history-recovered address; metadata may be retained when the recovered address matches or account-specific evidence establishes it.
In `DashWalletTests/CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] DashWalletTests/CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift:105-121: Add regression coverage for tri-state ownership and nil handling
These tests verify address classification and the pure `storedAccountVerdict` mapping, but they do not exercise `validatePrefs`, `restoreState`, `getOnlineAccountAddress`, or the resulting persisted and published state. They therefore would still pass while the signup-history branch publishes balance and online-account metadata copied from another wallet. Add a restore-level seam and compile-ready cases that seed wallet A's address, state, and balance before restoring wallet B. Verify that no B history preserves the recovery data without activation, and that B-owned history activates only B's reconstructed account without publishing A's associated metadata.
- [NITPICK] DashWalletTests/CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift:54-55: Do not attribute ticket 32026 to an address past index 300
The PR description states that the reported wallet had issued only 105 addresses and that its CrowdNode address was probably missed because the scanned derivation paths do not reproduce it, not because its index exceeded 299. This test stubs a generic scan miss and establishes neither an index nor a derivation path, so the comment records a cause contradicted by the available evidence.
| func testProvenOwnershipTrustsTheStoredAccount() { | ||
| XCTAssertEqual(CrowdNode.storedAccountVerdict(ownership: true), .trusted) | ||
| } | ||
|
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| func testRefutedOwnershipResetsTheAccount() { | ||
| XCTAssertEqual(CrowdNode.storedAccountVerdict(ownership: false), .alien) | ||
| } | ||
|
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| func testUnknownOwnershipNeitherTrustsNorResets() { | ||
| // The blocking review finding: `nil` used to be indistinguishable from | ||
| // `true` at the restore's trust decision, so legacy state copied from | ||
| // another wallet of the same network published `.linkedOnline` and | ||
| // showed that wallet's CrowdNode balance under this one. | ||
| let verdict = CrowdNode.storedAccountVerdict(ownership: nil) | ||
| XCTAssertEqual(verdict, .unproven) | ||
| XCTAssertNotEqual(verdict, .trusted, "an unproven address must not activate an account") | ||
| XCTAssertNotEqual(verdict, .alien, "an unproven address must not destroy stored data") |
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🟡 Suggestion: Add regression coverage for tri-state ownership and nil handling
These tests verify address classification and the pure storedAccountVerdict mapping, but they do not exercise validatePrefs, restoreState, getOnlineAccountAddress, or the resulting persisted and published state. They therefore would still pass while the signup-history branch publishes balance and online-account metadata copied from another wallet. Add a restore-level seam and compile-ready cases that seed wallet A's address, state, and balance before restoring wallet B. Verify that no B history preserves the recovery data without activation, and that B-owned history activates only B's reconstructed account without publishing A's associated metadata.
source: ['claude']
| // Ticket 32026: a long-lived wallet holds its account address past the | ||
| // 300-index bound, and answering `false` here tore the link down. |
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💬 Nitpick: Do not attribute ticket 32026 to an address past index 300
The PR description states that the reported wallet had issued only 105 addresses and that its CrowdNode address was probably missed because the scanned derivation paths do not reproduce it, not because its index exceeded 299. This test stubs a generic scan miss and establishes neither an index nor a derivation path, so the comment records a cause contradicted by the available evidence.
| // Ticket 32026: a long-lived wallet holds its account address past the | |
| // 300-index bound, and answering `false` here tore the link down. | |
| // Ticket 32026: the bounded scan could not reproduce a live account | |
| // address, and answering `false` here tore the link down. |
source: ['claude']
ReviewI read the diff against the branch head ( My concerns are all in the compensating 🔴 1. The signup branch still publishes the unproven address's metadataPre-PR, Wallet B seeded from wallet A's legacy globals, B has its own signup history:
B's history proves B's address — it proves nothing about the balance and online state attached to the address it replaced. Suggest: when the recovered address differs from the stored one, clear 🔴 2.
