fix(migtd): bound untrusted input sizes before allocation - #1012
Draft
MichalTarnacki wants to merge 1 commit into
Draft
fix(migtd): bound untrusted input sizes before allocation#1012MichalTarnacki wants to merge 1 commit into
MichalTarnacki wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Reject pre-session payloads larger than 64 KiB before allocating the receive buffer, so an untrusted peer cannot request an excessive allocation. Bound peer certificates by the TLS input buffer size before DER parsing. The previous 8 KiB limit was arbitrary and smaller than a valid MigTD certificate, which embeds a TDX quote and the event log. Apply the bound in every verification path instead of the legacy one only, and export TLS_BUFFER_SIZE so the limit tracks the buffer it derives from. Signed-off-by: Michal Tarnacki <michal.tarnacki@intel.com> Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:GPT-5.6 Sol Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:Claude Opus 5
MichalTarnacki
marked this pull request as draft
August 26, 2026 08:06
sgrams
approved these changes
Aug 26, 2026
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Reject pre-session payloads larger than 64 KiB before allocating the receive buffer, so an untrusted peer cannot request an excessive allocation.
Bound peer certificates by the TLS input buffer size before DER parsing. The previous 8 KiB limit was arbitrary and smaller than a valid MigTD certificate, which embeds a TDX quote and the event log. Apply the bound in every verification path instead of the legacy one only, and export TLS_BUFFER_SIZE so the limit tracks the buffer it derives from.
Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:GPT-5.6 Sol
Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:Claude Opus 5