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chore(deps): bump actions/attest-build-provenance from 4.1.1 to 4.2.2 - #121

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chore(deps): bump actions/attest-build-provenance from 4.1.1 to 4.2.2#121
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dependabot/github_actions/actions/attest-build-provenance-4.2.2

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Bumps actions/attest-build-provenance from 4.1.1 to 4.2.2.

Release notes

Sourced from actions/attest-build-provenance's releases.

v4.2.2

[!NOTE] As of version 4, actions/attest-build-provenance is simply a wrapper on top of actions/attest.

Existing applications may continue to use the attest-build-provenance action, but new implementations should use actions/attest instead.

What's Changed

Full Changelog: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4.1.1...v4.2.2

Commits
  • 4d10147 Bump actions/attest from 4.2.0 to 4.2.1 in the actions-minor group (#862)
  • e3fe62e Bump the actions-minor group with 2 updates (#860)
  • See full diff in compare view

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Bumps [actions/attest-build-provenance](https://github.com/actions/attest-build-provenance) from 4.1.1 to 4.2.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/attest-build-provenance/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/attest-build-provenance/blob/main/RELEASE.md)
- [Commits](actions/attest-build-provenance@0f67c3f...4d10147)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/attest-build-provenance
  dependency-version: 4.2.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot dependabot Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file github_actions Pull requests that update GitHub Actions code labels Sep 8, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

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supply-chain-guard Scan Report

WARNING: Findings were detected.

Canonical JSON report: 1 reportable finding(s).

## 🛡️ supply-chain-guard Scan Report

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Tool | `supply-chain-guard v6.0.15` |
| Target | `.` |
| Type | directory |
| Time | 2026-09-08T04:33:59.706Z |
| Commit | `dede81f6d28339a2bfad28cef1d35ce0c9466dce` |
| Detection Set | `v6.0.15 (20423 entries, generated 2026-09-07T00:00:00.000Z)` |
| Duration | 2057ms |
| **Risk Score** | **5/100** (LOW) |

### Summary

Scanned 208 of 222 files.

🟡 1 medium

### Findings

#### 🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow requests OIDC id-token:write permission. If combined with unreviewed third-party actions or outbound curl, an attacker can steal the OIDC token to impersonate the workflow's cloud identity.

- **Rule:** `GHA_OIDC_WRITE_PERM`
- **File:** `.github/workflows/release.yml:57`
- **Match:** `id-token: write`
- **Recommendation:** Audit all steps in this workflow when id-token:write is set. Ensure no third-party action or run step can exfiltrate the OIDC token. Scope permissions as narrowly as possible.

### Recommendations

- Review the listed findings and assess whether they represent legitimate functionality or potential threats.

---
*Generated by [supply-chain-guard](https://github.com/homeofe/supply-chain-guard)*

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