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Wave 1 follow-up: dir-fsync boot regression, TXN FLUSHDB/FLUSHALL refusal, CHANGELOG accuracy - #1305
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…s boot on a created dir (moon#1293, PR #1301 review) Round 3 (c55924b) made any directory-fsync error on a directory the call CREATED fatal, EINVAL included. On a filesystem without directory fsync (vboxsf, WSL1 drvfs) `--dir /mnt/x/moon/data` with `moon` and `data` both missing failed boot with EINVAL, while the one-level case and every later boot succeeded: the fatal branch bought no durability. The classifier now treats EINVAL / EROFS / EBADF / ENOTSUP / EOPNOTSUPP / ENOTTY (raw errno; ENOTSUP != EOPNOTSUPP on macOS, where F_FULLFSYNC on exFAT/SMB answers ENOTSUP or ENOTTY) and ErrorKind::Unsupported as "this filesystem cannot fsync directories", tolerated on created and pre-existing directories alike. EACCES stays tolerated only on a pre-existing ancestor (fatal, and documented so, on a created dir); EIO and anything else stay fatal. Skips that leave new entries unsynced produce ONE warning per call. Config::resolve_dir: when the durable create errors but the user-data directory exists afterwards, use it with a warning instead of silently falling back to `.` (a later boot from another cwd would not see the data). Decision factored into the pure `user_data_dir_choice`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
…re refused (moon#1285, PR #1301 review) Pre-existing data loss: on the connection leg `SET k orig; TXN BEGIN; FLUSHDB; TXN ABORT; GET k` answered nil — the flush ran, the undo log (keys, not databases) captured nothing, and the abort said +OK. Same for FLUSHALL (every db) and ASYNC/SYNC forms, both runtimes, any shard count. The script path already refused them (KEYLESS_DISPATCHED_WRITES). Both handlers now refuse FLUSHDB / FLUSHALL inside an open cross-store TXN, above every routing / fan-out site, with the new ERR_TXN_NOT_UNDOABLE ("ERR TXN cannot roll back this command (whole-database write) -- run it outside the TXN"), and poison the TXN via mark_cross_txn_rejected so TXN.COMMIT answers EXECABORT. The set lives in crate::transaction::TXN_WHOLE_DB_WRITES, shared with the script path. SWAPDB, MOVE and COPY ... DB were already refused on the connection leg (unchanged, ERR_TXN_CROSS_SHARD); MULTI inside a TXN is refused, so the MULTI queue cannot carry a flush in. Test: tests/txn_abort_durability_1285.rs connection_writes_the_txn_cannot_undo_are_refused_shards_{1,4} (red on 18ad969 both runtimes, green here; also pins SWAPDB / MOVE / COPY DB and a kill -9 restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
…_key_the_command_does_not (moon#1285, PR #1301 review) Round 3 inserted written_keys_if_known_separates_write_free_from_unknown under the existing doc comment of the subset test; move it back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
…me its residuals (moon#1285, PR #1301 review) The round-3 bullet claimed a write-flagged command that only reads its keys "captures nothing". Narrow it to what was fixed (an argv the key walker reads as naming no written key: SORT / GEORADIUS without STORE) and name the residual over-capture: LMPOP / ZMPOP candidates, the GEORADIUSBYMEMBER-member-STORE and XGROUP HELP <x> walker corner cases, successful no-op writes, and connection-leg writes that answer an error (moon#1303), pointing to moon#1299. Rewrap the over-long line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request changes directory-fsync error handling and user-data directory selection. It also adds transaction guards for whole-database writes in both connection handlers, with tests for refusal and transaction abort behavior. ChangesDirectory durability
Transaction write refusal
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Bug fix Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant ConnectionHandler
participant Transaction
Client->>ConnectionHandler: Send FLUSHDB or FLUSHALL during TXN
ConnectionHandler->>Transaction: Mark rejected
ConnectionHandler-->>Client: Return ERR_TXN_NOT_UNDOABLE
Client->>ConnectionHandler: Commit transaction
ConnectionHandler->>Transaction: Process commit
Transaction-->>Client: Return EXECABORT
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Startup can continue after a fatal directory-durability failure. Preserve propagation of these errors before merging; the transaction refusal changes have no established remaining defect. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The transaction changes strengthen rollback protection and the directory changes avoid silently moving data elsewhere. However, startup can retain a directory after a durability failure without completing every required ancestor flush, potentially leaving stored data unreachable after power loss. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Review comments at @src/config.rs:
- Line 1085: Update user_data_dir_choice in resolve_dir to propagate
non-tolerated durability errors from create_dir_all_durable, including EIO, even
when the target directory already exists; reserve UseDespite for errors that are
explicitly safe to tolerate.
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.add/milestones/v0-9-2-perf-review/plans/WS31-txn-abort-review-fixes/SUMMARY.mdCHANGELOG.mdsrc/command/transaction.rssrc/config.rssrc/persistence/fsync.rssrc/scripting/bridge/txn_capture.rssrc/server/conn/handler_monoio/mod.rssrc/server/conn/handler_sharded/mod.rssrc/tracking/invalidation.rssrc/transaction/mod.rstests/txn_abort_durability_1285.rs
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…durable fails boot (moon#1293, PR #1305 review) resolve_dir mapped every create_dir_all_durable error on a directory that exists afterwards to 'use it anyway, with a warning'. Since round 4 every tolerable directory-fsync error (EINVAL/ENOTSUP/..., EACCES on a pre-existing ancestor) is skipped inside the helper, so what reaches resolve_dir is fatal (EIO, EACCES on a created dir). Booting on it left a directory entry that may not survive a power loss, and the next boot cannot repair it: the directory then exists, so only its own parent is fsynced. resolve_dir now returns io::Result; the binary and embedded entries fail startup on it, matching an explicit --dir. A user-data directory that cannot be created at all still falls back to the current directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
Summarises round 1 (#1292), wave 1 (#1301) and its follow-up (#1305): what shipped per issue, measured costs, the five review rounds and why they point at #1299, and the open residuals. Plans wave 2 as a DAG of 11 workstreams in three lanes (TXN, AOF stream, cold/expiry/parity) over two stages with an adversarial review + integration gate after each, and lists the maintainer decisions needed before starting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
…graph WAL overflow, expiry/ACL parity, held-file release (#1316) * docs(add): wave 1 review summary and the wave 2 plan (DAG) Summarises round 1 (#1292), wave 1 (#1301) and its follow-up (#1305): what shipped per issue, measured costs, the five review rounds and why they point at #1299, and the open residuals. Plans wave 2 as a DAG of 11 workstreams in three lanes (TXN, AOF stream, cold/expiry/parity) over two stages with an adversarial review + integration gate after each, and lists the maintainer decisions needed before starting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(add): record the wave-2 maintainer decisions (Q1-Q4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(add): wave-2 team-rules addendum (private targets, lanes, ports, oracle) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(review): without an AOF a mid-TXN snapshot resurrects an aborted TXN (moon#1285) A BGSAVE taken while a TXN is open holds its uncommitted writes (by design: point-in-time, needed by the AOF fold). With --appendonly no the abort's compensating records have no log to go to, and the snapshot is the durability authority: kill -9 + restart brings the aborted writes back. Pre-existing: red on f7f1d96 monoio and tokio, and on ce65400 monoio. The WS27 durability claim does not cover this quadrant. MOON_BIN=... cargo test --test review_w1_txn_abort_no_aof_snapshot_1285 -- --include-ignored --test-threads 1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(review): kill -9 inside a TXN keeps its uncommitted writes after AOF recovery (moon#1285) A crash is an implicit abort, but a TXN's writes reach the AOF as they run, with no transaction markers, and recovery rolls nothing back. Pre-existing: red on f7f1d96 monoio and tokio, and on ce65400 tokio. MOON_BIN=... cargo test --test review_w1_txn_abort_no_aof_snapshot_1285 a_crash -- --include-ignored Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(review): TXN.ABORT overwrites another client's acknowledged write, now durably (moon#1285) A non-TXN client's SET to a key the open TXN wrote is accepted (no write-write conflict), and the abort restores the pre-TXN value over it. Live this is pre-existing (ce65400 answers orig too); on ce65400 the restart replayed the other client's SET and brought it back, on f7f1d96 the compensating RESTORE makes the lost update durable and replicated. Red on f7f1d96 monoio/tokio (live orig, restart orig) and ce65400 monoio (live orig, restart other-client). MOON_BIN=... cargo test --test review_w1_txn_abort_no_aof_snapshot_1285 an_abort_does_not -- --include-ignored Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): an erroring TXN connection write takes its undo capture back (moon#1303) Mechanism: the connection leg of both runtimes captured a key's pre-image and recorded a write intent BEFORE dispatch and kept both even when the command answered an error and wrote nothing (`SET k v BADOPT`, `INCR` of a non-number, WRONGTYPE). `TXN ABORT` then restored the stale pre-image over whatever another client had written meanwhile - logged to the AOF and replicated. The capture now lives in one shared helper, `transaction::conn_capture` (both handlers call it; `handler_monoio/mod.rs` -52 lines, `handler_sharded/mod.rs` -21). `capture_conn_write` returns a mark (undo length + each key's previous intent, which `KvWriteIntents::record_write` already returns); `ConnWriteCapture::finish` runs after dispatch and, on an error reply, truncates the undo log back to the mark (`UndoLog::truncate`) and puts every key's previous intent back (`KvWriteIntents::restore`, new), newest first so a key captured twice by one write ends where it began. The pattern of the script leg (`txn_undo_capture` / `txn_undo_discard`, PR #1301). Evidence: unit tests `transaction::conn_capture::tests::*` and `kv_mvcc::tests::restore_undoes_record_write`. The real-server test (`an_erroring_write_holds_nothing_{1,4}_shard(s)` in tests/txn_isolation_1299.rs: A `TXN BEGIN; SET k v BADOPT`, B `SET k fresh`, A `TXN ABORT`, `GET k` = fresh; also INCR of a non-number and two WRONGTYPE shapes) lands with moon#1299 in the next commit, which also makes the capture take back the key hold it adds. Red on base 2e99254+3 (both runtimes: "TXN ABORT restored the pre-image ... over another client's write"), green after, monoio and tokio, --shards 1 and 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): hold the keys an open TXN wrote until COMMIT/ABORT (moon#1299) Mechanism: another client's write to a key an open cross-store TXN had written was acknowledged, and the TXN's ABORT then restored its pre-image over it (live, after a restart, on replicas). A key the TXN writes is now HELD until the TXN commits or aborts; any other writer is refused with `-TXNCONFLICT key held by an open transaction`, and FLUSHDB / FLUSHALL / SWAPDB touching a database with held keys with `-TXNCONFLICT database has keys held by an open transaction`. - `transaction::isolation` (new): the per-shard hold table (thread-local: a TXN writes only on its own shard, #499), gated by one `Cell<usize>` load, so a shard with nothing held pays one thread-local load per checked write and no atomics. Holds are taken by the connection capture (`conn_capture`, which now refuses a key another TXN holds before capturing, poisons its TXN, and on an error reply releases the holds it created) and by the script leg (`run_local_script`). Released by COMMIT (also the killed-snapshot path, which leaked intents before) and by `abort_logged` only AFTER the restore's compensating records are enqueued. - Checked on every write path: `command::dispatch` (both runtimes' local legs, routed SPSC legs, coordinator legs, MULTI/EXEC bodies, every script `redis.call`); the monoio inline SET stands down while anything is held; `immediate_serve` / the MULTI BLPOP rewrite; `move_core` / `copy_core`; `MQ.*`; FLUSHDB/FLUSHALL in their dispatch arms and SWAPDB in both intercepts read every shard's published view (`Published`: one writer, whole-word stores; loom model `txn_isolation_view` in tests/loom_response_slot.rs). `dispatch_read` executes reads only. - The TXN's own writes run in an `OwnerScope`; the replica's apply of the master stream in a `BypassScope`. - Blocking wakers leave a held key's waiters parked (a BLMOVE whose destination is held too) and re-wake them when the hold is released. - Eviction samplers and active expiry (whole-key sweep, lazy drain, hash-field sweep) skip held keys; an expired held key is reaped after the TXN ends, and does not latch the moon#1288 backlog. - INFO stats: txn_open, txn_oldest_age_ms, txn_held_keys, txn_conflicts_refused. docs/guides/transactions.md documents the error. Evidence (base 2e99254+3 cherry-picked review tests vs this commit, both runtimes, --shards 1 and 4): tests/txn_isolation_1299.rs 20 tests, 18 red on base (the 2 `disconnect_releases_*` guards pass vacuously there), 20 green after on monoio and tokio. The PR #1301 review over-capture shapes: 10/10 lose another client's write on base at --shards 1 (9/10 at 4: `SET 100` routes to another shard), 0 after. review_w1 ... an_abort_does_not_overwrite_another_clients_acknowledged_write: red -> green; its two siblings stay red until WS42 (#1300). Gates green: fmt, clippy --all-targets on both feature sets, fuzz check, cargo test --lib (6938 monoio / 5996 tokio), txn_abort_durability_1285, txn_multikey_undo_500, txn_kv_wiring, txn_partial_reject(_monoio), inline_read_txn_visibility_807, scripts_in_multi_894 (tokio: known replica-order failure), script_key_routing, eviction_reason_del_run_budget_1294, active_expiry_backlog_drain_1288. Deferred: no idle-TXN timeout (maintainer decision); a cross-shard multi-key write whose one leg meets a held key applies its other legs (the same non-atomic shape as any failed leg); a race between the FLUSH/SWAPDB pre-check and a hold taken on another shard during the fan-out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): release an aborting TXN's keys from a drop guard (moon#1299) `abort_logged` released the transaction's holds with an explicit call after its last await. A dropped abort future (task cancelled mid-await) would have left the keys held for the life of the process. The release is now an `isolation::EndOnDrop` guard taken at the top of `abort_logged`: it still runs after the restore and the enqueue of its compensating records (end of the function), and also when the future is dropped mid-await. Evidence: `transaction::isolation::tests::end_on_drop_releases`; tests/txn_isolation_1299.rs (incl. `disconnect_releases_{1,4}_shard(s)`) and txn_abort_durability_1285 green on both runtimes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs: WS36 SUMMARY (moon#1299, moon#1303) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(graph): a WAL burst past the 4096-slot append channel is acked but lost on kill -9 (moon#1302) One Cypher CREATE of 6000 nodes keeps 4096 after kill -9; a TXN with 6000 graph rollback records, or a 2,500-node Cypher CREATE pipelined with its TXN ABORT, answers MOONERR WAL backpressure; after such an abort a master restart disagrees with its replica (1905 vs 1 nodes); a TXN.COMMIT materializing 6000 MQ PUBLISHes keeps 4096. Red on the WS36 base on both runtimes (graph tests skip on the tokio leg, which builds without the graph feature); --shards 1 and 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(shard): WAL records past the append channel's free slots are appended, not dropped (moon#1302) Every graph, MQ, workspace and temporal WAL record went through an unchecked try_send into the shard's 4096-slot append channel, drained only on the shard's 1 ms tick; a command emitting more records than the free slots (a 6000-node Cypher CREATE, a large TXN rollback, a TXN.COMMIT materializing thousands of MQ PUBLISHes) lost the rest after answering OK. New shard::wal_append: a full channel spills the record to the owning shard thread's overflow queue, and the tick's drain_into appends the channel's records and then the overflow's, in production order, in one synchronous stretch. No fixed capacity for one command's records, no drop, identical durability (same tick, same flush), on-disk WAL-v3 format unchanged. ShardDatabases::{wal_append, try_wal_append_required, try_wal_append_all} and mq_exec's slice appender all route through it; a record that still cannot be enqueued (writer gone, or produced off its shard's thread) is counted in reclamation_wal_append_channel_dropped_total and logged. The shutdown paths drain the queues before their final flush. New INFO field reclamation_wal_append_overflow_total. TXN.ABORT's checked rollback