Scrub header-protection key material on drop - #23
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ChaChaHeaderProtectionKey held its raw 32-byte key as a plain array that survived its drop; the AES twin's expanded schedule and the transient per-mask chacha20 cipher states likewise dropped unscrubbed. The ChaCha key now rides zeroize::Zeroizing, and the aes and chacha20 dependencies enable their zeroize features, so the schedule and cipher states scrub themselves. zeroize was already in the lock.
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`ChaChaHeaderProtectionKey` stored its raw 32-byte key as a plain `[u8; 32]` with no zeroization on drop; the AES header-protection key's expanded schedule (`aes::Aes128`) and the transient `chacha20` cipher states built per mask call dropped unscrubbed too. The ChaCha key now rides `zeroize::Zeroizing`, and the `aes`/`chacha20` dependencies enable their `zeroize` features — matching the webcrypto core's practice for key schedules. `zeroize` was already in the lock; the workspace gains the direct edge.
Verified locally: quinn lib tests (Appendix A vectors + the masking guard test), fmt, clippy all-features.
Fixes #22