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…ress Review follow-up. The tri-state ownership verdict was right, but the machinery compensating for it left two paths that the old destructive `false` had been covering by accident. `validatePrefs` preserves an unproven address; the saved online state and cached balance stored beside it came from the same pre-multi-wallet globals and are just as unproven. Wallet B's own history can prove an ADDRESS through `tryRestoreSignUp`, which proves nothing about the metadata attached to the address it replaced — `setFinished` then published wallet A's `lastKnownBalance` (`refreshBalance` seeds from cache by default) and `restoreCreatedOnlineAccount` published A's online state, which for a mid-signup B also overwrote the reconstructed state with `.linkedOnline`. That metadata is now held back across the reconstruction and handed over only to an address that turns out to be the one it was stored against. `getOnlineAccountAddress` persisted `.linking` unconditionally on the untrusted path. For the population the guard exists for the verdict is unproven on every launch, so this was not one-shot: each launch rewrote a persisted `.done` (6) backwards to `.linking` (1), and an offline launch parked the account there. It now persists only when the confirmation actually recovers a different address. `ownsAddress` collapsed "the wallet isn't up" and "the scan ran out" into one `nil`. Only the second is a verdict about this wallet: the first meant the check never ran, yet the restore still memoized the pass in `fruitlessRestoreTxCount`, which could short-circuit the next restore — the one that would have had a wallet. `CrowdNodeMessageSigner.Ownership` now distinguishes owned / foreign / walletUnavailable / notFoundWithinBound, `ownsAddress` remains as a documented lossy bridge, `validatePrefs` returns the four-case verdict with `nil` reserved for "no stored address at all", and the memo is skipped when the check never ran. Also: drop the 300-index attribution for ticket 32026 from the signer doc and the test, since that wallet had issued ~105 addresses and the cause is not established; and say in `StoredAccountVerdict` that `.alien` is a backstop rather than the live defence, which is `.unproven` plus `trustStoredAddress`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcjA8GEmHJbdDHGb1LrHto
The branch was 20 commits behind and conflicting. The only conflict is in `project.pbxproj`: both sides add a test file at the same four places, so both entries are kept — `CrowdNodeOwnershipTests` from this branch and `StuckAssetLockRetryTests` from develop.
Review follow-up: both reviewers noted the tests sit at the wrong altitude — `storedAccountVerdict` is a three-line map, while the finding they raised lives in `getOnlineAccountAddress`, which nothing exercised. With trust withheld, that function reaches the API-confirmation branch WITH a saved address present, which it never could before this branch, and it makes two decisions there. Both are now named and pure, so they can be pinned without standing a wallet, a keychain or a network up: `trustsStoredOnlineAddress` (an unproven address is never taken, however far along its stored state claims to be; a proven one is taken only when a stored state says an online account exists) and `persistsLinkingDowngrade` (the `.linking` write happens only when the confirmation recovered a genuinely different account, so a stored `.done` is not rewritten backwards on every launch). The behaviour is unchanged — the conditions are the ones already inline, moved out and given names. Still not covered, and worth saying plainly: seeding wallet A's prefs and running wallet B's `restoreState()` end to end. That needs `CrowdNodeDefaults` and `TransactionObserver` injected into a singleton, which is a refactor beyond this PR.
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Both supplied findings are valid at head 80772f0: online reconstruction can retain another account’s cached metadata, and the new regression tests contain ambiguous overload calls. Source tracing confirms the cache-publication path; focused Swift typechecking reproduces the test errors and passes after explicitly typing the nil arguments. Full application build and runtime smoke validation were not performed during this verification.
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The change alters wallet-address ownership validation and persistent CrowdNode account restoration and activation, where incorrect handling of unknown ownership could retain or act on another wallet’s account or disrupt access to a live funds-linked service. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 31 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🔴 2 blocking
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/Models/CrowdNode/CrowdNode.swift:281-284: Keep metadata quarantined until the online account address is resolved
When wallet B inherits wallet A’s legacy preferences and has API-confirmation history but no signup history, this block restores A’s cached balance before getOnlineAccountAddress replaces the stored address with B’s recovered address. The online branch never applies metadataSurvivesReconstruction or clears that mismatched balance; tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount also loads the unreconciled crowdNodePrimaryAddress. The background refresh’s seedFromCache: false does not protect subsequent callers: CrowdNodePortalController.viewDidLoad calls CrowdNodeModel.refreshBalance(), which uses the default seedFromCache: true and publishes A’s cached balance under B. If the API request fails, that value remains displayed. This is exposed by the PR’s change from resetting scan misses to preserving their preferences. Keep the metadata quarantined through online address resolution, and discard account-specific cached metadata when the recovered address differs from the stored address.
