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Security: steph4n-gh/hackrf-edge

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported material

Material Security status
Public documentation, specifications, reference layouts, and validation tools on main Reviewed and maintained
v0.1.0-alpha.1 release assets and exact source pins Public experimental prerelease; narrow hardware scope
prxq0016 qualified firmware seal Private, experimental, and not publicly supported or distributed
Historical engineering candidates Unsupported

Only assets named by an authorized release manifest are public HackRF Edge firmware. A GitHub tag, qualification record, checksum, or protocol document is not by itself an authorization to install another image.

Report a vulnerability privately

Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting for this repository:

https://github.com/steph4n-gh/hackrf-edge/security/advisories/new

Do not open a public issue containing an exploit, device identifier, capture, credential, private artifact, or destructive reproduction procedure.

Include:

  • the affected repository, commit, candidate, and artifact checksum;
  • the affected hardware revision;
  • whether the path is USB, SD, CDC control, malformed PRX, firmware update, host parsing, or RF input;
  • the smallest safe reproducer;
  • observed versus expected fail-closed behavior; and
  • recovery and persistence impact.

If GitHub private reporting is unavailable, contact the repository owner through their GitHub profile with only a request for a private channel.

Response

Maintainers will acknowledge a report, assess reachability and impact, coordinate a fix or mitigation, and agree on disclosure timing with the reporter. Timelines depend on hardware access and recovery risk; the project will not rush a firmware write solely to meet a nominal deadline.

Security boundary

HackRF Edge reports acquisition continuity and integrity conditions. It does not provide cryptographic proof of RF-signal origin.

  • PRX CRCs detect accidental corruption; they do not authenticate a capture.
  • PRX2 does not cryptographically bind same-length IQ content.
  • Device-relative ticks are not trusted UTC.
  • The firmware does not create secure boot.
  • Physical access can replace firmware, SD content, or retained captures.

Hash IQ and sidecar files independently and protect evidence outside the device when adversarial modification matters.

There aren't any published security advisories