fix(release): reject credential-bearing SSH remotes

scripts/release.ts

@@ -169,9 +169,43 @@ function sshTargetFromOrigin(originUrl: string): string | undefined {
   return undefined;
 }
 
-/** `ssh://host/owner/repo` or the scp-like `user@host:owner/repo`. Used for both derivation and override validation. */
+/**
+ * `ssh://host/owner/repo` or the scp-like `user@host:owner/repo`.
+ *
+ * This check is also a log boundary: the accepted value is printed before the push and appears in
+ * the failure command. Parse URL userinfo instead of treating any `ssh://` string as safe, and
+ * reject the scp-like `user:password@host:path` lookalike before either sink can observe it.
+ */
 function isSshRemote(value: string): boolean {
-  return /^ssh:\/\/[^/]+\/.+$/.test(value) || /^[^@\s/]+@[^:\s/]+:.+$/.test(value);
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (!trimmed || /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(trimmed)) return false;
+
+  if (trimmed.startsWith("ssh://")) {
+    try {
+      const parsed = new URL(trimmed);
+      let decodedUsername: string;
+      try {
+        decodedUsername = decodeURIComponent(parsed.username);
+      } catch {
+        return false;
+      }
+      return parsed.protocol === "ssh:"
+        && parsed.hostname.length > 0
+        && parsed.pathname.length > 1
+        && parsed.password === ""
+        // The release deploy key uses GitHub's fixed SSH principal. Treat any other userinfo as
+        // credential-shaped rather than trying to distinguish a harmless username from a token.
+        && (decodedUsername === "" || decodedUsername === SSH_USER)
+        && parsed.search === ""
+        && parsed.hash === "";
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // scp-like syntax has no parser-level query/fragment boundary. Reject those delimiters rather
+  // than allowing a token-shaped suffix to reach the target log or failed-command output.
+  return /^git@[^:\s/?#]+:[^?#]+$/.test(trimmed);
 }
 
 /** Split out so the scp-like SSH target is assembled rather than written as an address literal. */
@@ -185,7 +219,7 @@ async function releasePushCommand(branch: string): Promise<{ command: string[];
   // silently retarget a production release. Check the shape, and print the resolved target either
   // way so the destination is visible before the push rather than inferred afterwards.
   if (configured && !isSshRemote(configured)) {
-    console.error("✗ OCX_RELEASE_SSH_REPO is not an ssh:// or user@host:owner/repo remote; refusing to push.");
+    console.error("✗ OCX_RELEASE_SSH_REPO is not a credential-free ssh:// or git@host:owner/repo remote; refusing to push.");
     process.exit(1);
   }
   const slug = configured || sshTargetFromOrigin(await capture(["git", "remote", "get-url", "origin"]));

tests/release-helper.test.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ interface ReleaseScenario {
   originUrl?: string;
 }
 
+interface SshInvocation {
+  args: string[];
+}
+
 function writeExecutable(path: string, contents: string): void {
   writeFileSync(path, contents, "utf8");
   chmodSync(path, 0o755);
@@ -264,6 +268,51 @@ function runRelease(version: string, scenario: ReleaseScenario = {}) {
   return { calls, result };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Run the exact command string emitted by the release helper through real Git and a fake SSH.
+ *
+ * The release shim proves which string was placed in the environment, but Git owns the parsing
+ * contract for `GIT_SSH_COMMAND`. Exercising a real Git process here catches quoting that looks
+ * correct in text yet splits, substitutes, or reinterprets the private-key path before SSH sees it.
+ */
+function executeGitSshCommand(gitSshCommand: string): { calls: SshInvocation[]; result: ReturnType<typeof spawnSync> } {
+  const shimDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-release-ssh-"));
+  const logPath = join(shimDir, "ssh-log.jsonl");
+  const jsPath = join(shimDir, "ssh.js");
+  writeFileSync(logPath, "", "utf8");
+  writeFileSync(jsPath, `import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs";
+appendFileSync(process.env.FAKE_SSH_LOG, JSON.stringify({ args: process.argv.slice(2) }) + "\\n");
+process.exit(0);
+`, "utf8");
+
+  // Use a native executable directly on every platform. A Windows `.cmd` shim that forwards `%*`
+  // reparses quoting and can make a broken GIT_SSH_COMMAND look correct after the damage, turning
+  // this regression into a false green. Only replace the executable token; Git still parses the
+  // exact emitted `-i` argument and hostile key path.
+  expect(gitSshCommand.startsWith("ssh ")).toBe(true);
+  const quote = (value: string) => `"${value.replace(/(["\\`$])/g, "\\$1")}"`;
+  const nativeFakeCommand = `${quote(process.execPath)} ${quote(jsPath)}${gitSshCommand.slice(3)}`;
+
+  const inheritedEnv = Object.fromEntries(
+    Object.entries(process.env).filter(([key]) => key !== "GIT_SSH" && key !== "GIT_SSH_COMMAND"),
+  );
+  const result = spawnSync("git", ["ls-remote", "ssh://example.invalid/owner/repository.git"], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: {
+      ...inheritedEnv,
+      FAKE_SSH_LOG: logPath,
+      GIT_SSH_COMMAND: nativeFakeCommand,
+    },
+    encoding: "utf8",
+  });
+  const raw = readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").trim();
+  const calls = raw
+    ? raw.split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean).map(line => JSON.parse(line) as SshInvocation)
+    : [];
+  rmSync(shimDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  return { calls, result };
+}
+
 describe("release helper", () => {
   test("preflight runs the shared audit, typecheck, test suite, and privacy scan before version bump", () => {
     const { calls, result } = runRelease("9.9.9");
@@ -391,6 +440,25 @@ describe("release helper", () => {
     expect(push?.gitSshCommand).toBe('ssh -i "C:\\\\Users\\\\Jun Kim\\\\.ssh\\\\ocx release key" -o IdentitiesOnly=yes');
   });
 