In `DashWalletTests/CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWalletTests/CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift:122: Disambiguate the nil ownership arguments in the new tests
storedAccountVerdict now has overloads accepting Bool? and CrowdNodeMessageSigner.Ownership?, so this untyped nil matches both and fails compilation with “ambiguous use of storedAccountVerdict(ownership:)”. The metadataSurvivesReconstruction calls at lines 147–167 have the same ambiguity. Focused Swift typechecking using the production helper definitions and these test methods reproduces both errors independently of the pre-existing application test-target breakage; replacing the ownership: nil arguments with ownership: Bool?.none makes that focused check pass. Explicitly type these nil arguments or remove the redundant overloads so the new regression tests are compile-ready.
| if metadataIsUnproven { | ||
| prefs.savedOnlineAccountState = quarantinedOnlineState | ||
| prefs.lastKnownBalance = quarantinedBalance | ||
| } |
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🔴 Blocking: Keep metadata quarantined until the online account address is resolved
When wallet B inherits wallet A’s legacy preferences and has API-confirmation history but no signup history, this block restores A’s cached balance before getOnlineAccountAddress replaces the stored address with B’s recovered address. The online branch never applies metadataSurvivesReconstruction or clears that mismatched balance; tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount also loads the unreconciled crowdNodePrimaryAddress. The background refresh’s seedFromCache: false does not protect subsequent callers: CrowdNodePortalController.viewDidLoad calls CrowdNodeModel.refreshBalance(), which uses the default seedFromCache: true and publishes A’s cached balance under B. If the API request fails, that value remains displayed. This is exposed by the PR’s change from resetting scan misses to preserving their preferences. Keep the metadata quarantined through online address resolution, and discard account-specific cached metadata when the recovered address differs from the stored address.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in 740bda5.
The reasoning behind lifting the quarantine there was "no signup ran, so nothing was replaced" — which is true at that line and false by the end of the function, because getOnlineAccountAddress can still swap the stored address for one recovered from this wallet's API-confirmation history. You're also right that seedFromCache: false on the background refresh contains nothing: CrowdNodePortalController.viewDidLoad calls refreshBalance() on the default, and a failed API request leaves the cached figure on screen.
So the quarantine now holds across the lookup and resolves on the far side of it, by the same rule the signup branch uses and against the address the lookup actually returned:
- same address — this wallet's own history proved the one the metadata was stored against, so the online state and balance are handed back;
- different address — the pair was another wallet's, and
lastKnownBalanceis cleared rather than left for the next cache-seeded refresh; - nothing recovered — the stored address is untouched and merely unproven, which is what
validatePrefsdeliberately leaves it as, so the metadata goes back to it.
Two details worth naming. The saved state is still read before the lookup, into a local, because trustsStoredOnlineAddress needs it as an input — un-quarantining prefs to get it was the actual mistake. And the surviving branch does not write savedOnlineAccountState in the mismatch case: getOnlineAccountAddress already persisted the .linking its own evidence supports, via persistsLinkingDowngrade, and overwriting that would undo a deliberate decision.