append (PR #1301) therefore no longer refuses a burst: MOONERR WAL backpressure / txn_rollback_wal_dropped remain only for a writer that is gone. append_graph_rollback_wal now borrows the records and reports the accepted prefix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): TXN.ABORT replicates only the graph rollback its WAL accepted (moon#1302) abort_logged recorded the graph rollback records in the replication stream BEFORE the checked WAL append: on a refusal the replica held the whole rollback while the master's WAL held a prefix, and after a master restart the two disagreed for good. Append first, then replicate exactly the accepted prefix, in the same no-await stretch (the EndOnDrop hold guard from moon#1299 still releases only after the records are enqueued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(transaction): a graph rollback past the WAL channel's capacity now answers +OK (moon#1302) The PR #1301 overflow tests accepted either +OK or MOONERR WAL backpressure; with no capacity limit on the owning shard's thread the abort must answer +OK and stay aborted after kill -9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs: WS41 SUMMARY (moon#1302) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(persistence): touchback probe, mixed-log and downgrade tests for the AOF replay clock (moon#1283) The `touchback` probe of REVIEW-FINAL-P5B re-created as a Rust integration test (the original rvfb_1277_edges.py is gone): 40 keys in five classes whose verdict after a restart depends on the clock the log was written under — keys that expired while the server ran and were rewritten before their DEL was logged (moon#542: INCR -> 1, SET NX -> new), an RMW logged while alive whose TTL passes during the downtime, long-TTL and persistent controls. Every live reply is asserted. The AOF files' mtimes are moved an hour back (and forward) before the restart. - moon_1283_touch{back,forward}_probe_s{1,4} - moon_1283_touchback_probe_after_a_rewrite_s{1,4}: the workload lands in a new generation cut by BGREWRITEAOF - moon_1283_mixed_old_new_log_s{1,4}: a stamp-less first generation (MOON_OLD_BIN, or this binary with every MOON.TS stripped) followed by a stamped one - moon_1283_the_log_carries_ts_records - moon_1283_downgrade_read_s{1,4}: a stamped log replayed by MOON_DOWNGRADE_BIN (skips with a note when unset) Red on the base binaries (2e99254, release-fast), keys wrong: monoio s1/s4: touchback 20/40, 17/40; forward 10/40, 10/40; after a rewrite 12/60, 18/60; mixed 20/70, 11/70 tokio s1/s4: touchback 12/40, 12/40; forward 10/40, 10/40; after a rewrite 20/60, 13/60; mixed 16/70, 19/70 (the L/E counts vary run to run: the active expiry reaps some keys, and logs their DEL, in the few ms they sit expired; the rounds are spread over the expiry cycle so a regressed replay cannot pass by luck). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * feat(persistence): MOON.TS replay clock and the MOON.* pseudo-command intercept (moon#1283) Replay side of moon#1283 option (a). - `replay::pseudo`: the ONE intercept for replay-only `MOON.*` records (`MOON.TS`, and now `MOON.COLDCUT` / `MOON.SPILLED` too), called first in `DispatchReplayEngine::replay_command` — before anything that could skip a data record (decision Q6: clock stamps are observations, not data). `classify` is a 5-byte prefix check for every data record. New route `ReplayRoute::Marker` (never KV history). `TsRecord` encodes `MOON.TS <ms>` on the stack (<= 44 bytes, no allocation). - `replay::clock`: a pin guard now scopes one replayed file. `observe_log_ts` sets the judgment clock to the LAST stamp read (not a running max: a parked producer's record carries an older stamp); until a file's first stamp the mtime pin rules, so a log without stamps replays exactly as before. Stamps outside a pin scope, 0, or past year 9999 are ignored. - Downgrade: an older binary sends MOON.TS to dispatch, gets "unknown command" (ReplayRoute::Unhandled) and replays everything around it; pinned by `an_older_binary_sees_an_unknown_command_and_skips_it`. Tests: replay::pseudo::tests (6), incl. the touchback shape through the production flat-file replay, a stamp-less prefix + stamped suffix, and last-not-max. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * feat(persistence): stamp AOF records with the shard clock and emit MOON.TS (moon#1283) Writer side of moon#1283 option (a): the log now says which clock each record was judged under, so a replay no longer depends on the file mtime (REVIEW-FINAL-P5B: 27-36/40 keys wrong with the mtime an hour back). - `AofMessage::{Append,AppendSync}` carry `clock_ms` in memory only, like `epoch`. `AofWriterPool::fold_stamp` now returns an `AppendStamp` (epoch + this thread's cached clock — the `CachedClock` value the mutation was judged with), read in the mutation's synchronous section, so a record that parks before its enqueue keeps its own clock. The synchronous producers stamp themselves. Stamp-taking APIs accept `impl Into<AppendStamp>`; a bare `FoldEpoch` converts with clock 0 (= unknown: no stamp; barriers, tests). - `aof::record_ctx::RecordCtx` replaces the writers' `last_db: usize`: one rule, `prefix(db, clock_ms, empty)`, yields `MOON.TS <ms>` when the clock differs from the last stamp in stream order, then `SELECT <db>` when the db differs. Applied by the four batch loops (`inject_record_prefixes`, the renamed `inject_select_records`, same #455 filter and moon#1187 fast path) and per record by every rewrite and overflow drain. A new generation `reset()`s it (db 0, no clock). Stamps are carved out of a 4 KiB arena: no allocation per stamp. - Injected stamps are lsn 0 in the framed incr (max_lsn unaffected). - Every generation head (boot seed, flat-file seed, rewrite) now carries `MOON.TS <now>` right after `MOON.COLDCUT` (`write_generation_head_at` with 0 = no stamp keeps the byte-exact test fixtures). - `migrate_aof` copies a `MOON.TS` to every shard's incr instead of routing it by its argument's hash. - size_of::<AofMessage>(): 72 -> 80 bytes (pinned by `the_clock_costs_at_most_one_word_per_message`). Cross-lane touch: one-line `FoldEpoch::INITIAL` -> `AppendStamp::INITIAL` defaults (and two param types) in handler_monoio/{mod,write}.rs, handler_sharded/{mod,write}.rs, handler_single.rs, shared.rs, txn_abort.rs, coordinator.rs; `clock_ms: 0` in test literals. The per-shard WAL v3 KV log (`--appendonly no`) does not carry stamps yet (it is not the AOF stream); its replay keeps the mtime judgment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fuzz: aof_incr_replay — AOF bytes through the replay engine (moon#1283) No target exercised AOF *replay*: `resp_parse*` stop at the RESP layer and `wal_v3_record` at the WAL record decoder. `aof_incr_replay` drives arbitrary bytes through the three production readers — the framed per-shard incr (plus the ordered-entry merge), the multi-part RESP incr, and the flat `appendonly.aof` (via a temp file, RDB preamble detection included) — into real databases through `DispatchReplayEngine` and its pseudo-command intercept. Byte 0 selects the reader and prepends well-formed `MOON.COLDCUT` / `MOON.TS` / malformed `MOON.TS` records so the intercept arms are reached without discovery. Invariants: no panic; the replay clock never leaks out of its pin scope. - `aof_manifest::shard_replay` is now `pub mod` so the cfg(fuzzing) entry `shard_replay::fuzz::{replay_framed, replay_resp}` is reachable. - Listed in BOTH fuzz.yml matrices (PR + nightly) and in fuzz/Cargo.toml; `cargo check --manifest-path fuzz/Cargo.toml --all-targets` is clean. - No nightly toolchain on this host: a stable smoke of the same contract runs as a unit test (`mutated_stamped_logs_never_panic_nor_leak_the_clock`, 6000 seeded mutations of a stamped log, both readers). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(persistence): STORAGE-FORMAT §3.3 replay-only records and MOON.TS (moon#1283) Lists the replay-only pseudo-commands (SELECT injection, MOON.COLDCUT, MOON.TS, MOON.SPILLED), what MOON.TS carries and how a replay uses it (last stamp, mtime fallback until a file's first stamp), and the compatibility story: no §2 rule-4 layout changes; upgrade replays old logs as before; a downgraded binary treats MOON.TS as an unknown command, skips it and replays everything else (verified: moon_1283_downgrade_read_s{1,4} against the 2e99254 binaries, both runtimes); the WAL v3 KV log does not carry stamps yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(persistence): writer record-context comments name MOON.TS (moon#1283) The TopLevel writer's `last_db` and the rewrite drains' `db_ctx` are `RecordCtx`s now; their comments still described the db-only context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs: WS37 SUMMARY (moon#1283) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(persistence): everysec kill -9 durability leg (moon#1266) tests/aof_everysec_kill9_1266.rs acks N SETs under `--appendonly yes --appendfsync everysec`, SIGKILLs the server 1 ms after the last ack (MOON_1266_KILL_DELAY_US), restarts on the same --dir and counts acked keys that did not come back. Shapes: 10,000 unpipelined SETs, 10,000 SETs in pipelines of 100, and one SET after the writer idled 1.5 s; --shards 1 and 4; 20 reps per cell (MOON_1266_REPS). Every rep's count is printed. Red on this branch's base (lane-b-ws37-*), 5 reps per cell, lost per rep: monoio s1 unpipelined [123,0,104,92,69] s4 [1,17,3,0,15] monoio s1 pipelined [1118,0,200,10000,0] s4 [100,366,338,300,7557] monoio lone-after-idle s1/s4 [1,1,1,1,1] tokio s1 unpipelined [2,67,160,92,109] s4 [348,184,208,310,364] tokio s1 pipelined [0,152,201,52,101] s4 [459,235,469,442,543] tokio lone-after-idle s1/s4 [1,1,1,1,1] Also: `always` acks only after its fsync (the fsync held open with MOON_TEST_AOF_SYNC_GATE: no reply while held, +OK once released), and an everysec writer keeps acking and writing while its fsync is held, with 0 lost to a kill -9 during the held fsync (INFO aof_delayed_fsync >= 1 proves the hold bit). Those two need the hook and INFO field added with the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(persistence): tokio AOF writer flushes every batch to the kernel (moon#1266) The tokio writers kept a batch in their user-space BufWriter until 8 KiB had accumulated (the moon#1187 tail bound), so a SIGKILL took up to 8 KiB of acknowledged records per shard with it under everysec/no. A kill -9 does not touch the kernel page cache: once write(2) has returned, the record survives. Every non-`always` batch now ends with `flush()`, which also waits for the write tokio::fs::File may still have in flight on its blocking pool (its poll_write returns before the write is done). Cost: one blocking-pool hop per batch instead of one per 8 KiB; the BufWriter capacity (2 MiB, moon#1226) still sets how many hops a large batch takes. `always` is unchanged (it already flushed before its fsync). Evidence: tests/aof_everysec_kill9_1266.rs (tokio numbers in the SUMMARY). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(persistence): run the everysec AOF fsync on a per-writer agent thread (moon#1266) The everysec fsync ran inline on the AOF writer thread, once a second: for as long as the disk took, the writer did not drain its channel, so acked records piled up in process memory (lost to a kill -9) and past 10k records producers met the moon#769/#838 backpressure. redis runs this fsync on a background thread (BIO_AOF_FSYNC); moon now does the same. - fsync_agent.rs: one `aof-fsync-<idx>` thread per writer (spawned by the writer, joined when it exits). At the everysec deadline the writer hands it a dup of its fd and goes straight back to its channel. The agent records the outcome where the inline fsync did (fsync-latency metric, record_everysec_fsync_result -> INFO aof_last_fsync_status / aof_fsync_failures). A failed fsync is retried at the next deadline even with nothing new written. No agent (thread refused) or a failed dup: the writer fsyncs inline exactly as before; nothing is dropped. - fsync_handoff.rs: one atomic word, IDLE -> IN_FLIGHT (writer CAS) -> IDLE (agent finish, outcome stored first; or writer abort). At most one fsync in flight per writer; a deadline that finds one running is postponed and retried on the next wake, counted once per deadline in the new INFO field `aof_delayed_fsync`. Unlike redis, the WRITE is never postponed, so a slow fsync no longer exposes acked writes to a process crash. Loom model: tests/loom_aof_fsync_agent.rs compiles the real file (at most one job; every byte written before a claim covered by its fsync; a claim sees the settled outcome; a postponed deadline is retried, never dropped; an aborted claim frees the state). Reordering `finish` (IDLE before the outcome) makes the loom run fail. - The writer only hands off when something was written since the last hand-off (or the last fsync failed): an idle writer no longer fsyncs a clean file every second. - MOON_TEST_AOF_SYNC_GATE=<path> (test-only) holds every AOF data fsync - the agent's and `always`'s per-batch one - while <path> exists. MOON_TEST_AOF_FSYNC_STALL_MS keeps holding the WRITER at its deadline (it now models a writer blocked behind a slow disk), so the moon#769/#838/ #1272/#1294 suites keep their mechanism. `appendfsync always` is untouched: its per-batch fsync stays on the writer, before the batch's acks (group_commit); tests/aof_everysec_kill9_1266.rs always_acks_only_after_the_fsync_{s1,s4} hold the fsync and see no reply until it is released. Cross-ownership: src/command/connection.rs (one INFO line). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(persistence): monoio AOF writer picks records up promptly - warm poll, then park (moon#1266) The monoio writer polled its channel park-free with `wait/16` sleeps: ~3 ms between polls while writing (50 ms floor wait) and 50 ms for the first record after an idle second (1 s escalated wait). Every acked record sat in process memory for up to one step, and a kill -9 inside it lost the record - 10,000 of 10,000 acked pipelined SETs in one base rep. Now, under everysec/no: - WARM (the previous receive returned a message): poll every 100 us (AOF_WARM_POLL_STEP) for up to 5 ms (AOF_WARM_POLL_SPAN). Producer try_sends stay futex-free while writes flow - the reason the loop was made park-free (149,718 shard-thread futex wakes per 8 s at p1). - then, or when the previous receive timed out (COLD): park in recv_timeout for the rest of the wait. The first record after an idle period costs its producer ONE futex wake and is picked up at once; an idle writer wakes only when its wait (<= 1 s) elapses, fewer times than the old <= 20/s. `always` keeps its parked receive. Unit: poll_recv_tests::a_cold_writer_picks_up_the_first_record_promptly (median pickup < 10 ms; old step 50 ms), a_warm_writer_polls_with_a_short_step (median < 1.5 ms; old 3.125 ms), a_warm_writer_parks_after_its_span_and_times_out_on_schedule. Integration: tests/aof_everysec_kill9_1266.rs (numbers in the SUMMARY). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * refactor(persistence): move the monoio writer's channel poll to writer_task/poll.rs (moon#1266) Pure move of poll_recv / recv_next / the warm-poll constants and their tests out of the over-cap writer_task.rs (2317 -> 2079 lines, below its 2154-line base). No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * perf(persistence): MOON_AOF_WARM_POLL_US overrides the AOF writer's warm poll step (moon#1266) A diagnostic knob (10..=50,000 us, read once; default 100 us) for same-binary A/B runs of the warm poll step's trade-off: the step is the everysec kill -9 window while writes flow, and ~1/step is the writer's wake rate. Documented in docs/internal/env-knobs.md, together with the test-only MOON_TEST_AOF_SYNC_GATE / MOON_TEST_AOF_FSYNC_STALL_MS hooks and redis's 2 s write-postpone caveat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * style(persistence): cargo fmt (moon#1266) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * test(persistence): the kill -9 leg asserts the Option-3 property, STRICT opt-in for 0 (moon#1266) Option 3 narrows the everysec kill -9 window to one warm poll step or one thread wake-up; it does not close it. On this 4-vCPU host shared with two other build lanes, 20 reps per cell on the fix still lost acked SETs in 1-2 reps of some cells (a writer descheduled, or a write(2) stalled, for longer than the 1 ms kill delay), while every base cell lost in its MEDIAN rep. So the default assertion is the property the fix does deliver: the median rep loses nothing and at most a quarter of the reps lose anything. MOON_1266_STRICT=1 asserts 0 in every rep - the bar for moon#1266 1A (write before the reply, WS46). Per-rep counts are always printed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(persistence): everysec's fsync agent, its kill -9 window, redis's 2 s postpone (moon#1266) - production-guide: the writer poll (warm, then parked), the everysec fsync agent and INFO aof_delayed_fsync; what a process crash can still lose under everysec (the ack-to-write(2) window) with the measured 20-rep results, base vs fix; and redis's own caveat - with a background fsync still running it postpones the AOF WRITE for up to 2 s while replies go out, so a slow disk exposes up to ~2 s of acked writes to a kill -9 there. moon postpones only the fsync. - PRODUCTION-CONTRACT: the everysec process-crash RPO names that window instead of "last buffered batch". - The kill -9 suite's docs carry the 20-rep base medians. README.md:280 ("kill-9-lossless") is a shared artifact and is not edited here; its replacement text is in the WS40 SUMMARY. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(persistence): correct the base lossy-rep count (moon#1266) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * perf(persistence): AOF writer warm poll step 500 us, not 100 us (moon#1266) Measured on the 4-vCPU Linux container, --shards 1, everysec, redis-benchmark -t set -r 1000000 -d 16, interleaved with the base binary (3 reps; same binary, MOON_AOF_WARM_POLL_US): at 100 us the warm poll cost ~10-15% rps at p1 c50 (base 103.5K, 100 us 93.6K, 500 us 107.7K, 3000 us 103.2K) and +20-28% server CPU per op across the grid; 500 us ran at parity, and 3000 us (the old step) at parity too, so the fsync agent itself costs nothing measurable. The kill -9 leg (1 ms after the last ack, 20 reps x 6 cells) lost in 5 of 120 monoio reps at 500 us vs 2-5 of 120 at 100 us: the residue is writer stalls, not the step. The window while writing is <= ~0.5 ms (was ~3 ms), and the first record after idle is still picked up at once (the writer parks when cold). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(add): WS40 fsync agent SUMMARY (moon#1266) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): count every expiry-driven key removal in INFO expired_keys (moon#1286) `INFO stats` `expired_keys` read 0 forever: `record_expired_key` was the only writer of the counter and nothing in production called it (only a unit test). Mechanism: call the existing per-thread cache-line-striped counter (summed at INFO time, no shared atomic) from every whole-key expiry removal: - active cycle (`expire_cycle_budget`, which the 100 ms slow cycle and moon#1288's fast slices both run) and the lazy-reap drain (`drain_lazy_expired`, moon#542's deferred delete); - DEL/UNLINK reaping an expired key and a write over one (redis's `expireIfNeeded` counts both) - not when applying the master's stream: a redis replica does not expire, its `expired_keys` stays 0 (measured on 7.0.15 and 7.2.7: master 100/150, replica 0); - cold tier: the TTL sweep (`sweep_expired`, batched) and the on-read cold reclaim. Hash-field expiry is not counted (redis counts keys only). The exact-sum unit test drove `expired_keys` on the assumption that nothing else counts it; it now drives a test-only probe field, and unit tests read an exact per-thread mirror instead of the shared striped sum. Evidence: tests/info_expired_keys_1286.rs (50 x SET PX 20, active / lazy / DEL arms, shards 1 and 4, hash-field negative control). Red on the base binaries of both runtimes (expired_keys 0, want 50; 6 of 7 fail, the control passes). Consistency rows in scripts/test-consistency.sh and scripts/test-commands.sh compare the delta on both servers. Known gap: a replica's own cold TTL sweep and on-read cold reclaim still count (they run on replicas too); only spilled TTL'd keys are affected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(acl): render command rules in application order, as redis 7.2+ (moon#1296) `ACL GETUSER`, `ACL LIST` and the `ACL SAVE` file sorted a user's command rules alphabetically at render time (and, before that sort, in per-process HashSet order, which is why the moon#981 consistency rows flipped between runs of one binary). redis 7.2+ renders them in the order they were applied: `+set +get` is `-@all +set +get`, a re-applied rule moves to the end, and grants and revocations stay interleaved (`+@all -get -set +get -del` is `+@all -set +get -del`). Mechanism: the two `HashSet`s of `CommandPermissions::Specific` become one insertion-ordered `CommandRules` map (`rule -> allowed`, indexmap, already a dependency), new module `acl/command_rules.rs`. Lossless: a rule lived in at most one set, so the sets were one map with a boolean, and only one map keeps the order BETWEEN grants and revocations (two ordered sets cannot). `apply` does shift_remove + insert, redis's ACLUpdateCommandRules. `permits` probes one map instead of two. The permission semantics are untouched: `cmd|arg` rule, then bare `cmd` rule, then the base polarity (GHSA-9x86-7597-5wwj stays). The fail-open guard survives: a bare `cmd` token is never written after a `cmd|arg` token of the same command, because a reload's bare rule clears the older `cmd|*` ones. Application order cannot produce that state (a bare rule clears them as it lands), so `CommandRules::tokens` hoists as a guard only, and a unit test builds the impossible state by hand. Evidence: tests/acl_rule_order_1296.rs (14 sequences x GETUSER / ACL LIST / ACL SAVE line / GETUSER after ACL LOAD, shards 1 and 4), expectations read off redis 7.2.7; red on the base binaries of both runtimes (`+set +get` read back `+get +set`). Unit tests in acl/command_rules.rs. Consistency rows for the sequences added to scripts/test-consistency.sh (the moon#981 SAVE/LOAD loop) and scripts/test-commands.sh; their oracle note is corrected (deterministic on 7.2+, still dict-ordered on 7.0). Not covered, pre-existing: moon expands a category (`+@read`) into its member commands where redis keeps the `+@read` token, so category rules still render differently. Existing ACL files re-save with a different rule order (same permissions). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(tiered): release held cold files without a manual fold or snapshot (moon#1289) A dead spill file the unlink hold covers (`hold_below`) is released only by a committed fold (AOF) or a snapshot that started after it went zero-ref (no AOF). Nothing asked for either: the auto-rewrite monitor folds for growth (>= 64 MB), a forced rewrite or ledger pressure (`ledger > maxmemory/4`), and without an AOF nothing snapshots. In the cold_file_id_reuse_1067 shape the ledger is ~63 KiB against a 128 KiB threshold, so the files stayed on disk (`cold_files_pending_unlink` 8) until an operator ran BGREWRITEAOF / BGSAVE. Mechanism (maintainer decision: option 2 without an AOF, option 1 with one): - After each orphan sweep, `held_release_tick::after_sweep` asks every database whether a held file still awaits a fold (`UnlinkHold::awaits_fold`) at the same committed floor. `HeldWait` counts consecutive sweeps; three running (>= two whole sweep intervals) makes the database stale. A committed fold that moves the floor, or a release, restarts/clears the count. - With an AOF a stale database raises a signal the auto-rewrite monitor answers with a fold (the ledger-pressure path, so it is answered even with `auto-aof-rewrite-percentage 0`), spaced by `held_release::spacing`. - Without one the shard requests a snapshot through the new reusable `persistence::snapshot_request` (moon#1297 reuses it: a reason enum, one process-wide rate-limit gate, Busy does not consume the slot, a refusal does, goes through `bgsave_start_sharded` so it is a counted save). - No new timer: the check rides the sweep's own arm on both runtimes (`runtime::interval` on tokio, `tick_cadence::Cadence` on monoio). A TopLevel multi-shard AOF layout, where no committed fold covers the shard, never triggers. - Defaults are expressed in the existing knob, the sweep interval (`--cold-orphan-sweep-interval-secs`, 60 s): stale after 3 sweeps (2 min), and at most one fold/snapshot per 10 intervals (10 min, from the last request of any reason), which bounds continuous churn to six per hour, the order of an ordinary --save rule. Nothing new is configurable. - INFO # MoonStore: cold_held_files_stale_databases, cold_held_release_folds_requested, cold_held_release_snapshots_requested. Evidence: tests/cold_held_files_release_1289.rs, the 1067 shape (fill, spill, the one manual fold/snapshot that raises the hold, DEL everything), 1 and 4 shards, AOF and no AOF, both runtimes. Red on the base binaries (60 s later 8 files still held, 4 of 6 fail on monoio and on tokio); green on the fix (released 5.0 s after being held with an AOF, 2.0 s without; heap files gone; exactly the matching trigger counter moved). The steady-state control (live cold keys, no held file, 8 s of sweeps) requests no fold and no snapshot and moves no rdb_last_save_time, on base and fix alike. Unit tests: HeldWait, the gate (spacing boundary, Busy/Refused, 8 racing callers start one), and a real ColdIndex held file going stale then clearing on a committed fold. