Only the latest 0.0.x release is supported. There are no backports while the project is pre-1.0.

Report privately through GitHub security advisories. Do not open a public issue for anything exploitable. Expect an acknowledgement within a week.

• Exposure is opt-in. Without API_KEY there is no authentication: publish it on loopback or a VPN, or put an authenticating proxy in front. With API_KEY it can face a LAN or the internet behind HTTPS; see Security in the README for what the key protects and how the lockout, sessions and proxy trust work.
• It reads, never writes, the library. Mount it read-only. The container runs as a non-root user on a read-only root filesystem with all capabilities dropped.
• It hands files to ffmpeg and SoX. A malformed file reaches their decoders, so keep the image current; Renovate and the Trivy gate in CI are there for that.

In scope: a way past the API_KEY check or the lockout, a leak of the key or a session, path traversal out of LIBRARY_ROOT, command injection through any query parameter, a way to write to the host, or denial of service from a single request.