release: dev -> master - #12
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Three changes, mirroring the constitution's new lane: the Authority Model gains the lane bullet; the Incubation Contribution Boundary is scoped to unsolicited patches with a pointer to the lane; Source Authority names the lane a controlled source path. Reason: two statements of one rule must not diverge — the org governance now cites the lane where the constitution defines it. Source: owner 2026-09-01 Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XehTac5TJNmPAskwrPp7rJ
Tracked .serena/project.yml and .mcp.json, uniform across the MinSpec org, so every checkout and worktree of this repository is a Serena-served agent workspace with identical scope. The PHP backend is Phpactor (PHAR-managed, no Node). Mate is deliberately absent: it is application-scoped by nature and lives in minspec/workbench, the org's application host. Source: owner 2026-09-01 Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XehTac5TJNmPAskwrPp7rJ
governance: mirror the maintainer-directed agent lane
repo: register Serena for agent sessions
CI on pull requests and on pushes to dev and the stable branch: composer validate for PHP manifests, the create-project end-to-end oracle where this repo is the skeleton, JSON/YAML validity elsewhere. Public repo: GitHub-hosted runners are free; the check name "ci" is the required context the dev ruleset will pin. Source: owner 2026-09-01 Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XehTac5TJNmPAskwrPp7rJ
repo: real CI — the ci workflow on dev
Findings applied from the independent audit (CHANGES verdict): workflow-level permissions contents:read; persist-credentials false on checkout; every action pinned to a reviewed commit SHA with its tag in a comment; Serena pinned in .mcp.json to the audited git commit instead of floating uvx resolution. Finding: [P1] workflows ran with default token permissions Finding: [P1] .mcp.json launched unversioned uvx serena Finding: [P2] mutable action tags across all repositories Verified: python yaml.safe_load + json.load on the changed files Source: original Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Reviewed-by: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XehTac5TJNmPAskwrPp7rJ
repo: workflow and MCP hardening from the security audit
…n CI A composite action every repo's ci job runs: it scans tracked content, file paths, the change's commit messages (base...head via the API, or the pushed commit), the pull request title and body, and the branch name for names that must not appear here — not affirmed, not negated, not cited. The wall never spells what it refuses and masks every hit it prints; a surface it could not read is a hit, never a pass. This repo's own ci runs it and then proves it fires on a planted fault and stays quiet on a clean neighbour. Verified locally: 10/10 cases (clean tree and PR; planted content, path, title, branch name, commit message via API and via push; API unreachable) exit as specified, and the action's files pass their own wall. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY
Two producers read the contract differently: the location of a hit (with or without a colon), the pull request title and body as one surface or two, and the names of the refusal classes. The contract now pins all three in a table; the implementation moves to it, the tests stand. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY
Authored from the contract by a producer other than the implementer: each test runs term-wall.sh as a subprocess in its own temporary git repository with a test-only pattern, simulating pull_request and push events, and asserts exit code and output shape. Red at this commit: 13 of 15 fail, identically over three runs. Source: original Co-Authored-By: GPT-5.6 Sol <noreply@openai.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T225145Z-apply-push-ca3088 Patch-SHA256: 5c280fccf2f955ddce536df7b4d99ca4c652c5a7edd059354eab12a985bb92e1
…token term-wall.sh reads its pattern only from TERM_WALL (the action takes it from vars.TERM_WALL) and refuses on the wire when it is unset; commit messages come from git (base..head, or the head commit on a branch creation), fetched offline, never from an API, so the action holds no token; every hit is masked; the self-test plants vars.TERM_WALL_PLANT and proves the refusal. CONTRACT.md carries the contract verbatim. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T225148Z-apply-push-dc1f97 Patch-SHA256: 3f59b7252e7ae3b3e0c7894ec551f7e1811d1811f7ed285ef585232bb740fddb
A composite action cannot read vars (GitHub refuses the template: 'Unrecognized named-value: vars', PR#8 run 33568333825), so the calling step passes env TERM_WALL from vars.TERM_WALL and the action refuses when it did not. Same for the self-test's planted fault. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY
The pinned wire: one summary line on a clean run, one
`<surface>: <location>: <line>` per hit with the location never
carrying a colon, four refusal classes. The pattern now arrives from
the calling step (`env: TERM_WALL: ${{ vars.TERM_WALL }}`) because the
runner refuses `vars` inside a composite action; the action refuses
when the step passed nothing. ci.yml passes it.
Source: original
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY
Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T230235Z-apply-push-4be45d
Patch-SHA256: c8606262ab7780275c529792f1882bd9c94478fff501ad995d318c286ef7eeb7
repo: the term wall — names this organisation does not use, refused in CI
`pull_request` without `types` fires on opened, synchronize and reopened only, so a title or body edited after the checks passed reached the merge unscanned. Name the types and add `edited`; the wall then runs against the current text. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T234631Z-apply-push-a1af92 Patch-SHA256: f9816cdf7b1a595a0a2c9e69366d5ae859daf5624cb7a5edb495fd8bf6a18491
A working-tree scan skipped what `grep -I` calls binary and followed symlinks to their targets, so a tracked blob carrying the name could land while the wall reported clean. The content surface is now every tracked blob, read from the object store, bytewise; a symlink is scanned as the blob it is, never followed; a blob that is not UTF-8 reports `[binary blob]` in place of the line. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T234752Z-apply-push-4f650a Patch-SHA256: 82bfe322636865f3130a554e957100917ee1f99402bea2137f9635d8cc838575
Five subprocess tests, each in its own temporary repository: a blob that is not UTF-8 carrying the planted fault, a symlink whose target text carries it, a clean symlink to a clean file, a clean commit with a dirtied working tree, and a committed fault deleted from the working tree. Written against the pinned contract, before the implementation; red until it moves. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T235011Z-apply-push-77cd09 Patch-SHA256: 7b9e0252dd5761078e3b1a1f88134326ef7d53ec10efdb4b55d5b9538c9d5e06
Enumerate the scanned commit's tree with `git ls-tree -r -z`, read each blob with `git cat-file`, scan bytewise; a symlink is scanned as the blob it is and never followed; a blob that is not UTF-8 reports `[binary blob]` in place of the line; a blob that cannot be read is a `git work tree` refusal. Implementation moves to the pinned contract; the tests stand. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T235752Z-apply-push-437ac9 Patch-SHA256: 47bcffbb08b404c5732c0e9ef2ed74a2344887559f096ab5c6dfe6f74048ccd2
The pinned content surface makes every tracked blob scannable, so the pre-existing test asserting that a binary blob passed as clean contradicts the contract. The binary-blob test written against the amendment covers the case. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260901T235927Z-apply-push-91f0e5 Patch-SHA256: 5f57e606b263e185759beacf0f8ec59baa69a00b7b4c23c80e85b3c8e6aa3a9f
The content surface is the scanned commit's tree, so a planted file that is only staged is not on it. The self-test now commits the plant before expecting the wall to fire. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260902T000046Z-apply-push-aa7d57 Patch-SHA256: fa75a5987b8760303465c1ab5e6ec4a2aa9e52100f37a9e9a34a7537baa00fd6
repo: pin the content surface to the object store
repo: scan a pull request again when its text is edited
Workflows name master where they named main, and CODEOWNERS makes the release branch the owner's to approve. Source: original Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY Apply-Push-Job: 20260902T222636Z-apply-push-1b731f Patch-SHA256: e9f8c08a0cade732915569a960cbd632ab7f6f3bf2164f5b583b1e8897fb7e78
repo: master is the release branch
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Release: the work on
devsince the last release, for your approval.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jj94rkp3tfHAxUkTCthgY