Verified: BUILD SUCCEEDED, and CrowdNodeOwnershipTests runs 26 tests, 0 failures.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at 740bda53): Your revised restore keeps the cached balance and saved online state quarantined across getOnlineAccountAddress, then reconciles them against the returned address. A different recovered address now leaves lastKnownBalance cleared before subsequent cache-seeded portal refreshes, fixing the reported cross-wallet cached-balance publication.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at 5329bfb4): The restore now quarantines saved online state, cached balance, and primary address through both signup and online-address reconstruction, restoring them only when the recovered address matches the stored address and clearing mismatched metadata.
| // `true` at the restore's trust decision, so legacy state copied from | ||
| // another wallet of the same network published `.linkedOnline` and | ||
| // showed that wallet's CrowdNode balance under this one. | ||
| let verdict = CrowdNode.storedAccountVerdict(ownership: nil) |
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🔴 Blocking: Disambiguate the nil ownership arguments in the new tests
storedAccountVerdict now has overloads accepting Bool? and CrowdNodeMessageSigner.Ownership?, so this untyped nil matches both and fails compilation with “ambiguous use of storedAccountVerdict(ownership:)”. The metadataSurvivesReconstruction calls at lines 147–167 have the same ambiguity. Focused Swift typechecking using the production helper definitions and these test methods reproduces both errors independently of the pre-existing application test-target breakage; replacing the ownership: nil arguments with ownership: Bool?.none makes that focused check pass. Explicitly type these nil arguments or remove the redundant overloads so the new regression tests are compile-ready.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in 740bda5 — six untyped nil arguments are now Bool?.none, which is the overload the assertions actually describe (nil = ownership unknown, not "no stored address").
Confirmed the way you framed it: with the target compiling, CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift produces no errors at all, and the remaining test-target failures are unrelated files — the three still waiting on #1088, plus StuckAssetLockRetryTests needing @MainActor. Patched those locally to get a run and reverted them; the suite executes 26 tests with 0 failures.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at 740bda53): Your six explicit Bool?.none arguments select the intended overload and eliminate the reported compilation ambiguity. I independently compiled and ran all 26 ownership tests in an isolated harness using the current production helper definitions, with zero failures.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at 5329bfb4): The six ambiguous nil arguments in CrowdNodeOwnershipTests.swift now use explicit Bool?.none or Ownership?.none types, so the ownership overload selected by each assertion is unambiguous and the tests are compile-ready.
The quarantine was being lifted as soon as the signup scan came up empty, on the reasoning that nothing had been replaced. But the online-account lookup that runs next can still replace the stored address with one recovered from this wallet's own API-confirmation history, and it applies neither `metadataSurvivesReconstruction` nor any clearing of its own. A wallet that inherited the legacy globals and has confirmation history but no signup history therefore got wallet A's cached balance back under wallet B's address. The background refresh's `seedFromCache: false` does not contain that: `CrowdNodePortalController.viewDidLoad` calls `refreshBalance()`, which takes the default `seedFromCache: true` and publishes the cached figure — and if the API request then fails, that is what stays on screen. So the quarantine now holds across the lookup and resolves on the other side of it, by the same rule the signup branch uses and against the address the lookup actually returned. Same address: this wallet's history has proven the one the metadata was stored against, so it stands. Different address: the pair was another wallet's, and the cached balance is cleared for good. The saved online state needs no matching write — `getOnlineAccountAddress` already persisted the `.linking` its own evidence supports — but it is still read locally beforehand, because `trustsStoredOnlineAddress` needs it as an input. The branch where nothing is recovered hands the metadata back: the stored address is untouched there, and merely unproven, which is the state `validatePrefs` leaves it in. The new tests passed `nil` to `storedAccountVerdict(ownership:)` and `metadataSurvivesReconstruction(ownership:)`, which each have a `Bool?` and a `CrowdNodeMessageSigner.Ownership?` overload — ambiguous, so the file did not compile. Typed as `Bool?.none`, which is the overload their assertions describe.
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Both prior blockers are fixed at head 740bda5, and no supplied finding remains actionable. Independent verification passed nine focused XCTest cases using the current production decision helpers, including all six corrected optional arguments; git diff --check also passed and the worktree remains clean. Full application and runtime validation remain unverified; the pinned DashUIKit manifest requires Swift tools 6.3, while the installed compiler is 6.1.2.