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs: WS38 and WS39 SUMMARY (moon#1286, moon#1296, moon#1289) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): end an open TXN on every connection exit, not only the tail (moon#1299) R1 review F1 (BLOCKER). The only TXN cleanup, `abort_logged(.., Disconnect)`, sat at the tail of each runtime's connection body, and many exits `return`ed before it: a protocol fault (monoio), a BLPOP blocked in the TXN whose peer went away (both), a failed or over-limit reply write (tokio), SUBSCRIBE then QUIT (monoio), SUBSCRIBE then a protocol fault (both), a PSYNC hijack (monoio), tokio's fatal cross-shard reply, subscriber write errors. The TXN then outlived its connection for the life of the process: its keys held (every other writer answered -TXNCONFLICT, FLUSHALL/FLUSHDB/SWAPDB refused, expiry and eviction skipping them), INFO txn_open stuck at 1, and its uncommitted writes never rolled back. Structural fix: the ConnectionState moves OUT of the body. Each runtime's entry point (`handle_connection_sharded_monoio`, `handle_connection_sharded_inner`, same names and signatures, callers unchanged) now lives in a new `exit.rs` beside the handler: it builds the state, awaits the body (`handle_connection_body`, which borrows the state as `&mut`), and then runs the exit epilogue — `txn_abort::end_open_txn`, the same boxed `abort_logged(.., Disconnect)` as before. Why every exit now passes it: the body is a plain async fn whose every `return`, `break` and hand-off result returns control to the wrapper's `.await`, with the state still owned by the wrapper; the epilogue is the next statement. A future early exit cannot skip it without editing exit.rs. (Panics and a future dropped by runtime teardown are outside, as before; no caller wraps the handler in a select/timeout.) Hand-offs: PSYNC hijack (monoio) is aborted BEFORE the stream returns to the caller that starts the replica sync — the socket stops being a client connection for good, so its TXN can never commit; the same outcome as a disconnect, and needs no per-site check (the very thing F1 is about). Migration and task-park already require `active_cross_txn.is_none()` (`migration_eligible`, the park predicate), so the epilogue is a no-op there (debug-asserted); if that gate ever regressed the TXN would be rolled back, never leaked. Double abort is impossible: `end_open_txn` take()s the TXN first, so it is a no-op after TXN.ABORT / TXN.COMMIT. Ordering: monoio still sends FIN before the rollback (as before); tokio now drops the stream before the rollback instead of after — a client could never observe the difference (its own close races the server's EOF either way). Handler files shrink (the construction and tail block move out). Tests: tests/txn_exit_epilogue_1299.rs, one per exit class (protocol fault s1+s4, BLPOP then peer reset s1+s4, reply over the output-buffer limit, SUBSCRIBE+QUIT, SUBSCRIBE+protocol fault, PSYNC in the TXN); each asserts the write is rolled back, INFO txn_open:0 / txn_held_keys:0, the key writable, FLUSHALL OK. Red on f766fc2: monoio 7/8 fail (all but the output-buffer case, which was clean there), tokio 4/8 fail (output buffer, BLPOP x2, subscriber fault) — exactly the review's matrix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): a cross-shard DEL/UNLINK answers its refused local slice (moon#1299) R1 review F2 (MAJOR). `coordinate_multi_del_or_exists` read the local slice's reply with `if let Frame::Integer(n)`, so a local `-TXNCONFLICT` (check_write refuses the whole local argv when it names a held key) was dropped: the client got a success count of the remote legs (`:1`) while the held key AND every other key co-located with it stayed undeleted. Mirror MSET's `local_err`: a local `Frame::Error` becomes the first leg error, the slice is not logged and does not count as applied, every remote leg is still drained, and the reply goes through `refused_leg_error` like a remote leg's refusal. EXISTS/TOUCH share the path (a local read error now surfaces instead of vanishing from the sum). Sibling audit of the other multi-key fan-ins: MSET already carried `local_err`; MSETNX, BITOP and COPY run one owner and return its reply (errors included); MGET/EXISTS pipeline splits (`conn::fanout`) propagate the first part error; no other coordinator sums integer replies. Test: tests/review_r1_txn_isolation_1299.rs `cross_shard_del_with_a_refused_local_slice_answers_the_conflict` (s4): a client on the held key's shard runs `DEL|UNLINK remote held local_free` → -TXNCONFLICT, held and local_free still exist; a client on another shard gets -TXNCONFLICT for the same slice; after ABORT the DEL answers :3. Red on f766fc2 on both runtimes (`:1`). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): INFO txn_held_keys counts every held key (moon#1299) R1 review F3 (MINOR). `hold()` / `unhold()` published the shard's view only when a database's held count went 0->1 or 1->0, so `txn_held_keys` kept the count of the last such transition: 1 for five held keys, 6 for seven, 1 for the 2000 keys of the F1 leak. The held-key word is now stored on every hold and release: the full `publish()` still runs on a database transition (the db mask must change), and any other hold/unhold stores just the count (`publish_held_keys`, one Relaxed store by the single writer, no Arc clone; falls back to `publish()` if the view is not registered yet). No change on the no-TXN path. Tests: unit `published_held_keys_follow_every_hold_and_release` (5 holds count 1..5, a 2nd db 6, an unhold 5, txn_end 0); integration `info_txn_held_keys_counts_every_held_key` (5 SETs -> 5, 7 -> 7, rewrite stays 7, +1 in db 2 -> 8, erroring writes (#1303) stay 8, 0 after COMMIT and after ABORT). Integration red on f766fc2 on both runtimes (`Some(1)` vs 5). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): RESET ends an open TXN like redis RESET discards MULTI (moon#1299) R1 review MINOR. RESET inside a cross-store TXN left it open (a later TXN.COMMIT answered OK). With moon#1299 holds and no idle timeout, a pooled connection's RESET-and-return kept every key the TXN wrote locked until the pool closed the socket. redis's RESET discards the connection's MULTI state; RESET now ends the TXN the way a disconnect does. `txn_abort::try_handle_reset` wraps the shared `shared::try_handle_reset` (the one definition of "default state", untouched): a valid RESET first rolls the TXN back through `end_open_txn(.., AbortCause::Reset)` — awaited, so a command pipelined after RESET already reads the pre-TXN value — then resets the rest. A RESET refused for its arity changes nothing, the TXN included. All four sharded call sites use it (monoio normal + subscriber arm, tokio normal + subscriber loop); the replicator is the runtime's usual one (monoio `abort_replicator`, tokio None). The reply stays `+RESET` whatever the rollback's durability (redis RESET always answers +RESET); a refused log record is counted and logged at ERROR by `abort_logged`, like a disconnect rollback. Test: `reset_ends_the_open_txn_and_releases_its_keys` — pipelined TXN BEGIN / SET / RESET / GET reads the pre-TXN value, INFO txn_open:0 txn_held_keys:0, the key writable, FLUSHALL OK, TXN.COMMIT afterwards errors; the same from subscriber mode; `RESET extra` leaves the TXN open. Red on f766fc2 on both runtimes (GET after RESET read `txnval`). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): a partly-applied cross-shard write refused by a TXN hold says so (moon#1299) R1 review MINOR. A cross-shard MSET (and, since F2, DEL/UNLINK) whose leg on the held key's shard was refused while other legs were applied answered the bare `-TXNCONFLICT key held by an open transaction` — reading as "nothing happened" although the remote keys were written. Cross-shard writes have no two-phase commit (documented as Risk 1); the reply now says what happened. `refused_leg_error` — already rewriting the AOF-backpressure "not executed" into its partial form (moon#769) — rewrites ERR_TXN_CONFLICT_KEY the same way when another part ran, into the new ERR_TXN_CONFLICT_PARTIAL: `TXNCONFLICT key held by an open transaction: command partially executed; its keys on the shard holding that key were left unchanged, the rest were applied`. Same TXNCONFLICT code (is_conflict_reply still true), so a client's retry handling is unchanged; a refusal with nothing else applied keeps the plain text. Tests: unit `a_txn_conflict_leg_of_a_command_whose_other_parts_ran_says_partial` (refused_leg_tests); integration `partially_applied_cross_shard_writes_say_so` (s4: MSET and DEL from the held key's shard say "partially executed", the remote leg applied, the refused slice unapplied; an all-local refused MSET keeps the plain text). Red on f766fc2 on both runtimes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(transaction): a TXN.COMMIT refused for a killed snapshot rolls its writes back (moon#1299) R1 review, pre-existing MAJOR. After `KILL SNAPSHOT` (or the old_snapshot_threshold sweep), `TXN.COMMIT` answered `MOONERR snapshot too old` — a failed commit — but the transaction's writes stayed applied: the killed arm retired the transaction (`abort_killed`) and, since WS36, released its intents and holds, but never restored the pre-images. A client told "not committed" found its writes committed. The killed arm now rolls back exactly like the dirty-commit arm above it: `abort_logged(.., AbortCause::KilledCommit)` — `abort_local` restores every plane, retires the transaction in the manager (`txn_manager.abort`, which removes a killed entry as `abort_killed` did), releases its intents and key holds, and logs the compensation (AOF + replication on monoio). The reply is unchanged. A local change on the killed path of both runtimes' txn.rs; a disconnect of a killed transaction already rolled it back this way. Test: `killed_snapshot_commit_rolls_the_transaction_back` — overwrite and a created key are both rolled back after the refused commit, INFO txn_open:0 txn_held_keys:0, the key writable. Red on f766fc2 on both runtimes (GET k read `txn`). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(wal): a foreign workspace record can land ahead of the owner's overflow (moon#1302) R1 review NIT (WS41). The wal_append module doc claimed a foreign record "cannot jump the owner's overflow" because it can only enter the channel once the owner's drain freed a slot. But `drain_into` frees a slot with every record its channel loop pops, so a foreign-thread `WS CREATE` / `WS DROP` sent while that loop runs enters the channel and is appended in the same loop — ahead of the overflowed records the owner produced earlier. Doc-only: the FIFO bullet and `drain_into` now scope the order guarantee to the owner thread's records and describe the one exception (a workspace record ahead of shard 0's overflowed graph/MQ/temporal records; no replay consequence found). No behaviour change: a len-snapshot in `drain_into` (pop only the pre-drain channel records, then the overflow, then the rest) would close it, but it cannot be tested deterministically and the reviewer found no harm, so it is left as a follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * chore(transaction): drop redundant too_many_arguments allows (moon#1299) The lint is allowed crate-wide in src/lib.rs; the three attributes added with the exit wrappers and txn_abort::try_handle_reset were redundant (CLAUDE.md: no new allows without justification). No code change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(add): R1 fix-a SUMMARY (moon#1299, moon#1302) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(tiered): defer the automatic held-file snapshot while a TXN is open (moon#1289) R1 review finding 1 (MAJOR, WS39 x WS36 seam). Without an AOF, WS39's held-file trigger (`held_release_tick::after_sweep` -> `snapshot_request::request`) started a snapshot about 3 s into any cold churn, whether or not a transaction was open. A snapshot taken mid-TXN keeps the TXN's uncommitted writes (moon#1300 F3, WS42), so an aborted TXN came back after kill -9: `k=aborted new=inserted` where the pre-transaction state is `k=original new=nil`. Until WS42 makes snapshots TXN-safe, an AUTOMATIC snapshot reason (`SnapshotReason::waits_for_open_txns`, true for `HeldColdFiles`, the only reason in the enum) answers the new `SnapshotRequest::TxnOpen` while any shard has a TXN open, BEFORE touching the gate: the spacing slot is not consumed, the database stays stale, and the next orphan sweep asks again. BGSAVE, SAVE and save rules are unchanged (WS42's). The signal is the process-wide published view behind `INFO txn_open` (`transaction::isolation::info`), never another shard's thread-local; no new atomic state machine (a plain per-reason statistics counter was added, so no loom model). New INFO field `cold_held_release_snapshots_deferred_txn`. Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar): - tests/held_release_txn_open_1289.rs, 3 tests (abort + kill -9 at s1 and s4 - the TXN's shard differs from the held files' shards - and "the deferred snapshot runs once the TXN ends"). - f766fc2 monoio and tokio: 3/3 fail (restart answers k=aborted new=inserted; 1 snapshot requested during the TXN). - fix, both runtimes: 3/3 pass. - unit: snapshot_request::tests::an_open_txn_defers_an_automatic_snapshot_without_consuming_the_slot. Known limits: a TXN that begins between the check and the shards starting their part of the snapshot can still be captured (WS42 closes it); a workload that always has a TXN open defers the release indefinitely (visible in the new INFO counter; no timeout, per the maintainer's decision). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): do not count expired_keys again while replaying the AOF (moon#1286) R1 review finding 2 (MAJOR for the feature). The AOF holds every reap the live server made - the active cycle's reason DELs, a client's DEL of an expired key, a write over one - and each was counted once, live. Replaying them counted them again, so every restart started `expired_keys` at the number of reaps logged since the last rewrite. redis counts nothing while it loads (`keyIsExpired` returns 0 when `server.loading`). `persistence::replay::scope::ReplayScope` (thread-local depth, like the replica's `MasterStreamScope`) is entered by `DispatchReplayEngine::replay_command`, the single funnel of every RESP log replay (AOF, manifest shards, WAL v3). `metrics_setup::counts_expiry()` - not replaying and not applying a master stream - now gates `record_expired_keys` itself, so every call site (hot drain, active cycle, DEL/UNLINK, write-over-expired, cold sweep, cold on-read reclaim) is covered. Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar): - tests/expired_keys_parity_1286.rs `aof_replay_does_not_recount_*`, s1 and s4: 50 active-expired + 500 HSET-over-expired + 500 DEL-of-expired, then a graceful and a kill -9 restart. redis 7.2.7: 1050 before, 0 after both. - f766fc2 monoio: (1050, 1050) at s1 and s4. fix, both runtimes: (0, 0). - unit: replay::scope::tests::a_replayed_reap_is_not_counted_in_expired_keys (red with the gate removed: counted 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): count a write over an expired key in expired_keys (moon#1286) R1 review finding 3. redis's `lookupKeyWrite` -> `expireIfNeeded` reaps and counts an expired key before the write. Moon counted only the `get_or_create*` paths (HSET, LPUSH, ...); every write that lands through `Database::set` over an expired entry replaced it silently, and a read that hid the key for the lazy drain (GET/EXISTS then SET) left nothing for the drain to count, because the drain re-verifies and skips the fresh value. `Database::set_recording` now counts in its hit arm when the entry it overwrites is expired (`old_ttl != 0 && now_ms >= old_ttl`): one compare on the write path, no allocation, and the counter skips a replay and a replica's master stream (`counts_expiry`). Counting at the overwrite, not at hide time, is what keeps the drain from double counting. All three dispatch paths reach it (the monoio inline SET writes through `Database::set`). Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar), 1000 keys `SET PX 30`, overwritten 32 ms later, delta of expired_keys per case: - redis 7.2.7: 1000 in all 37 cases of the oracle matrix. - f766fc2 monoio: SET, SETNX, SET NX, GETSET, APPEND, INCRBYFLOAT, SETBIT, PFADD, MSET, COPY/RENAME dst, GET->SET, EXISTS->SET, SETRANGE, SET GET, SETEX, MSETNX, INCRBY, DECR, SUNIONSTORE/BITOP dst: 0 (or a timing- dependent part, e.g. INCR 79 at s1, 0 at s4). - fix, monoio s1 and s4: 1000 in all 37 cases (SET KEEPTTL 1000; SET PXAT past 2000 = redis 2000). - tests/expired_keys_parity_1286.rs `a_write_over_an_expired_key_counts_it_*` (22 cases + 5 controls): f766fc2 monoio and tokio fail all 22 at s1 and s4; fix, both runtimes: 1000 each. - unit: expiration::expired_keys_tests (the old "rewritten before the drain is not counted" expectation was the bug; now counted once by the write). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): delete at once on an absolute expiry already in the past (moon#1286) R1 review finding 4, and finding 9's two NITs. redis's `checkAlreadyExpired`: a deadline at or before now deletes the key immediately - a deletion, so it publishes `del` and does not move `expired_keys`. Moon stored the past deadline and let expiry reap it (1 counted, `expired` published) for EXPIREAT / PEXPIREAT in the past, GETEX EXAT/PXAT in the past and RESTORE ... ABSTTL in the past; its EXPIRE k -1 / EXPIREAT k 0 deletes published nothing; and GETEX k EX -1 answered "value is not an integer or out of range" where redis says "invalid expire time in 'getex' command". - `command::key::delete_already_expired`: shared by the four past-deadline arms of EXPIRE/PEXPIRE/EXPIREAT/PEXPIREAT (the existing <= 0 arms and the new "positive but already past" arm, after the NX/XX/GT/LT gate). Publishes `del`. A key whose own TTL already passed does not exist for the command (answers 0, handed to the lazy drain, counted once), as redis's `lookupKeyWrite` treats it. - GETEX: redis's `getExpireMillisecondsOrReply` replies; EXAT/PXAT in the past deletes, publishes `del`, still answers the value. - RESTORE: an ABSTTL in the past writes nothing; with REPLACE the old key is deleted and `del` published; +OK either way. - "past" is judged on the database clock, which a replay pins to the log's time (moon#1277), so a replayed deadline is judged as it was live. Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar): - tests/expired_keys_parity_1286.rs `a_past_absolute_deadline_*` (19 cases, reply bytes + EXISTS + keyevents + expired delta vs redis 7.2.7), s1 and s4: f766fc2 monoio 17 of 19 wrong; fix, both runtimes: all match. - Oracle diff (f4.py, 40 cases): the only remaining differences are the pre-existing missing `expire` / `restore` keyspace events on a FUTURE deadline (moon publishes neither for any EXPIRE*/RESTORE; out of scope). - The overwrite matrix gains "EXPIREAT past" over an already-expired key (redis: answers 0 and counts the reap, 1000/1000; fix matches) and PERSIST / MOVE controls. - unit: command::key::expire_past_tests (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): CONFIG RESETSTAT resets expired_keys (moon#1286) R1 review finding 5. `config_resetstat` was a placeholder that reset nothing; redis's `resetServerStats` zeroes `stat_expiredkeys`. Rule used: reset what redis's `resetServerStats` resets among the counters wave 2a touched (`expired_keys`), plus the moon-only STATISTICS those workstreams added - monotonic event counts: `txn_conflicts_refused` (WS36), `cold_held_release_folds_requested`, `cold_held_release_snapshots_requested` (WS39) and `cold_held_release_snapshots_deferred_txn` (this wave). Gauges of live state (`txn_open`, `txn_oldest_age_ms`, `txn_held_keys`, `cold_held_files_stale_databases`) and the snapshot gate's spacing slot are never reset. The other redis stats (`keyspace_hits`, `evicted_keys`, `total_commands_processed`, ...) are still not reset (pre-existing). Cross-ownership: `transaction::isolation::reset_stats` (4 lines, WS36). Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar): - tests/expired_keys_parity_1286.rs `config_resetstat_zeroes_expired_keys`: f766fc2 monoio 50 after RESETSTAT (redis 7.2.7: 0); fix, both runtimes: 0, and txn_conflicts_refused 1 -> 0. - unit: config::tests::resetstat_zeroes_expired_keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * docs(tiered): the held-file snapshot runs even with save "" (moon#1289) R1 review finding 6 (docs; behaviour kept - maintainer decision moon#1289 Q2: a rate-limited snapshot without an AOF). - `storage::tiered::snapshot_hold` module docs no longer say that without save points only a manual BGSAVE or SHUTDOWN SAVE releases held files. - docs/guides/persistence.md, "Automatic snapshots with disk offload": a no-AOF server with disk offload writes an automatic snapshot (overwriting the dump file, moving LASTSAVE) to release held cold files, even with `save ""`; it waits while a TXN is open; the INFO fields to watch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(acl): record a grant under +@all so ACL SAVE/LOAD is stable (moon#1296) R1 review finding 7. `ACL SETUSER u on nopass +@all -get +get -set` rendered `+@all +get -set` (WS38's application-order rendering), but on ACL LOAD the `+get` landed on a still all-allowed user and `allow_command`'s `AllAllowed => {}` arm dropped it, so it reloaded as `+@all -set`: the same permissions, but config-management tools saw a diff after every reload. redis 7.2.7 renders `+@all +get -set` and keeps it across reloads. A bare or `cmd|sub` grant under `+@all` now transitions to `Specific { base_allow: true }` with the grant recorded (a category grant there stays a no-op: moon expands category tokens, moon#1306). Permissions are unchanged, and the `unrestricted` fast-path cache treats `+@all` followed only by grants as `+@all` (`CommandRules::all_allow`), so such a user keeps the inline path. This also fixes WS38's known `+@all +get` difference. Evidence (Linux container, not the merge bar): - tests/acl_rule_order_1296.rs `grants_under_all_survive_save_and_load_*` (11 cases, GETUSER / LIST / saved line / GETUSER after two SAVE+LOAD rounds, byte-equal to redis 7.2.7), s1 and s4: f766fc2 monoio fails (`+@all -set` after reload); fix, both runtimes: pass. The 14 existing cases still pass (now with a second SAVE/LOAD round). - Oracle diff (aclrt.py, 16 cases): only the two category-token cases (moon#1306) differ, and they are now stable across reloads too. - unit: command_rules::tests::grants_under_all_* (2 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(tiered): count a held-release fold only once it is dispatched (moon#1289) R1 review finding 10 (NIT). The auto-rewrite monitor set `last_held_release` and called `note_fold_requested()` before `bgrewriteaof_start_sharded`, so a failed dispatch was counted in `cold_held_release_folds_requested` and pushed the next held-release fold a whole spacing (10 sweep intervals) away instead of the 60 s dispatch cooldown. Both now happen only after a successful dispatch (`note_held_release_fold`). Evidence: unit `auto_rewrite::tests::only_a_dispatched_held_release_fold_counts_and_arms_the_spacing`. The old code had no seam for a failing dispatch (the monitor loop is not unit-testable and a real BGREWRITEAOF dispatch failure cannot be forced from outside), so the red proof is structural: the helper encodes the ordering the old code lacked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu * fix(info): count cold expired entries befor…
Summary
This PR applies the fixes from the fourth adversarial review round of PR #1301. #1301 had already merged by the time the round finished.
c55924b).--dir /mnt/x/moon/datawith two missing levels failed to boot with EINVAL.ErrorKind::Unsupported. Each call logs one warning. EACCES is tolerated only on a pre-existing ancestor, and EIO stays fatal.resolve_dir: a user-data directory that exists but could not be made durable is now kept, instead of silently falling back to..FLUSHDB/FLUSHALLinside a TXN (pre-existing data loss).TXN ABORTanswered+OKwith the data gone.ERR TXN cannot roll back this command (whole-database write) -- run it outside the TXN. The refusal also poisons the TXN, so COMMIT answers EXECABORT. The script path already refused them; both paths now share one list (transaction::TXN_WHOLE_DB_WRITES).Checklist
All of these ran on head
267b518in a Linux container (4 vCPU x86_64), not the merge bar:cargo fmt --checkpasses.cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warningspasses on monoio and onruntime-tokio,jemalloc.cargo check --manifest-path fuzz/Cargo.toml --all-targetspasses.cargo test --all-features: not run (gpu-cudacan't run here). What ran instead:cargo test --release --libpassed on both runtimes.--include-ignoredandMOON_BINpinned to a release binary of each runtime. 56 are green, includingtxn_abort_durability_1285at 25/25 on each runtime.script_move_copy_db_replica_agrees_{1,4}_shard_master,script_effects_in_exec_reach_the_replica_in_order). Tokio has no master-side PSYNC, and they fail the same way on base.Red → green:
connection_writes_the_txn_cannot_undo_are_refused_shards_{1,4}fails on the Wave 1 (2026-09 round): durable TXN.ABORT, no-AOF tiering and graves residuals, eviction/expiry/SSCAN performance #1301 head binaries and passes here, on both runtimes and after kill -9.dir_fsync_error_classification,create_dir_all_durable_skips_unsupported_dir_fsync_on_created_dirs,create_dir_all_durable_keeps_eio_and_created_dir_eacces_fatalandtest_user_data_dir_choice. The previous code's own test asserted that EINVAL on a created directory was fatal.Not run: the moon-dev VM and macOS, where the errno values for ENOTSUP and EOPNOTSUPP differ from Linux and are untested; Windows;
crash-matrix.yml.Performance Impact
None.
Notes
Behaviour change: inside a TXN,
FLUSHDB/FLUSHALL(plain, ASYNC or SYNC) now answer an error and poison the TXN.Residuals, tracked in moon#1299 / moon#1303:
SET … NX, COPY without REPLACE, RENAMENX, LPUSHX on a missing key, SMOVE of a missing member) keep their capture;GEORADIUSBYMEMBER g STORE 100 kmandXGROUP HELP <x>capture a key they never write.Blocking other writers on keys held by an open TXN (moon#1299) makes all of these harmless.
SWAPDB, MOVE and
COPY … DBinside a TXN still answer the olderERR_TXN_CROSS_SHARDtext. That text predates this PR and is unchanged here.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01D81NZwUjEnWCaZekSCB3Uu
Generated by Claude Code
Summary by CodeRabbit
FLUSHDBandFLUSHALLissued on a connection during an open transaction are now refused before execution. The transaction is marked for abort, soCOMMITreturns an error and accepted changes are rolled back.