The issue tracker is public and permanent. If reporting something would mean posting a client's name, a case number, a document or an address, email Joshua@HarkinsSolutionsSystemsGroup.com instead.
You do not need a GitHub account to do that. If you would rather stay on GitHub, private vulnerability reporting opens a report only the maintainers can read.
If you need to send a document, redact it with Docketry first — redact-apply
removes the text rather than covering it, then re-reads the output and reports
anything still extractable. A box that comes back unverifiable covered no
readable text: the content is gone, but nothing could be confirmed, so check
that page yourself before it leaves your machine.
That advice stops where the tool is the problem. If Docketry is what mishandled something — a redaction that did not hold, data written somewhere it should not have been — do not redact with it and send it. Describe what happened and we will work out how to reproduce it without the original.
Email Joshua@HarkinsSolutionsSystemsGroup.com, or use private
vulnerability reporting. Include what you did, what happened, and the
version (docketry --version). We will confirm receipt, tell you what we find,
and credit you in the release notes unless you would rather we did not.
Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability, and please do not post a working exploit while it is unfixed.
The latest release only. Fixes go forward rather than into patches of older tags.
Five properties are deliberate. A report that one of them is true is describing the design; the right-hand column is what would be a real finding.
| Design | Real finding |
|---|---|
No login. The review UI binds to 127.0.0.1 and refuses any other address. A role is a name typed at approval time, checked against roles.toml. |
The UI reachable from another machine; an approval accepted without passing the role check. |
No encryption at rest. Messages and attachments are plaintext SQLite and files, protected by file permissions. config.toml is created mode 0600 on POSIX; on Windows it inherits the directory ACL, and init says so when a password is stored. |
The password written at looser permissions than 0600 on POSIX; secrets written anywhere outside the home directory. |
Home gates execute. <home>/gates/*.py is imported and run with the operator's permissions — the same trust guardrails.toml already has. |
A gate loaded from outside <home>/gates/; a home gate silently replacing a shipped gate id; a load failure being skipped rather than stopping the command. |
| The approval chain detects edits, it does not prevent them. Anyone who can write to the database can recompute every digest after the row they changed. | chain_report() missing an edit it should catch; anchor printing a head over a chain that does not verify. |
Not a security product. No malware, phishing or antivirus claims. sender-scope and attachment-policy decide what the pipeline accepts, nothing more. |
— |
Local operation is not in that list. Docketry sends nothing. A configured model endpoint is refused unless every address it resolves to is loopback, private-range or link-local. If you find any path that sends data off the machine without the operator configuring it, that is a serious bug — report it privately.