+  test("Git passes the emitted deploy-key path to SSH as one literal argument", () => {
+    const keyPath = 'C:\\Users\\Jun Kim\\.ssh\\ocx "quoted" $HOME $(not-run) `not-run`; key';
+    const { calls: releaseCalls } = runRelease("9.9.9", {
+      releaseSshKey: keyPath,
+      releaseSshRepo: sshTarget,
+      pendingBump: true,
+    });
+    const push = releaseCalls.find(call => call.name === "git" && call.args[0] === "push");
+    expect(push?.gitSshCommand).toBeDefined();
+
+    const { calls } = executeGitSshCommand(push?.gitSshCommand ?? "");
+    expect(calls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    for (const call of calls) {
+      const identityIndex = call.args.indexOf("-i");
+      expect(identityIndex).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(call.args[identityIndex + 1]).toBe(keyPath);
+    }
+  });
+
   /**
    * The SSH target is derived from `origin` rather than hardcoded, so a fork's release pushes to
    * the fork instead of silently targeting upstream.
@@ -436,6 +504,44 @@ describe("release helper", () => {
     expect(calls.find(call => call.name === "git" && call.args[0] === "push")).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  test("credential-bearing SSH targets are rejected without logging the credential", () => {
+    for (const scenario of [
+      { releaseSshRepo: "ssh://git:SECRET@example.test/owner/repository.git" },
+      { releaseSshRepo: "ssh://SECRET@example.test/owner/repository.git" },
+      { releaseSshRepo: "ssh://git%3ASECRET@example.test/owner/repository.git" },
+      { releaseSshRepo: "git@example.test:owner/repository.git?token=SECRET" },
+      { originUrl: "ssh://git:SECRET@example.test/owner/repository.git" },
+      { originUrl: "git:SECRET@example.test:owner/repository.git" },
+    ]) {
+      const { calls, result } = runRelease("9.9.9", {
+        releaseSshKey: "/tmp/k",
+        pendingBump: true,
+        ...scenario,
+      });
+      const output = `${result.stdout ?? ""}\n${result.stderr ?? ""}`;
+      expect(result.status).not.toBe(0);
+      expect(output).not.toContain("SECRET");
+      expect(calls.find(call => call.name === "git" && call.args[0] === "push")).toBeUndefined();
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("credential-free ssh URL and scp-like release targets remain accepted", () => {
+    for (const releaseSshRepo of [
+      "ssh://git@example.test/owner/repository.git",
+      "ssh://example.test/owner/repository.git",
+      "git@example.test:owner/repository.git",
+    ]) {
+      const { calls, result } = runRelease("9.9.9", {
+        releaseSshKey: "/tmp/k",
+        releaseSshRepo,
+        pendingBump: true,
+      });
+      expect(result.status).toBe(0);
+      expect(calls.find(call => call.name === "git" && call.args[0] === "push")?.args[1])
+        .toBe(releaseSshRepo);
+    }
+  });
+
   test("an ssh origin is reused verbatim rather than rewritten", () => {
     const { calls } = runRelease("9.9.9", {
       releaseSshKey: "/tmp/k",