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The change alters wallet-address ownership validation, persisted CrowdNode account quarantine, and online restoration across substantial state-management logic, where regressions could activate a foreign account, erase a valid link, or associate financial data with the wrong wallet. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 31 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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One blocking cross-wallet leak remains. restoreState() quarantines savedOnlineAccountState and lastKnownBalance, but not crowdNodePrimaryAddress, even though that key is seeded from the same legacy globals. When wallet B recovers a different API address from its own confirmation history, tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount immediately copies wallet A’s persisted primary address into primaryAddress. getOnlineAccountAddress has already set signUpState = .linkedOnline, so the portal opens synchronously and its account-details screen can display/copy A’s primary address before the async isAddressInUse check replaces it. If that lookup fails, the stale value also remains persisted and is loaded again next launch. Please quarantine/reconcile crowdNodePrimaryAddress with the same stored-vs-recovered address decision used for the balance/state.
…etadata `crowdNodePrimaryAddress` sits in the same legacy-seeded per-wallet keys as the saved online state and the cached balance, but was left out of the quarantine. `tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount` copies it into `primaryAddress` unconditionally, and `getOnlineAccountAddress` has already set `signUpState = .linkedOnline` by then — so the portal opens synchronously and its account-details screen shows, and copies to the pasteboard, the other wallet's primary address before the async `isAddressInUse` lookup can replace it. A failed lookup leaves the stale value persisted for the next launch as well. It now travels with the other two and resolves on the same `metadataSurvivesReconstruction` decision, at all three exits. Where the recovered address differs it is deliberately left nil rather than restored: `tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount` then has nothing to seed from, and the `.linking` state that path forces sends it through `checkIfAddressIsInUse`, which fills the field from CrowdNode's own answer for this account. A failed lookup leaves it empty, which is the honest state — and an empty field cannot be copied as if it were the user's. Nothing stale is persisted either, since that check only writes back when the address is actually in use. The wallet-switch path needed no change: `handleActiveWalletChanged` already clears the in-memory `primaryAddress`. The leak was the persisted key alone.
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Fixed in ae88bbd.
You're right, and the reason it slipped is that I treated the quarantine as being about the two values restoreState reads directly, when what actually matters is which keys CrowdNodeDefaults seeds from the legacy globals — and crowdNodePrimaryAddress is one of them.
The timing you describe holds: getOnlineAccountAddress sets signUpState = .linkedOnline before tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount runs, so the portal is already openable when that method copies the stored primary into primaryAddress, and OnlineAccountDetailsController both displays it and puts it on the pasteboard. The isAddressInUse replacement is a Task away, and on failure never happens at all.
It now travels with the other two and resolves on the same metadataSurvivesReconstruction decision, at all three exits — the signup branch, the online branch, and the nothing-recovered branch.
The one choice worth calling out is the mismatch case: the primary address is left nil rather than restored. That is not just "don't show A's address" — it is what makes the recovery correct. With nothing to seed from, tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount leaves the field empty, and the .linking state that path already forces (!trustStoredAddress ⇒ .linking) routes through checkIfAddressIsInUse, which fills it from CrowdNode's own answer for this account. A failed lookup leaves it empty, which is the honest state, and nothing stale is persisted either — that check only writes back on result.isInUse.
I also checked the ordering: the quarantine resolves before tryRestoreLinkedOnlineAccount is called, so on the converged pass — where the stored and recovered addresses agree — the field is seeded exactly as before.
No change needed on the wallet-switch path: handleActiveWalletChanged already clears the in-memory primaryAddress, so the leak was the persisted key alone.
Verified: BUILD SUCCEEDED, and CrowdNodeOwnershipTests still runs 26 tests with 0 failures. No new test — the decision is made by the same function those 11 metadata cases already pin, so a third field would re-assert the same rule rather than cover new behaviour.
…rship-scan # Conflicts: # DashWallet.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
The final head correctly distinguishes proven foreign ownership from inconclusive bounded scans and quarantines account metadata until the recovered address is resolved. The previously identified test overload ambiguity and metadata-leak path are fixed, and the added ownership and reconstruction tests are compile-ready. No new in-scope defects were identified.
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — This changes wallet address-ownership classification and CrowdNode account persistence across restore flows, touching cryptographic derivation/message-signing boundaries, storage-reset behavior, and launch-time synchronization with substantial new logic and tests. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 19 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
5 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Support ticket 32026: a customer reported CrowdNode had disappeared from the app. Their logs show it happening on every launch:
The address the app rejected is genuinely theirs:
XdFrhco13KQnRgg1nYUoN889pxtuJrGBnY, which the previous app recognised (found finished CrowdNode sign up, account: XdFrhco13…) and which shows 20 appearances and 11.87 DASH of throughput on chain. The app declared the customer's own CrowdNode account foreign and tore the link down.What was done?
CrowdNodeMessageSigner.ownsAddressanswers "is this stored address mine?" by re-derivingm/44'/<coin>'/0'/{0,1}/{0..299}and matching hash160, because the SDK exposes no address→index lookup. That bound arrived with the SDK-native message signer (2e44a26), where exhausting the scan is the safe answer: no key found, no signature produced. A day later (3766008) the same helper started answering the ownership question, where exhaustion means something entirely different — yet it was still reported asfalse, andCrowdNode.validatePrefsresponds tofalseby resetting the stored account.Scan exhaustion now returns
nil(unknown), whichvalidatePrefsalready handles by keeping the stored account and re-checking on the nextrestoreState.falseis reserved for the one answer that does prove foreignness: an address that is not a P2PKH address of the running network. The signer is untouched and still fails closed.The doc comments were corrected too: they claimed an out-of-bound address had "never been observed in practice".
What this does and does not fix
reset()is not permanent —restoreState()rebuilds the account by scanning the wallet's transaction history from 2022, andreset()deliberately clears the fruitless-restore memo so that rescan always runs. The customer confirmed CrowdNode reappeared after updating, which is this mechanism working as designed. So the defect is not a permanent loss of access.What it does cost: CrowdNode vanishes from the UI until the wallet's history is synced (in the customer's logs the teardown ran at 13:06:19 while
syncDoneonly turned true at 13:06:27), it repeats on every relaunch — three times inside three minutes in their logs — and each teardown forces a full history rescan that the code itself describes as blocking the main thread for seconds apiece.Worth stating plainly: for this particular wallet the 300 bound was probably not the trigger. It had issued only 105 addresses, so the scan had room to spare, which means their CrowdNode address is simply not reproduced by the paths this scan walks. Either way the conclusion drawn from a failed scan was wrong, and that is what this change corrects. Finding where that address actually derives from is the follow-up, and the durable answer is to stop deriving at all —
ManagedCoreWallet.signMessage(address:)knows the wallet's own addresses authoritatively.Breaking Changes
None.
Trade-off taken deliberately: an address belonging to a genuinely different wallet now reads as unknown rather than foreign, so a stale link survives where it used to be cleared. Keeping a stale pointer is recoverable; tearing down a working account is churn the user sees. An unproven address is kept but never acted on — it stays on disk for a later launch to re-check, and cannot activate an online account or drive a balance fetch.
How Has This Been Tested?
Clean
dashpayDebug build, no new warnings in the touched files.The condition cannot be reproduced on a normal test wallet, whose CrowdNode address the scan finds immediately. Reviewers can force it by temporarily setting
scanLimitto1: before this change the CrowdNode shortcut disappears on the next launch and the stored account is wiped; after it, the account survives and the log reads "validation inconclusive … keeping stored account".CrowdNodeOwnershipTestscovers the tri-state and the restore's verdict: scan found → true, bounded exhaustion → nil, wallet not up → nil, undecodable address → false; the address forms that reach the scan at all (mainnet P2PKH, P2SH, wrong network, malformed, broken checksum); andunprovenequalling neithertrustednoralien. The seam that made this testable isCrowdNodeMessageSigner.OwnershipLookup— the wallet reduced to two closures, so no SDK host is needed. The unit-test target still does not build repo-wide, so the tests are compile-ready and unrunnable, like the ones around them.QA verified the user-visible behaviour on TestFlight internal-only builds 9.1.1 (1) (pre-fix) and 9.1.1 (3) (post-fix).
Checklist:
For repository code-owners and collaborators only
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests